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This dissertation describes how it came about that the British government, 
civil service and military were prepared badly for the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. Its new analysis of this often-discussed period centres on the plans 
prepared in 2002 by the various government departments involved; those 
plans were not suitable for the policy that the British government 
eventually pursued in the beginning of 2003. This mismatch occurred 
because although Britain’s post-9/11 Iraq policy was understood across 
Whitehall and Downing Street, its limits were not. Specifically, there was 
no clarity on the circumstances under which a policy should be abandoned, 
and if so, for what alternative. The assumptions made about those 
elements varied across actors. This resulted in internally contradictory 
British plans, unsuitable for the invasion as it happened. A relatively simple 
mechanism that can limit, though not eliminate, these problems in future 
policy-making is the so-called ‘preferred alternative to the pursued policy’, 
derived from the ‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’ (BATNA). 
BATNAs are a well-known concept in negotiation practice and doctrine; I 
argue that similarly, ‘preferred alternatives’ can and should be used in a 
policy-making context for keeping policy and policy plans aligned and 
coherent across members of government and their civil service 
departments. The original contribution to knowledge is both a new 
interpretation of the reasons for Britain’s difficulties in Iraq, and a new 
argument about how to improve policy-making through a new application 
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Introduction: Between Dream and Deed 
1. BETWEEN DREAM AND DEED  
‘Between dream and deed / the law still stands / and practicalities’. This is how Willem 
Elsschot, one of the greatest writers in the Dutch-speaking world, described an old man’s 
unfulfilled desire to kill his wife.1 This dissertation is not about poetry, nor is it about 
marriage; but it is about the wide gap between dreams and deeds because of practicalities, 
including the law. Specifically, this dissertation describes Britain’s failure to prepare well for 
its own invasion of Iraq, in particular the post-invasion phase. This failure is well-known but 
nonetheless remarkable, because Tony Blair’s government committed itself to (a) a politically 
dangerous invasion (b) out of choice. This voluntary choice for a risky policy meant that Tony 
Blair and his government had every incentive to get this invasion right. Yet while the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime succeeded, the British and Americans alike were 
criticised for a severe lack of post-war planning. How did this lack of good planning come 
about? In other words, how can this gap between incentives and results – between dream 
and deed – be explained? 
To answer that question, this dissertation describes Whitehall’s planning failure. It traces the 
planning done by Whitehall departments and its relation to the political decision-making 
process. More specifically, it shows how a widespread lack of clarity about the (political) 
policy choices reverberated through the civil service, impeding its capacity to prepare 
relevant policies. The empirical chapters demonstrate that the different departments 
involved in the planning had a different understanding of the policy they were pursuing. They 
also had different understandings of their respective roles. Those departments – the Ministry 
of Defence, the Foreign Office, the Department for International Development, and the 
Cabinet Office – had different assumptions on which they based their plans. These 
assumptions were often not applicable to the policy and events as they eventually played out; 
many also were mutually contradictory. The plans resulting from those differing assumptions 
were equally incoherent, underdeveloped, and unsuited for the invasion as it happened. 
Secondly, this dissertation puts forward an argument about how these differing and 
unsuitable assumptions came about and led to mispreparation. That argument focuses on the 
role of ‘preferred alternatives to the pursued policy’ and ‘minimal requirements’ – concepts 
loosely based on insights from the Harvard Negotiation Project – in developing a coherent 
                                                             
1 Willem Elsschot, Verzameld Werk (Amsterdam: Querido, 1976). 
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policy position. The argument is quite simply that policy-makers should determine not only 
their policy goal and strategy when making policy, but also give thought to - and achieve a 
measure of agreement on – their preferred alternative if the original policy were to fail, and 
to the conditions they wish to attach to the original policy. A good understanding of one’s 
preferred alternative and minimal requirements can be as important in policy-making as a 
good understanding of one’s goal and strategy; but the importance of the former two 
concepts – and how they can help improve policy – is much less well understood. This 
dissertation will demonstrate how and why they matter. It does so for the case of the British 
2003 war in Iraq. 
The lack of a well-defined preferred alternative constitutes a suboptimal way of making 
policy, which in turn has the propensity to bring about suboptimal policy outcomes. This 
argument amounts to a prudential guideline, applicable to all foreign policy-making in 
uncertain circumstances.2 It is not tied to any conditions particular to the case of British Iraq 
policy. How and how far this propensity manifests itself is a matter of contingency; in the Iraq 
case, it manifested itself very explicitly, which makes this case a good type study of this 
prudential guideline: it should just how important it potentially is to clearly define one’s 
preferred alternative. In the 2001-2003 preparation for the invasion of Iraq, as will be 
shown, the failure to follow this guideline was the root cause of a litany of policy planning 
problems Britain encountered, and of the weakness and unsuitability of the resulting plans. 
This introductory chapter has four goals and four corresponding sections. The first is to 
introduce the research question. What exactly is curious about London’s lack of preparation? 
What is to be explained in this dissertation, and how is the task taken on here different from 
the wider literature that precedes it? The second section introduces the arguments. It gives 
an outline of the types of mistakes that were made as Britain decided on and prepared for 
war. It also presents the central thesis and explains the concepts of the ‘preferred alternative’ 
and ‘minimal requirements’ in more detail. Thirdly, the introduction identifies the 
argumentative burdens required by the thesis: what questions must this dissertation address 
to warrant the central claims set out in the second section? What falls within the scope of this 
dissertation and what is explicitly not covered? The fourth section, finally, gives the chapter 
outline and details how the six chapters relate to those argumentative burdens and the thesis 
as a whole. 
2. THE CURIOUS FAILURE TO BE PREPARED  
                                                             
2 I would like to specifically thank Hidemi Suganami for helping me clarify this line of thought. 
13 
 
In December 2015, British parliament voted on intervention in Syria to fight Islamic State.3 In 
many ways, it was a debate shaped by the intervention of Iraq more than 12 years before - 
not only because the Iraq war continues to shape British political debate, but also because 
the Sunni jihadist group was created in 2006 post-invasion Iraq.4 The 2003 invasion remains 
contentious for at least four distinct reasons. The first is the fact that the government went to 
war at all: the invasion itself - its reasons, its wisdom, its feasibility - was contested. The 
second is the widespread impression that the British public was misled, and popular opinion 
ignored.5 Thirdly, the military campaign itself has sparked big debates, over British 
counterinsurgency capacity, over the readiness of the Defence Forces, over British grand 
strategy.6 The current problems in and around the Iraqi territory only magnify the 
importance of these debates. The importance and limits of the ‘special relationship’ with the 
United States remain another area of debate.7 
One of the controversies surrounding the invasion concerns how badly prepared London 
(like Washington) seemed for the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s fall. Military victory was 
swift, but afterwards the security situation deteriorated, the political process proved difficult 
to say the least, and the coalition’s engagement in Iraq was longer than either capital would 
have envisaged when their troops undertook the race to Baghdad. Events in the last decade 
have led to the now-common understanding that top-down democratization of a foreign 
country is a risky and expensive undertaking. It is easy to argue that the expectations set for 
Iraq were exceedingly high and optimistic. Yet at the same time, the United States and its 
junior partner have faced severe criticism for their lack of preparedness for their own 
undertaking. In other words, the problem with the Iraq war was not just that the Western 
coalition set out to fulfil a highly ambitious, massive goal; it is also that they seemed severely 
underplanned, understaffed and underfunded to do so. As testified by government officials, 
journalists, and academics alike, plans for the immediate post-warfighting phase were 
lacking in almost every dimension (with the exception perhaps of humanitarian provisions).8 
                                                             
3 Andrew Sparrow and Frances Perraudin, “Cameron Wins Syria Airstrikes Vote By Majority Of 174 - 
As It Happened,” The Guardian, December 3, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-debate-vote-
cameron-action-against-isis-live. 
4 David Cameron, Hansard Parliamentary Debates: 2 December 2015, Column 339 (2015). 
5 For example by Eric Herring and Piers Robinson.  
6 For example by Warren Chin and Paul Dixon. 
7 For example by Patrick Porter and Tim Dunne. 
8 See for example:  
Frederick Viggers, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry,” December 8, 2009. 




This dissertation aims to explain how it came about that London failed to prepare properly 
for its invasion of Iraq, in particular for the phase immediately after the deposing of the old 
regime. This failure itself has been described extensively: wide-spread criminality and 
looting, unsecured arms dumps, public services that stopped working, severely damaged 
infrastructure, and a lack of troops, expertise and money to deal with the problems.9 We have 
some understandings of its causes. The preparation was severely flawed. It was characterized 
by a lack of troops, lack of civilian experts, lack of money, lack of time.10 The invading troops 
emphatically did not hit the ground running. They failed to ensure security and quick 
improvements of daily life in the very beginning of the post-invasion phase.11 Quickly, events 
began spiralling out of control. Shortly afterwards, Sunni discontent began to transform into 
an insurgency. The British and American war effort over time morphed into full-blown 
counterinsurgency operations.12 
Yet if this lack of preparedness is well-known, it also remains curious. Just as it is generally 
recognised that Britain was not prepared for Phase IV of the war – the post-invasion phase – 
it is also recognised that the Iraq war was a war of choice. Even those who advocated the war 
have acknowledged that 9/11 changed their assessment of the risk posed by Iraq, and their 
window of opportunity to deal with Saddam Hussein, but that nothing had changed in 
Baghdad per se.13 In other words, the coalition has substantial leeway in going to war at a 
moment of its choosing. The timeline was not driven by the Iraqis. 
In addition, the war was a major political gamble for Blair. He had staked his premiership on 
the invasion. He ignored one of the biggest mass protests in history to do what he believed to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Tim Cross, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 7 December 2009,” 2009. 
Clare Short, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 2 February 2010,” 2010. 
David Mitchell and Tansa George Massoud, “Anatomy of Failure: Bush’s Decision-Making Process and 
the Iraq War,” Foreign Policy Analysis 5, no. 3 (2009): 265–85. 
9 Nicholas E. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 
2005), 143-144. 
Dominick Chilcott, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009,” 2009. 
Suma Chakrabarti, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009,” 2009. 
Cross, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 7 December 2009.” 
Desmond Bowen, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 7 December 2009,” 2009. 
Mike Rossiter, Target Basra. The High-Octane Story of the Royal Marine Commandos in Iraq (London: 
Bantam, 2008), 263-264. 
Andrew Alderson, Bankrolling Basra (London: Robinson, 2007), 15-16, 18-22, 26-38. 
10 Cross, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 7 December 2009.” 
11 Viggers, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry”, 1-7. 
12 Warren Chin, “Why Did It All Go Wrong? Reassessing British Counterinsurgency In Iraq,” Strategic 
Sudies Quarterly 2, no. 4 (2008): 119–35. 
13 Tony Blair, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 29 January 2010,” 2010, 10, 72-73. 
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be right.14 He was not a poodle of Bush, as may have been suggested in the first reading of 
history.15 On the contrary, Bush and his administration repeatedly offered Blair a way out of 
his commitment.16 Nonetheless, the Prime Minister was committed to the war even as 
Cabinet was unhappy, Parliament was close to revolt, and everyone was doubtful about the 
legality of the war.17 He offered the biggest contribution that Britain was capable of, because 
if the war was worth doing, it was worth doing well.18 So why was it not done well? 
The failure was not a matter of unforeseen problems. Of course, some problems were less 
severe than foreseen (notably the humanitarian problems) and others were more severe (the 
amount of looting) but concerns about the quality of the planning and the plans were raised 
time and again before the invasion. When confronted with the post-war difficulties, several 
witnesses to the Iraq Inquiry have argued that war is complicated. It is, even with the best 
laid plans. One cannot expect perfection or even anything close to it. Plans change and might 
prove irrelevant; however, they should at least be developed and internally consistent. 
In the case of the invasion of Iraq, as shown in the following chapters, they were not. 
How did this come about? 
This mismatch between ambitions and plans has been addressed – implicitly or explicitly – in 
existing Iraq writings and debates in various ways. However, apart from High Command, that 
focuses on the Ministry of Defence, little work has focused on examining how the plans were 
actually made (and that work analysed Iraq policy at the level of one department, not across 
departments).19 This means that our understanding of the planning failure remains limited. 
Those works that explain the failure of the invasion are important but not quite relevant to 
the question discussed in this dissertation: the success of the invasion and the quality of the 
preparation are plausibly related, but nonetheless distinct issues. To say that any invasion of 
Iraq would have failed regardless of how good the planning was, for example, does not 
address whether, how and why the plans were bad. The question about the post-war plans in 
specific thus remains. Several works have specifically address the failure of the post-war 
                                                             
14 Rajeev Syalm, Andrew Alderson, and Catherine Milner, “One Million March Against War,” The 
Telegraph, February 16, 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1422228/One-million-
march-against-war.html. 
15 Samuel Azubuike, “The ‘Poodle Theory’ and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship,’” 
International Studies 42, no. 2 (2005): 123–39. 
16 Blair, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 29 January 2010”, 129. 
Chilcott, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 26. 
17 Jack Straw, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 2 February 2011,” 2011, 104. 
18 Kevin Tebbit and Michael Boyce, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 December 2009,” 2009, 40. 
Kevin Tebbit, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 February 2010,” 2010, 39-40. 
19 Christopher L. Elliott, High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan Wars (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2015). 
16 
 
plans, describing the post-war chaos and the lack of plans.20 However, by not focusing on the 
origins of these plans, they do not address the precise nature nor roots of the planning 
failure; this dissertation aims to do so. 
Two common assumptions nonetheless underlie many interpretations of the planning 
failure: the plans were bad because they were rushed, or/and the plans were bad because of 
the way in which Tony Blair made and imposed decisions. These interpretations are not 
wrong, as this dissertation confirms. Nor, however, are they particularly informative. 
Attributing the war to the Prime Minister, for example, fails to address that the plans were 
not drawn up by him; nor could he single-handedly decide on war. Causal chains remain 
under-analysed. This limits our understanding of the war itself and the lessons we can learn. 
The idea of the plans being underdeveloped because of lack of time is similarly 
unsatisfactory, for several reasons. It does not explain why the British were ready for one 
part of the war (the fighting) but not the other (the phase immediately after the fighting). It 
fails to engage with the observation that the British government had every incentive to do 
this invasion well, and that there were clear warnings beforehand that the civil service was 
not ready. A closer look at the preparation moreover reveals that the British were not merely 
underprepared; they were also misprepared. More analysis is thus warranted. 
3. UNJUSTIFIED ASSUMPTIONS DETERMINE INCOHERENT PLANS  
Britain was curiously unprepared for the invasion of Iraq, in particular the phase 
immediately after Baghdad was toppled. How did this come about? This dissertation’s thesis 
is that London failed to prepare well for the post-warfighting phase of the invasion of 
Iraq because it failed to have a clear policy position. More specifically, there was no 
common understanding across the government on the minimal requirements of the 
pursued policy nor on the preferred alternative if this first policy was to fail. This lack 
of clarity meant that the departments and people involved prepared on the basis of 
mutually incompatible, unsuitable assumptions. This in turn led to plans that were 
internally contradictory and unsuited for the invasion as eventually pursued by the 
British government. In other words, the lack of agreed-upon preferred alternative and 
                                                             
20 For example: 
Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond. 
Rossiter, Target Basra. The High-Octane Story of the Royal Marine Commandos in Iraq. 
Alderson, Bankrolling Basra.  
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minimal requirements was the root cause for the problems in the policy-making process and 
the plans that resulted from it.21 
In the beginning of the 2000s, British Iraq policy was stable and had been roughly the same 
since the 1991 Gulf War. The United Kingdom was concerned with containing Saddam 
Hussein, who ruled his country with an iron fist, persecuted various ethnic groups and had 
waged war on both Kuwait and Iran. The primary goal of containment was to prevent the 
regime in Baghdad from developing weapons of mass destruction. However, the sanctions 
proved less tight than hoped, but still caused mass suffering amongst the Iraqi population. 
For this reason, the British government had started revising its Iraq policy. In addition, the 
government was led by Tony Blair. He had gained experience in interventionist foreign 
policies by previous military interventions, notably in Iraq (1997) and Kosovo (1999), Sierra 
Leone and East Timor (2000). He also maintained a firm commitment to the ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States and only qualified support for the United Nations, which 
he believed sometimes failed to fulfil its ethical duties of intervention.  
Then 9/11 occurred and was a catalyst for foreign policy change in the United States. 
Afghanistan was invaded – with the support of the Security Council and the military 
involvement of the United Kingdom – and not much later, the Bush administration turned its 
attention to Baghdad. The Americans’ apparent commitment to decisively dealing with 
Saddam Hussein – a policy that would amount to the active pursuit of regime change, which 
had been its stated long-term aim since Clinton (albeit not, at that time, through military 
intervention, but rather through supporting Iraqi opposition groups) – faced London with a 
choice regarding its own policy. Containment was replaced by the goal of disarmament, via 
the usual route of the Security Council. This amounted to a dual commitment to, on the one 
hand, disarming Baghdad (and to support the Americans in their regime change plans to 
achieve this disarmament) and, on the other hand, pursuing the United Nations route. 
For the Prime Minister, the primary commitment – and the ethical obligation – was to deal 
with Baghdad and stand by the United States. For the Foreign Office, the primary 
commitment was to the Security Council route, which in any case was the only way in which 
an invasion could be legal. The issue of what would happen if these two goals proved 
incompatible remained unresolved until immediately before the invasion. In other words, 
                                                             
21 Throughout this dissertation, I will be referring to the ‘preferred alternative’ used by various 
government departments in their policy-making. In using this terminology, I do not mean to convey 
that these were their own preferences; rather, these are the preferred alternatives that they presumed 
were held by the decision-makers.  
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while there was a clear strategy – compelling Saddam Hussein to disarm via the Security 
Council – there was no defined preferred alternative if a negotiated agreement through the 
Security Council were to fail. Similarly, London’s conditions or minimal requirements for 
pursuing this goal and strategy were unclear, both in London and to those diplomats who 
were pursuing them.22 At various moments in time London put various conditions on any 
participation in an invasion, but it usually remained unclear whether these ‘conditions’ 
constituted actual firm conditions sine qua non or something closer to wish lists. London had 
no clear conception of the circumstances under which the primary policy ought to be 
abandoned, and what it ought to be abandoned for in that case. 
The idea of the preferred alternative used in this dissertation is loosely based on that of the 
‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’ (or BATNA) developed by the Harvard 
Negotiation Project. It functions as a similar tool in a different context, with similar benefits. 
In the original argument, Fisher and Ury (1981) argued that negotiators should have an idea 
of their best alternative to a negotiated agreement. Only by comparing the offer on the table 
with the best alternative reached without negotiation would actors know whether it was in 
their interest to accept a deal on the table. Moreover, such a BATNA, they argued, not only 
helps you evaluate your options more transparently. It also helps you while you are still 
pursuing the negotiation itself (rather than the alternative).23 It moreover impacts several 
psychological mechanisms and prevents undue optimism, or, more commonly, pessimism 
about alternatives. Furthermore, if an alternative is not explicitly developed, it often quickly 
becomes unavailable. This is another reason BATNAs are worth developing while still 
pursuing a negotiated agreement. 
In this dissertation, I argue that policy-makers should think about their preferred alternative 
to the policy they are pursuing much like negotiators ought to think about BATNAs. I am not 
arguing that it is possible to ascertain with certainty what the objectively best alternative 
would be in any given situation. Rather, one of the reasons that the preferred alternative 
needs to be explicitly defined is precisely because reasonable people would be able to 
disagree on the plan-B that should be favoured. Yet having thought about, and reaching 
explicit agreement on, a preferred alternative even before that alternative will actually be 
needed, has benefits. To the extent that the pursuit of foreign policy goals usually entails an 
element of negotiation (in the case of Britain and Iraq, negotiations with the United States, 
Iraq, and the member states of the Security Council), all the ‘usual’ advantages of the BATNA 
                                                             
22 Christopher Meyer, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 26 November 2009,” 2009, 64. 
23 Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving 
In, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 2011), 104-107. 
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apply. The idea that alternatives that are not explicitly developed might be unavailable by the 
time they are needed, is even more true for elaborate governments plans than in individuals’ 
negotiations. 
Moreover, determining a preferred alternative forces policy-makers to think harder about 
the conditions they attach to their (first) policy. Few foreign policy goals are worth pursuing 
at all costs; most foreign policy goals will only be (deemed) worth pursuing if certain 
conditions are fulfilled. These conditions can be very varied: from progress in another foreign 
policy matter – I will agree to sign this treaty if you agree to sign another one – to compliance 
with international law, from domestic support for a particular course of action to a particular 
assessment of risk (upgrading a weapon system because a neighbour is deemed dangerous). 
These conditions can be the ideal conditions under which a government would like to pursue 
a policy; they can be essential conditions, without which the pursuit of a certain goal becomes 
either futile or not worth the price; they can be necessary conditions, without which a certain 
policy goal is not achievable for logical or practical reasons. Policy-makers must have clarity, 
at least in their own mind, about what type of condition any conditions they attach to their 
policy is. Is it optional? Essential? Truly essential? 
The answer depends at least partly on your alternatives. If your preferred alternative to your 
foreign policy goal is not a very good option, then this might change your calculus about 
which conditions are genuinely required and which are merely optional. The same is true if 
you have a good plan-B to replace the original policy with. The point at which you walk away 
from a certain option – when your conditions are not met – should, after all, depend on the 
alternative you have. The most sensible way of determining your course of action is to 
compare the options that are open to you, rather than evaluate any one option in and by itself 
without reference to what other options you have. This is also the key idea behind the 
original BATNA from Ury and Fisher. In our adapted version, it means that governments 
should consider their preferred alternative to the foreign policy they pursue to determine 
which conditions to action they consider optional, all things considered, and which are 
minimal requirements to a certain policy course, with the implication that the policy course 
will be abandoned (for the preferred alternative) if those minimal requirements fail to 
manifest themselves. 
Getting to Yes, Ury and Fisher’s book, focused on negotiations between individuals. When the 
idea of a BATNA is translated to a preferred alternative in foreign policy-making by 
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governments, there are further benefits.24 A preferred alternative not only helps with external 
negotiations: it can also help maintain clarity within the government and civil service. Indeed, 
an explicit preferred alternative and minimal requirements are an efficient way of conveying 
the rationale and limits of a policy choice. Thus, they can help mitigate some of the principal-
agent problems in governmental policy-making. Accidental policy drift is likely lessened. 
Departments and civil servants are also more likely to understand – and communicate – 
which of the practical limitations that they face in their planning are likely to be important to 
political decision-makers (namely those that affect minimal requirements). The concepts of 
‘preferred alternatives’ and ‘minimal requirements’ allow for better triage and 
communication of the most relevant information. They make it easier for everyone – 
politicians and civil servants, different government departments - to stay on the same page. 
When Whitehall prepared for the (potential) invasion of Iraq alongside the United States, 
there was no unequivocal policy position. Preferred alternatives and minimal requirements 
were not clearly defined. The Foreign Office – and most of the civil service – assumed that the 
Security Council route could and would not be abandoned. For them, the preferred 
alternative to negotiated disarmament in the Security Council was therefore further 
containment. The Prime Minister, however, assumed that Saddam Hussein must be dealt 
with. The Security Council was less important. For him, the preferred alternative to 
disarmament through the Security Council, therefore, was disarmament through military 
force by a coalition of willing states (in the hope that this would be feasible). Although Tony 
Blair was completely committed to disarmament, by February 2003, London was hopelessly 
stuck between these commitments – including all the military preparations – and the fact 
that the Security Council was fractured, Cabinet nervous and the Attorney General 
unconvinced until the last moment of the legality of the war. Washington said London could 
still withdraw, but the Prime Minister did not consider the offer. Instead, he wagered all his 
political capital on participation in the invasion – and narrowly won. Cabinet reluctantly 
agreed, and the Attorney General judged war legal after all. 
Tony Blair waged this bet despite virtually none of the conditions – the stated ‘minimal 
requirements’ without which an invasion would not be entertained as an option – set out by 
London having been fulfilled. A close look at the relevant Whitehall departments reveals that 
they were not prepared for this. Instead, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence and the 
Department for International Development had been preparing according to what they 
                                                             




believed to be the policy. They believed that the British government’s preferred alternative to 
disarmament via the Security Council was containment via the Security Council. In 
correspondence with this, they believed that war would only take place under a certain set of 
conditions: a solid war plan, the support of the United Nations institutions, clear legality and 
corresponding legitimacy, reconstruction of Iraq that would only take place with an 
additional (compulsory) Security Council resolution. These assumptions were built into their 
preparations for the invasion, both the fighting phase and the phase immediately after 
Saddam Hussein would be deposed. 
The British military assumed (amongst other things) that civilians would come in and take 
over soon after the war-fighting had finished; that other countries would shoulder large parts 
of the burden, both financially and in terms of military contributions after the regime had 
been removed; and that United Nations institutions and specialists would play a central role 
after the invasion. The Department for International Development assumed that its people 
would only work on reconstruction within a legal framework – that is, with an additional 
Security Council resolution – and only in a stable security environment. It also assumed that 
it would contribute by inserting money into the international system, counting on a leading 
role for the United Nations and the presence and support of other nations. The Foreign Office 
had similar assumptions. 
Crucially, their plans depended on those assumptions. If these assumptions proved untrue, 
the plans would become irrelevant and their execution deeply problematic. The Department 
for International Development, for example, did not merely want or expect an active role for 
both the United Nations institutions and the countries of the United Nations: it needed the 
United Nations to execute its plans. Without a leading role for the United Nations, it would 
not be able to disburse money via its institutions or related NGOs. Without major 
contributions from other nations, the British military would struggle to find enough money 
or capacity to fulfil its post-invasion role. Whitehall’s assumptions about British policy 
priorities matter. Its expectation that if disarmament with the clear support of the Security 
Council (the chosen policy goal and strategy) were to fail, the preferred alternative would be 
to stay with the Security Council and not go to war under those circumstances, was 
important. These interpretations of the preferred alternative and corresponding minimal 
requirements were interwoven with the preparations they made to enact what they thought 
to be the British policy position. 
Eventually the British government had to abandon its plan A when it became clear that the 
Security Council would not agree to disarmament in the timeframe foreseen. The alternative 
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that it chose was to pursue a war that was legal from a domestic point of view (after the last-
minute advice from the Attorney General), but that clearly failed to enjoy the support of the 
Security Council, the United Nations organization, or the member nations. Many categorically 
considered the invasion to be illegal; it had no international legitimacy. This was not the 
alternative Whitehall had expected or prepared for. It did not conform to its expectations of 
British minimal requirements either. As a result, the circumstances of war did not reflect the 
circumstances for which the plans were built. Thus, the plans were not only mutually 
contradictory but unsuited for the invasion that London eventually chose to pursue. 
4. SCOPE AND ARGUMENTATIVE BURDEN  
Metric and scope 
Like other works, this dissertation demonstrates that Britain was ill-prepared for the post-
war phase. However, unlike other works, it does not judge ill-preparedness by the situation 
on the ground (by linking it to the rise of the insurgency): the argument is not that Britain 
was incapable of handling the hand it had been dealt on the ground in Iraq. While that 
argument is certainly important, the metric used in this dissertation is different: the post-
invasion planning is evaluated by internal coherence and logic. London was ill-prepared in 
that the plans were incoherent and not relevant to the war the British chose to participate in. 
They were not only unsuited for the war that the Iraqis or circumstances forced on the 
British; they were unsuitable even for that part of the war effort that was under Britain’s 
control. 
In other words, this dissertation is not a work on military strategy. It is not about the 
interaction of warring parties. Rather, it is an examination of the British government and civil 
service’s internal workings. It seeks to explain how those institutions failed to set out and 
prepare a policy with corresponding coherent, relevant plans. The curiosity of the case lies in 
the mismatch between the goal and the tools. For that reason, the period covered in detail 
runs from 9/11 – as the proximate cause for Washington’s redirection of its Iraq policy – to 
the moment the war-fighting phase of the invasion was over. At this point, one can observe 
that the plans made by London were not suitable for the policy pursued by that capital. This 
dissertation examines (some of) the causal chains that led up to that point. It does not 
examine what followed: the relationship between the coalition’s post-war preparedness and 
the insurgency that emerged is a related but altogether different topic. 
This thesis does not contradict the generally accepted idea that within the British system, the 
Prime Minister was the primary actor pushing for war and the most important driver of 
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policy. However, it argues that ‘Blair’ – his wishes, his actions, the way the war was pushed 
through Cabinet and Parliament – is not in itself a sufficient explanation for the course of the 
invasion of Iraq. In particular, it fails to explain why the post-invasion part of the military 
intervention was under- and misprepared. This thesis examines how various departments 
prepared for war and how the assumptions that underlie their policy were both mutually 
contradictory and eventually incorrect for the invasion as it happened. This cannot be 
explained only be ‘Tony Blair’; it also must be understood as a result of the systems in which 
policy was made.  
With regard to this it is also important that the lessons that this dissertation draws from Iraq 
are valid regardless of whether Tony Blair misled his government on purpose. That is 
important because if the dissertation relied on Tony Blair having misled the government, the 
dissertation would need to spend substantially more time justifying that claim. Moreover, 
although a strong sense of betrayal has continued to surround the Iraq war – the Economist 
referred to Blair as one of the most hated men in the country – the academic argument is not 
settled, particularly on the question of whether Cabinet (as opposed to the wider public) was 
not aware of actual Iraq policy.25 Bluth argued that the assumption of deception is unfair, and 
many academics (including I) interpret the Iraq war as a matter of self-deception rather than 
deception.26 On the other hand, any dissertation on the Iraq war relying on innocence would 
have to deal with the evidence that tells us many members of Cabinet systematically failed to 
be included in policy-making, and with the observations made in this dissertation that 
indicate that ministers prepared inappropriate policy, likely because they did not know 
better.  
Type of argument and usefulness 
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This dissertation contains two main contributions. The first is describing Whitehall’s 
preparation for the invasion in much more detail than has been done, (overwhelmingly) on 
the basis of the primary materials that have become available through the Iraq Inquiry. It is 
also the first academic work to examine the preparation of Iraq policy across both political 
institutions and all key government departments, as opposed to either politics or one 
department only (like High Command).27 As this dissertation shows, the politics and civil 
service preparation are intimately linked – and many problems were the result of 
interdepartmental failures. This approach thus contributes directly to our knowledge and 
understanding of what exactly happened. Further works will doubtlessly be able to build on 
those insights. 
The second contribution is an argument about the use of ‘preferred alternatives’ while 
formulating and preparing foreign policy: namely, that the systematic use of ‘preferred 
alternatives’ and their corresponding minimal requirements is a useful tool in foreign 
policy-making, for without them policy-makers risk a range of problems, from 
suboptimal negotiation strategies to incoherent policy plans. This argument amounts to 
a prudential guideline; examining how this guideline (and the failure to follow it) played out 
in the case of British Iraq policy strengthens our insights on both the Iraq war and in the 
importance of this prudential rule. Indeed, the Iraq war is a near-ideal type case to illustrate 
this guideline, both because of the amount of source material available thanks to the Iraq 
inquiry, and because of the seriousness of the failures involved.  
Before discussing whether this argument is credible, however – the task of the entire 
dissertation – let us consider for a moment whether it is important. First, I will make the 
general case for its importance. Next, I will address two specific concerns. The first of those is 
whether the argument is trivially true: correct but yielding so few new insights as to become 
unimportant. The second specific concern is whether the argument is true and important, but 
unable to have practical consequences, destined to remain part of an academic wish for 
perfection only. I argue that the lesson is much less well understood than ought to be the 
case, and that preferred alternatives and minimal requirements can easily be applied in real 
foreign policy-making situations. Like any tool, they will not perfect the situation; but they 
are likely to improve it. 
The general argument for the importance of this dissertation is the following: when it comes 
to policy analysis, there is an important difference between foreseeing a wide range of 
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potential problems and analysing which problems actually occurred and why. It is relatively 
easy to say that much can go wrong when one decides to follow a controversial foreign policy 
or when one invades another country; more insight can be gained by examining what 
actually went wrong in a particular instance. This need for the identification of specific 
problems – and the need to learn from them – is very visible in the literature on war and 
defence forces. The same type of problem identification and analysis should be done about 
the wider civil service, which is what this dissertation does for British Iraq policy in the 
period of 2001-2003. It shows that a variety of problems encountered by the United Kingdom 
can be understood as the result of one root cause: the lack of well-defined policy position 
including preferred alternative and minimal requirements. 
More specifically, ‘Blair’ functions as a shortcut in explaining the problems of the (British) 
Iraq war, but that does not equal a good understanding of how things went wrong. The exact 
analytical links matter because prescriptions to avoid repetition of such failure depend on 
the diagnosis of the problem. Moreover, this thesis is a way of making policy-making a little 
more fail-proof as a system. Making the process more robust is fundamentally different – and 
more useful – than taking a particular stance on one policy issue. This dissertation is 
concerned with making policy well. The benefits of an improved understanding of the 
process by which policy is made, and the resulting improved process by which policy is 
made, are wider than any particular policy pursued by the government. This is why the 
argument about preferred alternatives and minimal requirement, if it is proven to be solid 
(the burden of the rest of the dissertation, not of this section), is so important. 
It is important, but is it trivially true? The argument against trivial truth is two-fold. There is 
a generic argument: the fact that something is well-known and has been recognised as 
important, does not mean that the lesson does not bear repeating. In the words of Lewis 
Carroll’s Gryphon: ‘That’s the reason they’re called lessons, (…) because they lessen from day 
to day.’28 If a well-known weakness in foreign policy-making presented itself (again) in the 
British case of Iraq, this is worth demonstrating, to better understand both the weakness and 
the war. However, and more importantly, I do not believe the importance of preferred 
alternatives and minimal requirements to be trivially true. Policy-makers generally 
understand the importance of clear policy goals and sound strategy. Those might not always 
be achieved in real policy situations, but the fact that people know their importance helps 
                                                             




them focus their thinking; gives a framework for useful critique; and has led to more research 
into and better understanding of the challenges that surround them.  
The same is not true for preferred alternatives and minimal requirements. To be sure, 
governments implicitly and sometimes explicitly understand that they need to determine the 
‘minimal requirements’ of their policy. This is particularly true in dealing with ‘enemies’: in 
this case ‘minimal requirements’, usually phrased as red lines, are part and parcel of normal 
policy and policy critique. The cartoons of Obama drawing multiple red lines in the sand 
regarding Syria’s use of chemical weapons are a more recent example.29 However, this is less 
obviously true when countries are dealing with other ‘friendly’ countries, even though, as 
Schelling pointed out, there ought to be no difference.30 Moreover, there is no clear evidence 
that administrations and civil services understand that explicitly distinguishing between 
desired conditions and essential conditions (the latter being minimal requirements, the 
former being desirable but not important enough to change the policy that is best pursued) 
benefits them internally, by providing structure and guidance to the efforts that underpin 
broad policy guidelines.  
As Fisher & Ury pointed out, even though BATNAs are the only rational way of determining 
which policy option should be pursued, in practice people tend to stick with arbitrary 
limits.31 In other words, we know people tend to use bottom lines badly – by setting them 
arbitrarily, rather than linked to a BATNA – and there is little in the policy-making literature 
to explicitly counter this. In my extensive research of the testimonies put forward in the Iraq 
Inquiry and the documents released, I have found no indication that politicians, diplomats, or 
civil servants were aware of the importance of an established preferred alternative (under 
that name or any other form). This indicates that at least for 2001-2003 Iraq policy, that 
insight was very likely missing; and it strongly suggests that the full understanding of 
preferred alternatives is not common in governmental policy-making. 
The argument about best or preferred alternatives is thus likely not generally understood. 
Governments get criticized on their plans. Often, especially in military affairs, they get 
critiqued for not having a follow-up plan: the governments apparent lack of follow-up plan 
for a Syrian bombardment, for example. However, that is not a lack of a preferred alternative; 
it is simply an incomplete plan A. Nor must a preferred alternative simply be understood as 
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‘the next thing we try when the first fails’. A preferred alternative is an assessment that 
happens simultaneously with the primary policy being pursued, as it has the specific goal of 
determining when one ought to abandon the original policy. It is a continuous benchmark. It 
is easy to understand that it would be good for governments to have back-up plans once the 
first plan fails; it is harder to grasp the full benefits of developing clear preferred alternatives 
and using them to enhance the first policy. Preferred alternatives are no luxury to be added on 
when the first plan is finished: they should be part of the first plan, for all the reasons briefly 
touched upon here and set out in Chapter II.  
Defined preferred alternatives and understood minimal requirements are thus, at least 
theoretically, useful. There are good reasons to believe they will also be of practical use. 
Introducing them as a part of standard foreign policy discussions would improve those 
debates and subsequent preparation of the chosen policy. Of course, there are many practical 
reasons why policy-making is imperfect. Governments and departments – as demonstrated 
amply in this dissertation – work under numerous pressures. They do not have unlimited 
resources and perfect information to devise perfect alternatives and corresponding minimal 
requirements. Yet this does not take away from the fundamental usefulness of introducing 
the concepts. Preferred alternatives do not receive the attention they deserve in practical 
policy-making because their function is little studied and poorly understood. A more explicit 
articulation of their function and usefulness – even to the preferred policy that is being 
pursued – makes it easier for governments officials and critiques alike to understand why 
and how they should be a part of the normal determination of a government’s policy position 
and to understand when they are missing. As a basic concept, they will not make perfect; but 
they are likely to improve policies and their preparation and implementation. 
Argumentative burdens of this thesis 
The arguments presented here imply several argumentative burdens. The essential message 
for policy-makers and analysists alike is that a government’s full policy position ought to 
include a goal, a strategy, a preferred alternative, and a corresponding articulation of minimal 
requirements. This relies on a convincing argument that preferred alternatives are likely 
useful (and, to a minor extent, that this is not already understood widely). There must be a 
plausible case that without preferred alternatives and corresponding preconditions 
(corresponding preconditions as opposed to random preconditions), policy-making is more 
likely to be more flawed. This argument is constructed as a common-sense prudential 
guideline, illustrated in this dissertation by the analysis of the Iraq war. It does not rely on 
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characteristics specific to the Iraq war and can be applied to other foreign-policy episodes 
too. 
Regarding the Iraq episode, there are several argumentative burdens. The first is to show 
that London indeed failed (explicitly and implicitly) to have a coherent policy position. The 
second is that London had plans that were unsuitable for the invasion. The third, the causal 
link, by its very nature is hardest to ‘prove’. The reasonable (and commonly accepted) 
argumentative burden is to show that there are plausible causal links between the lack of 
policy position and the nature of the plans. The argument of this dissertation is that the lack 
of preferred alternative and minimal requirements was the root cause of several other 
problems that together amounted to a bad planning process and bad plans. In the analytical 
chapter (VI), a short counterfactual is given to highlight how it is likely that with a clearly 
defined preferred alternative, it is likely that the plans and planning process would have 
shown substantially less weaknesses. 
5. DISSERTATION STRUCTURE  
How is the dissertation structured and how do individual chapters relate to the overall 
argumentative burden? This introduction is followed by six chapters. The first two chapters 
lay the groundwork for Chapters III-V, which are empirical. Chapter VI brings them together 
and, in the light of the evidence of the previous chapters, re-examines the central thesis. It 
also shows how this contribution fits in with the existing Iraq literature. The first chapter, a 
brief literature review, argues that usual explanations for Britain’s Iraq policy have focused 
too much on the Prime Minister. Although this is understandable and to a large extent 
justifiable, it has obscured that Britain’s failure was not simply the result of Tony Blair’s 
existence or decisions: it was a result of the friction between the will to go to war and other 
aspects of foreign policy-making. Indeed, Britain’s Iraq policy can best be understood as the 
result of the tension between the Prime Minister’s Iraq inclinations and usual Iraq policy, 
which had for a decade set the context within which the Foreign Office (and the rest of 
Whitehall) continued to work.  
As summarized in the chapter, many existing FPA explanation of the British conflict in Iraq 
focus on the Prime Minister and how the British political system and cultural context allowed 
his unusual, strong views on Iraq policy to prevail. These explanations, however, do not 
explain in themselves why Britain was willing to join the American-led invasion when it was 
clear that the plans for the conflict (in particular for Phase IV) were severely lacking – nor do 
they explain why the plans were so flawed. The literature on the American side of the war 
meanwhile, has focused heavily on both the (still disputed) reasons for going to war and on 
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the reasons for the American lack of Phase IV planning, including the role neoconservative 
thinking might have played in this. However, as I demonstrate, these existing explanations 
cannot explain the particular British characteristics of Britain’s failure to plan well. This 
failure merits a separate explanation, which is what this dissertation puts forward. 
The second chapter introduces a guideline about foreign policy-making: misassumptions in 
policy-making can be minimised by establishing preferred alternatives and minimal 
requirements. The argumentative burden of this chapter (and indeed the dissertation) is to 
formulate this guideline. It does so by taking an existing concept and adapting it for use by 
governments. The original guideline is that negotiators must develop a BATNA (best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement), a concept by Roger Fisher and William Ury. They 
envisaged it as a tool for individuals. I argue that their idea has further benefits when 
extended to governments. Preferred alternatives and their corresponding minimal 
requirements not only keep one on track to choose the optimal policy: as a short-hand tool 
for understanding the limits, scope and rationale of a given policy, they can help prevent 
bureaucratic drift, prevent policy inertia, and lessen the harms of information asymmetry 
between principals and agents. 
When 9/11 changed American Iraq policy, the United Kingdom reviewed its own policy in the 
light of that change. This is where the three empirical chapters begin. They end immediately 
after the successful overthrow of Baghdad, when the failure of British (post-)war planning 
becomes apparent. Chapter III discusses the process by which the British government 
decided to join the American invasion with a full division. It is the story of the London politics 
of the Iraq war. Chapter IV discusses how the various departments made plans and what 
those plans entailed. It is a civil service story, covering the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign 
Office, the Department for International Development, and the Cabinet Office. It uncovers the 
assumptions that underlie the planning and plans. Chapter V discusses the immediate post-
war phase. It thus contrasts the assumptions underlying the plans with the reality 
encountered by British troops and personnel on the ground.  
The argumentative functions of those chapters are closely linked. Chapter III demonstrates 
that in the decision-making process on Iraq policy, Blair’s vision on foreign policy won after a 
long period of ambiguity. Chapter IV shows that departments nonetheless mostly prepared 
along traditional lines because they did not envisage the policy that ended up prevailing. 
Chapter V shows that the assumptions on which the plans were built were incorrect in the 
event of the actual invasion. As a result, the plans were not suited for the circumstances. The 
overall argumentative burden of these chapters is two-fold. Together, they describe London’s 
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failure to prepare good plans for the invasion. In this sense, they can be read as an 
independent important contribution to the Iraq literature. 
However, these chapters also show the absence of a preferred alternative and of an 
understanding as to which ‘conditions’ to military actions were minimal requirements, and 
how this reverberated through the civil service. This is their second argumentative burden, 
which they share with Chapter VI. Chapter III demonstrates that London pursued an 
ambiguous policy for most of the lead-up to the war. The Foreign Office, much of Cabinet and 
the press interpreted the policy as following the Security Council first and dealing with 
Saddam Hussein second. Tony Blair, if forced to choose, was willing to abandon the Security 
Council. In other words, it was unclear what the preferred alternative would be if the Security 
Council proved unwilling to act under the timeline given by the Americans. The lack of clarity 
about priorities equally is a lack of clarity on the (pre)conditions that would determine war. 
Chapter III thus shows that London failed to have a clear policy position; all three chapters 
also show how this mattered. Chapters IV and V show that this lack of clear policy position 
led to misinterpretations in the departments and subsequent suboptimal planning and plans. 
Had the departments been clear on the limits and priorities of the chosen policy, their 
assumptions would very likely have been different: more coherent and more relevant to the 
actual circumstances of the invasion. Chapter III shows that even as the government received 
ample warning that the plans for the post-war phase had severe problems, the government 
invaded. This, too, is exactly what is predicted by the Harvard Negotiation Project about 
BATNAs: if alternatives are not developed, original plans cannot easily be abandoned even 
when there is a clear rationale for doing so.  
The dual purpose of Chapters III to V – part description based on primary research, part 
inductive theory-building about making foreign policy – inevitably leads to trade-offs. 
Because building the argument relies necessarily and primarily on a clear understanding of 
the facts that underlie it, description has taken priority in those chapters. They are structured 
to best elucidate the dynamics of the government and civil service and built around the 
assumptions that underlay policy-making. Therefore, Chapter VI was added, focusing more 
specifically on the consequences of the lack of an established preferred alternative and clear 
minimal requirements in Britain’s preparation for the Iraq invasion. It retraces Chapters III 
to V through the lens set up in Chapter II.  
First, Chapter VI demonstrates that London had no clear policy position. Next, it traces the 
dual impact this had: the lack of clear alternative meant that London was both worse 
prepared and more inclined to nonetheless continue the existing policy. Chapter VI’s task is 
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to demonstrate that London invaded Iraq with (very) suboptimal plans because of lack of a 
full policy position. That is also the general thesis of the dissertation. This is an original 
contribution because it shows an important connection between why Britain went to war and 
how it went to war. This connection has generally been assumed but remained 
underanalysed and was therefore in important aspects misunderstood. 
6. CONCLUSION  
This dissertation has two principal purposes. The first is to describe how Whitehall’s failure 
to plan well for the invasion came about, in particular the phase after Baghdad’s fall. The four 
departments most important to Iraq policy are examined: the Cabinet Office, the Foreign 
Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department for International Development. Those 
departments had different understandings of the Iraq policy they were meant to implement. 
They also had different – and incompatible – understandings of the division of responsibility 
and labour among them. The problem was that those assumptions were mutually 
contradictory and not applicable to the policy as it was eventually pursued. As a result, the 
plans based on those assumptions, too, were incoherent and unsuited for the invasion. 
The second purpose of this work is to put forward a related thesis about foreign policy-
making: in determining their foreign policy, governments should consider the ‘preferred 
alternative’ and, with the help of this preferred alternative, establish ‘minimal requirements’, 
as well as policy goals and strategy. These are not only important as a back-up plan; they also 
help improve the pursuit of the original policy. This happens through a better assessment of 
the strengths (or weaknesses) of the government’s position, but also because preferred 
alternative and the designation of minimal requirements minimise the risk of internal 
misassumptions and unsuitable policy planning. This prudential rule is introduced both 
theoretically and by analysing Britain’s Iraq policy between 2001 and 2003. Britain’s Iraq 
policy is a good case study for this argument despite not being completely typical of normal 
foreign policy-making: it highlights the importance of the prudential guideline introduced in 
this thesis by giving a near-ideal type example of what happens when that prudential rule is 
not followed.  
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Chapter I: Understandings of the Iraq War 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws on the secondary literature with two purposes. The first purpose is to 
give the background and context necessary for the empirical research in Chapters III-V; the 
second purpose is to highlight the newness and importance of the dissertation. Chapters III-V 
show that London failed to prepare well for the period after the fall of Baghdad, and that this 
failure resulted from the government’s way of deciding on its foreign policy position (notably 
its failure to choose an agreed-upon preferred alternative). They highlight a badly 
understood link between the decision-making process on war and the preparation for war: 
how Britain decided on the invasion (negatively) influenced how it subsequently was able to 
prepare for that invasion.  
Although these chapters themselves are based on primary sources, they build on existing 
understandings on the war in Iraq, introduced in this chapter. Thus, after a survey of existing 
Foreign Policy Analysis on the British invasion of Iraq, this chapter discusses the British case 
for war; US reasons for going to war; and existing explanations on why the United States 
seemed unprepared for the chaos of the post-invasion phase. The American failure to be well-
prepared for this phase shaped, but did not determine, Britain’s unpreparedness. Indeed, I 
argue that a separate analysis of the British failure to be prepared is warranted. Herein lies 
the contribution of this dissertation. 
A central argument underlying the chapter is that existing explanations of British Iraq policy 
focus too much on the Prime Minister. It is true that the Prime Minister was the primary 
driver of 2001-2003 Iraq policy: he had strong views, went to extraordinary lengths to push 
them through, and ended up prevailing when Britain helped disarm Saddam Hussein. 
However, Britain’s Iraq policy can only properly be understood by examining the contrast 
between Tony Blair’s world view and Iraq policy as previously pursued by Britain. As I 
demonstrate, much of Britain’s policy behaviour – from the demands on Saddam Hussein it 
argued for in the Security Council to the failure to have suitable post-war plans – cannot be 
convincingly explained or understood by any theory centred around the Prime Minister.  
The full importance of this argument will become clear in the later chapters: they will show 
how this tension between usual Iraq policy and Blair’s Iraq ambitions translated into one 
hybrid policy with two different implicit preferred alternatives. Those two different 
preferred alternatives mattered: Whitehall had been preparing its policy plans on the basis 
on one preferred alternative (described in Chapter IV), when suddenly the other preferred 
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alternative ended up prevailing politically (described in Chapter III), resulting in plans that 
were unsuitable for the policy as eventually pursued (described in Chapter V). In other 
words, London’s failure to prepare well and suitably for the post-warfighting phase of the 
invasion can only be explained by understanding the difference between pre-existing Iraq 
policy and the Blair-driven new Iraq policy. The same is true for much of the political process, 
as shown in Chapter III. One Prime Minister, no matter how influential, cannot explain this 
government’s decision to go to war and its preparedness for that war. 
With some exceptions, the literature survey focuses on FPA approaches to the war in Iraq. 
The first section of this chapter outlines existing analysis on the British invasion to invade 
Iraq. Most analysis has focused on the role of the Prime Minister, but others have looked at 
factors that enabled Blair to push his views through. The (idea of the) special relationship 
will likewise be discussed. After this brief overview of the most relevant literature, the 
second section sets out the government’s eventual internal case for war as described by 
Bluth: the government decided to invade Iraq because, of all the options available to 
guarantee safety from Saddam Hussein, an invasion was the only one that could guarantee 
success and did not have the bad humanitarian side-effects of sanctions. On the basis of my 
own research, I agree with Bluth’s interpretation of the government’s reasoning but disagree 
with his evaluation of it. 
The next section discusses why the United States went to war in Iraq; or rather, it describes 
the academic discussion, which is far from forming a consensus. It also introduces how the 
British interpreted the American process at that time. This context is provided to frame the 
British decision to join the American-led invasion. The fourth section, more specifically 
targeted to the original contribution of this dissertation, addresses the American preparation 
for Phase IV, while the fifth section addresses existing explanations for the (American) failure 
to be prepared for the post-invasion phase. The next section details how these existing 
explanations, while worthwhile, nonetheless still raise questions about the separate British 
failure to have well-prepared, coherent plans. This British element, I argue, merits separate 
consideration. There are lessons to be drawn from this failure that are different from the 
lessons that have been drawn thus far. 
In these last two sections, I engage with two major lines of alternative explanation for this 
failure. The first is the idea that the war was unwinnable for reasons internal to Iraq; the 
second is that post-war preparation was bad not because of failures in the plans but because 
of an ideological failure to recognise the need for planning. I argue that the latter cannot 
convincingly explain the British failure to prepare, while the former, though not incompatible 
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with my analysis, does not allow one to draw much-needed lessons about the British capacity 
to prepare for war. Indeed, there were internal British failures quite separate from the 
situation in Iraq and they deserve our attention to avoid them in the future. 
2. THE BRITISH INVASION OF IRAQ: EXPLANATIONS IN THE FPA 
LITERATURE 
Most explanations for the (British) 2003 invasion of Iraq fit within the tradition of Foreign 
Policy Analysis (FPA) at various levels of analysis. This is true both for work that explicitly 
locates itself in this tradition as well as for analysis that implicitly takes approaches 
advocated by FPA (biographies written by journalists are a prime example of this: FPA would 
advocate such analysis as psychobiography). FPA has at least three hallmarks that make it an 
approach of choice for the topic: it is agent-oriented; it is actor-specific; and it is strongest at 
explaining variation in foreign policy.32 It has a focus on human decision-makers as the only 
actors actually capable of making decisions – unlike, for example, states, which are 
abstractions rather than entities capable of thoughts or actions. It supposes that these human 
decision-makers are ‘not interchangeable generic rational utility maximizers and (…) not 
equivalent to the states that they service’.33 This means that one needs ‘specific and concrete 
information about [those] decisionmakers’ to explain the foreign policy they pursue.34 This 
focus on the fact that these humans are not identical and will not react in the same way to 
external constraints makes it much more suitable than (other) IR theories to explain 
variation and anomalies in international politics. 
This type of theory is a natural fit for the British invasion of Iraq, which was widely 
characterised as ‘Blair’s War’. Even the most cursory understanding of Iraq policy 2001-2003 
suggests that the British decision to invade Iraq – a war of choice, against an enemy that did 
not seem to directly threaten the United Kingdom, against international opposition, without 
legitimacy and with dubious legality in the Security Council – is a curious event to be 
explained, and that ‘Tony Blair’ – his specific, unusual characteristics – must be part of a 
satisfactory explanation. Non-actor-specific explanations of the British participation in the 
war can provide part of the explanation – alliance theory is one example – but even then, 
those constraints (or compelling factors) clearly interacted with the characteristics of 
individual decision-makers, most importantly Tony Blair, to have the impact they did. FPA 
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analysis recognises that foreign policy events are multifactorial and is emphatic in stressing 
that these multiple factors get processed and integrated in and by individual decision-
makers. FPA also examines different levels of analysis; I will roughly follow the structure of 
Valerie Hudson’s overview of FPA by starting off with individual decision-makers and going 
outwards.35  
What is it about Tony? 
The impact of Tony Blair’s personality, tendencies, world view, characteristics and leadership 
style on the decision to join the American invasion of Iraq has been examined in two broad 
ways. First discussed here are those works that examine his personality and leadership style, 
exemplified most clearly by Stephen Benedict Dyson’s work.36 These works look not at the 
content of his beliefs about Iraq, but at his preferred ways of acting. Also discussed are 
biographical approaches. Many of those have been written by journalists and (contemporary) 
historians rather than by Foreign Policy analysts, but these works provide insight in both 
ways of acting and, principally, in the content of his beliefs.  
Dyson uses at-a-distance measures to assess Tony Blair’s personality. Building on Margaret 
Hermann’s well-known Leadership Trait Analysis framework, which measures seven 
personality traits deemed relevant for political decision-making, Dyson compares Tony 
Blair’s personality with two comparison groups, respectively 51 world political leaders and 
12 British Prime Ministers.37 For four characteristics, Blair scores within the average range: 
distrust of others, in-group bias, self-confidence and task orientation. However, his score on 
conceptual complexity is lower, whereas Blair scores markedly higher (two standard 
deviations) on the need for power and the belief in his ability to control events. Building on 
previous research, Dyson argues that one should expect such a prime minister to ‘challenge 
constraints within the international system’; exhibit ‘expansionist foreign policy 
orientations’, ‘prefer proactive policy solutions and a less deliberative decision process’.38 
They would ‘make decisions based upon limited information’ decisively and in binary ways.39 
Moreover, a high need for power would lead leaders to be more insistent on their own view 
prevailing and on concentrating decision-making within a tight group of advisors. This need 
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for power would also tend to magnify the impact of other personality characteristics. Dyson 
argues that these expectations indeed characterised the Iraq policy process.40 
In his later work, Dyson builds on this work to characterise Tony Blair as a ‘constraint 
challenger’, a trait derived from the combination of his belief in his ability to control events 
and his high need for power.41 He argues that constraint challengers and constraint 
respecters – those with low need for power and belief that they can control events – respond 
differently to the pressures upon them. While both might feed pressure to support a stronger 
ally – as predicted by alliance theory – they will respond differently given domestic pressure 
to oppose such an ally. The literature on domestic politics suggests that leaders will not 
overrule domestic opinions on foreign policy. Thus, if an ally demands support for an 
unpopular foreign policy course, the domestic politics angle suggests that this support will 
not come forward. Dyson argues that constraint challengers, like Tony Blair, are less likely to 
be constrained by domestic politics (especially if they themselves believe in the need to 
support their ally) and more likely to go against popular opinion. This would account for why 
Blair supported the United States in 2003 for Iraq when prime minister Wilson failed to do so 
over Vietnam. 
Paul Hoggett approaches the Prime Minister in a very different way.42 His purpose is to 
examine whether Blair’s Iraq policy, during which the public (and well as, I would add, 
politicians and the civil service) was misled, must be understood as cynical deception by 
someone who knew better or whether it can be understood as a form of self-deception. 
Hoggett argues the latter. He argues that there were three rationales for war used by the 
Blair government and that each of these makes sense only if one assumes a particular form of 
self-deception taking place. The security case for war – the risk of weapons of mass 
destruction used by terrorist organisations – depends on a catastrophist form of thinking. 
The argument for war to maintain the special relationship presumes a black-and-white view 
of the possibility to maintain such a relationship. The modernising case for war, to offer 
Iraqis ‘freedom from dictatorship’ and of ’democracy and markets’, relied on a teleological 
view of modernity.43  
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Taken together, these justifications offer a picture of a potential catastrophe that can only be 
solved in one way in which, however, the good of modernity will win out. The self-deception 
underlying these notions is then traced back to a combination of religiosity and narcissism. 
Religiosity gives Blair his liberal openness and his messianistic desire to make the world a 
better place (to free Iraqis and protect the world from weapons of mass destruction) by 
doing the right thing (stand by the Americans). However, it also gives him the means and 
power to distinguish right from wrong and adopt the narcissistic view that he can decide on 
right and wrong, ‘ser[ving] his own pleasure whilst mistaking it for the general good’.44 
Although Dyson rejects religion as the underlying reason for Blair’s foreign policy, there are 
unmistakably ways in which these arguments reflect each other: the focus on black-and-
white thinking; the high need for control; the belief in one’s own capacity to impact the world 
for better underlie both Dyson and Hoggett’s interpretation of Blair.  
Oliver Daddow, too, focuses on Tony Blair to explain Britain’s Iraq policy.45 His argument 
concerns the evolution of Tony Blair from Kosovo to Iraq. In ‘Tony’s war? Blair, Kosovo and 
the interventionist impulse in British foreign policy’, Daddow revisits the idea that Kosovo 
and Iraq were both manifestations of a well-established doctrine of the international 
community that Blair had espoused early and set out most clearly in his 1999 Chicago 
Speech. Daddow argues that Blair did not come into office with a particular interest in, or 
coherent view for, foreign policy. Instead, Blair’s Kosovo policy was shaped by his desire to 
‘make his mark’ as his domestic policy agenda was being stymied by turf wars with Gordon 
Brown.46 In this reading, Blair’s engagement in Kosovo is not so much a manifestation of his 
foreign policy vision as a way to do something somewhere.  
However, Daddow argues, Kosovo was a success from which the prime minister took away 
three lessons. The first was the importance of media management; the second was that Blair 
should have ‘more confidence in his ability to push through his reformist vision’.47 In 
Daddow’s words, ‘Kosovo seems to have been the point at which Blair began to be his own 
man’, no longer bound by decision polls.48 The third lesson from Kosovo was that Blair ‘did 
not need to rely on Whitehall’s decision-making machinery for ideas or strategy – if he ever 
had done’.49 However, if these are the lessons that one can attribute to Kosovo, it is clear that 
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after 9/11 and in the lead-up to Iraq, these proclivities found a much starker expression than 
they had during the Kosovo episode. Thus, even if one subscribes to the idea that Kosovo was 
‘the making of Blair’, it might have been a prime minister who had not yet found the venture 
in which to pour these beliefs as he did in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq.50 
Both John Rentoul (whose bibliography of Blair was published before 2003) and John 
Kampfner in Blair’s Wars give a central place to Tony Blair’s beliefs and religiosity.51 
Similarly, his Manichean world view is frequently commented on, as is his sofa-style of 
government making. Seldon’s account of Tony Blair reinforced the prime minister as a 
religious man.52 He also stresses Blair’s informal decision-making style, which he calls a 
denocracy, after his ‘den’ in Number 10. While these biographies provide context about the 
prime minister and his decisions in the lead-up to the Iraq war, on the whole they are not 
concerned with our purpose here: assessing to what extent the prime minister was 
responsible for Iraq policy and to what extent other factors (shaping the prime minister) can 
explain British policy in 2001-2003. It is to these other factors that we now turn. 
Who makes UK foreign policy? Who lets foreign policy be made? 
As the next level of analysis, we can consider those articles that consider not the views of 
Tony Blair, but how the system around him enabled (or constrained) the prime minister in 
impacting policy. In 2004, Paul Williams asked the question ‘Who’s making UK foreign 
policy?’53 His answer elaborates on the various aspects of foreign policy, with multiple goals 
being pursued simultaneously by somewhat varying constellations of policy-makers in such a 
way that one ought to speak of the foreign policies of a government. It highlights the 
complexity of formulation interpretation, implementing and presenting foreign policies. 
From this emerges a picture of foreign policy shaped by a variety of factors but resulting 
from multiple actors and institutions. Williams argue that three ‘rather traditional foreign 
policy ideas’ nonetheless underlie New Labour’s ambition to draw together a more coherent 
foreign policy across different aspects: multilateralism, Atlanticism and neoliberalism.54 
Although usefully highlighting the context within which Iraq policy was pursued, Williams’ 
insights cannot explain which influences prevailed in the case of Iraq policy and why. As 
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Kettell notes, under this logic ‘the development of Britain’s Iraq policy [was] something of an 
aberration’.55 As such, the aberration remains to be explained. 
Eoin O’Malley gives a more explicit answer to ‘how prime ministers exercise influence over 
policy’.56 His argument is that prime ministers, in this case Iraq, control outcomes by 
structuring the choices faced by other actors. He gives two instances in the lead-up to the 
invasion of Iraq where choices were allegedly structured by the prime minister. The first are 
the dossiers that the government published on the threat posed by Iraq, which he argues 
influenced the conservative vote in parliament. The second example is the legal advice, which 
was given to cabinet in a more definite form than warranted and without the complete text of 
the legal advice attached, as demanded by the Ministerial Code. The theoretical argument is 
plausible, although the analysis applied to those specific instances is somewhat lacking in 
both warrants for claims and much-needed pre-emptive rebuttal. Nonetheless, the approach 
seems to have much potential for understanding how Blair navigated domestic opposition. 
Steve Kettell’s 2009 piece argues that Tony Blair’s preponderance is not an anomaly, as 
suggested by Williams, but rather an unusual degree of normal features of the British 
political system, which not only promotes decisive leadership but also fails to provide many 
checks and balances on any strong leader that would emerge from such a system.57 Both of 
these elements shaped the British Iraq war. By promoting strong decisive hierarchical 
leadership, Kettell argues, the British political system gave the Labour party the incentive to 
reform: after severe electoral defeats, ‘the party ... strengthened the powers of the leadership, 
and established new mechanisms of strong, centralized party discipline and control’.58 
Especially after the second election victory in 2001, a dichotomy-minded Blair phrased 
leadership in terms of all or nothing, with leaders having the choice of being perceived as 
either dictatorial or weak. The implication is that Blair falls in the first category. 
However, the system not only allowed a strong-willed leader to appear: the lack of checks 
and balances in the system also subsequently allowed this leader a relatively free hand in 
foreign policy. In the words of Kettell, ‘the structural architecture of the British political 
system ... facilitates a mode of governance based on the apparent benefits of a commanding 
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executive, replete with relatively weak checks and balances on the exercise of power, and 
with relatively few formal and effective mechanisms for enforcing scrutiny and 
accountability’.59 In such a system, a determined prime minister could push through policies 
even if he wanted to do so in ways that went against normal convention. More recently, 
James Strong has argued, however, that the Iraq episode of 2002-2003 was the beginning of a 
chance: he traced the growth of the parliamentary prerogative to decide on war through Iraq, 
Libya and Syria.60 Iraq set the precedent and the prime minister thereby (unwittingly) 
handed a measure of power to (future) parliament. 
Culture and National identity: the Special Relationship 
Looking at the wider context of British foreign policy and ideas of national identity, the 
nature of the so-called ‘Special Relationship’ between the United Kingdom and the United 
States has been the object of much analysis (and withering criticism). The underlying idea 
here is that British Iraq policy was driven partly not by Britain’s attitudes vis-a-vis Baghdad, 
but also by the country’s attitude vis-a-vis Washington. The questions here are twofold: how 
was Tony Blair’s view on the Iraq issue shaped by his interpretation of the Special 
Relationship; and how did Iraq impact on the Special Relationship. Central has been the 
question of whether Tony Blair was Bush’ ‘poodle’ or his ‘bulldog’: a submissive lapdog or a 
staunch junior ally who supported US policy out of genuine conviction or British interest.61 
Alex Danchev puts the Iraq War and the ‘Special Relationship’ in historical perspective, as the 
title of his article states.62 Closer to literature than a traditional foreign policy article, his is an 
effort to capture the essence of the ‘occult essence’ of the ‘Relationship’ by focusing on the 
way it has been performed over the years, including by Tony Blair. Jane M. O. Sharp, by 
contrast, focuses on the practical manifestations of the relationship over the Iraq episode.63 
Although she provides a strong criticism of the price Britain pays for this alleged relationship, 
Sharp does not address the question of whether Blair acted out of genuine conviction (I 
would argue he did). James K. Wither suggests he did but is equally negative about the impact 
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Iraq had on Anglo-American relations.64 Patrick Porter, although discussing a part of the Iraq 
war that is outside the scope of this dissertation, convincingly argues that the Anglo-
American relationship might have benefits but that this does not make it ‘special’ or leave the 
British with genuine influence on American foreign policy-making.65 
3. BRITISH CASE FOR WAR  
To understand why and how the United Kingdom joined the American-led invasion of Iraq, 
we should not only examine what factors shaped the decision to go to war. We should be 
clear on what exactly the line of argument was that the British government adopted. The best 
place in the literature is Christoph Bluth’s ‘The British road to war’, for the article lays out the 
government’s own case for war.66 On the basis of my own research, as shown in the three 
empirical chapters, I conclude that Bluth’s 2004 description of the British government’s case 
is overwhelmingly accurate (albeit completely uncritical). Importantly, it remains one of very 
few publications to fully lay out and engage with the case as stated by the government. As 
Bluth himself put in another article two years later, the point ‘is not that one should support 
the case that Blair made, but rather that one should actually understand it and judge it on its 
merit’.67 To attack and judge policy-makers on the basis of a case they never set up is to bring 
down a strawman. While I could not agree more with this premise, I disagree with Bluth’s 
final assessment of the validity of the government’s case. 
However, let me start where we agree: Bluth’s perceptive description of the government’s 
own case for war. Whence the decision for invasion? ‘This decision did not derive from the 
perception of an imminent threat. (...) The case for war rested on the premise that the 
containment of Iraq through sanctions was becoming ineffective and was morally 
unacceptable’, the latter both because of the humanitarian costs of the sanctions and because 
leaving Saddam Hussein in power meant giving free reign to a regime that violated human 
rights and a massive scale. 68 The long-term goal of the United Kingdom must be kept in mind 
here: ‘in the short term, to reduce the threat Saddam poses to the region (...) in the longer 
term, to reintegrate a territorially intact Iraq as a law-abiding member of the international 
community’.69 When sanctions fail, they no longer reach either goal. Saddam Hussein might 
well circumvent them and continue to reinforce his program and weapons programs. But 
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they not only fail: they also bring with them additional human rights harms. In Bluth’s 
opinion, this mattered because Blair not only ‘believed that containment was failing, but he 
believed containment was wrong’.70  
Then 9/11 happened. It proved the threat from terrorists to Western countries was real. It 
raised fears of a disorganised international community. Terrorists might get weapons of 
mass destruction from rogue states. Whether this was happening yet was beside the point. It 
was possible, and 9/11 showed such a risk could no longer be ignored. Something needed to 
happen to prevent the threat from growing, particularly as there was no way of knowing how 
advanced Baghdad’s programmes were and how terrorists would act. But this brought Blair 
to the position of being without alternatives to the forced disarmament of Saddam Hussein 
(assuming he would not voluntarily disarm or step down, although theoretically that was 
possible right until the invasion). Continued containment was not acceptable for 
humanitarian reasons. It was also getting more and more difficult politically, for members of 
the Security Council were divided. Simply lifting the sanctions was not an option for security 
reasons, particularly after the Twin Towers fell. 
In addition, those attacks also meant the American administration became bent on taking 
action against Iraq (or perhaps rather: the factions that wanted to deal with Iraq gained the 
upper hand). As such, it provided a window of opportunity to deal with Iraq. This had been 
the right thing to do ever since sanctions began to fail and the costs of inaction started to 
mount. It also became necessary after 9/11. This is why the British government’s internal 
case for war, as noted correctly by Bluth, in essence did not rely on Iraq representing an 
imminent threat. It did not have to. It was necessary and right to deal with Saddam Hussein. 
In addition, if the United States insists on going to Iraq, there is an additional benefit in 
getting involved: to prevent Washington from going it alone. ‘[T]he international order that 
Blair envisaged for the twenty-first century was one that would rest on the foundation of 
international norms and principles (...) and on a united western world. (...) The threat of 
international terrorism would be so much harder to tackle if the western world was 
divided.’71 
Summarizing this case for war, Bluth puts several argumentative burdens on those who wish 
to oppose Britain’s Iraq decision. The most important of those is to provide a better 
alternative.72 Blair and Bluth present the chosen policy as ‘the least unattractive of the 
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available options’.73 This claim must be rebutted by providing an alternative route that would 
plausibly have been better, not by simply pointing out the disadvantages of the chosen policy. 
‘Many critics of the war did not in fact propose any alternative to military action, as if doing 
nothing were an option.’74 Those who propose or implicit endorse further containment, in 
particular, must ‘engage with the argument that containment itself entailed human costs on a 
scale arguably greater than those that would be incurred in a war’, for ‘[i]f there was a human 
cost of going to war, there was also a human cost of not going to war.’75 Moreover, Bluth 
makes much of the point that ‘regime change was the only option that could achieve [all] 
objectives of British policy with regard to Iraq’, including its reintegration in the region as a 
law-abiding nation (deemed impossible with Saddam Hussein in charge, even disarmed).76 
The problem, for both the British government and Bluth, is that these burdens are quite 
easily addressed. By this I do not mean to argue that the invasion can clearly be dismissed as 
the wrong answer; but neither the British government nor Bluth have engaged with the 
counterarguments that can be – and have been – put forward. First, the argument is largely 
set up as a dichotomous choice between the disadvantages of the pre-9/11 sanctions regime 
and the risks of disarmament (on the tacit assumption that simply lifting sanctions was not 
an option; let us accept for the moment that this is true). Nonetheless, before Iraq policy 
shifted to an invasion, Britain had actually been pursuing a third way between the standing 
sanctions regime and forceful disarmament: Smart Sanctions. Smart Sanctions – the Goods 
Review List – were about making sanctions more selective and targeted. The specific aim of 
these more selective sanctions was to reduce humanitarian suffering while containing 
Baghdad’s security threat. Britain also was on its way to achieving the Smart Sanctions goal: 
the Security Council passed Smart Sanctions in May 2002 (albeit not to the full extent wished 
by Britain).  
In other words, the dichotomy set up by the British government and accepted by Bluth is 
false: the choice was not between the humanitarian cost of blanket sanctions and the 
humanitarian costs of an invasion. To equate all sanctions, the old system and the new 
system, and to condemn both for humanitarian reasons, is absurd when the precise 
difference between them was meant to be their humanitarian impact. Bluth tells us that 
detractors of the war have failed to come up with alternatives, and somewhat dismissively 
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says that the ‘Liberal Democrats advocated a continuation of containment’.77 But the 
government itself considered Smart Sanctions as a different policy option to mitigate the 
problems with the old sanctions regime. Therefore, the burden really is on the government 
and its defenders to engage with this proposed third option, and explain why it would no 
longer do.  
Beyond the humanitarian issue, two more lines of argumentation were used against 
sanctions. The first was that ‘[e]ven if [Smart Sanctions] make sanctions more sustainable, 
the sanctions regime could collapse in the long-term’ (my emphasis).78 This is an interesting 
argument for two reasons. First, no foreign policy is fail-safe. Absent more plausible analysis 
on why a sanctions regime probably would – as opposed to merely ‘could’ – fail, the simple 
possibility of failure is hardly sufficient justification for dismissing this policy option.79 
Secondly, if we want to understand why Britain decided to invade Iraq, we cannot just 
explain why an invasion is better than Smart Sanctions. At one point, the government thought 
Smart Sanctions were the best way to go. Later, it preferred an invasion. What caused this 
shift?  
The last line of argumentation against Smart Sanctions relies on the idea that Smart Sanctions 
would not achieve their goal for reasons of implementation:  
[It] would be difficult to pursue, because it would require the implementation of all the UN 
Security Council resolutions relating to disarmament in Iraq, the readmission of inspectors to 
ensure the elimination of all WMD programmes, and a more effectively policed sanctions 
regime that would hold third states to account for circumventing the sanctions.80 
In other words: Smart Sanctions would all be good and well if we managed to make them 
work, but we are not sure we can make them work. Conclusion? 
The [policy] document made it very clear, therefore, that regime change was the only option 
that could achieve the objectives of British policy with regard to Iraq: ‘In sum, despite the 
considerable difficulties, the use of overriding force in a ground campaign is the only option 
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that we can be confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international 
community’.81 
The problem here is that Smart Sanctions (and the other options under discussion) are held 
to a different standard than a full invasion. The other options get dismissed because they 
might not work, and therefore the invasion is the option that is left. But the question needs to 
be asked: will invasion work? It is absurd to assume that it will work because it is the only 
option still on the table. This is a negative fallacy ad consequentiam: the idea that if something 
is necessary, it must therefore be true.82 In reality, it might well be that no good policy option 
exists to achieve all of Britain’s proclaimed goals, including making Iraq into a democratic, 
stable, reliable neighbour. Bluth dismisses other policy options as incapable of achieving all 
Britain’s goal. Yet neither he nor the British government submit a ground invasion to the 
same test: how, exactly, does one go from a ground invasion to this utopic end state?  
The point here is explicitly not to argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that the invasion failed 
and was always going to fail. But neither is the absence of a plausible war plan – including 
Phase IV – a trivial issue. One cannot expect perfection; but the government can be expected 
to have at least a plausible idea of how an invasion will help it reach its end goal – 
particularly if it dismisses less radical and risky options because they do not reach this goal 
completely or reliably enough. The government argued that ‘a ground campaign is the only 
option [that will] remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international community’.83 
Unless there is at least some plausible analysis and a plan on how a ground campaign will 
achieve exactly that, the ‘only option’ is not an option at all.  
Note that this argument is not based on the ultimate failure of the invasion to transform Iraq: 
it is not based on hindsight. Bluth hold himself hostage to fortune, by concluding that ‘[i]f the 
reconstruction of Iraq and the establishment of a stable democracy succeed, then the 
decisions of 2003 will be vindicated’.84 I disagree. Even if the invasion had succeeded, the 
decision-making process pre-invasion was flawed because the comparison between the 
various policy options was made on the basis of different metrics for different options. There 
was no clear thinking on how having the American and British military in Iraqi territory 
would lead to a long-term solution. If despite this, the British would have ended up getting 
what they wanted out of the invasion, their decision to go to war on a hunch would have 
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hardly been proved to be a well-made decision.85 This is not to say that an invasion was a bad 
idea: a claim might be defended badly but nonetheless be valid. But Bluth puts a burden on 
those opposing the war to back their claims in a plausible way. The same must be asked 
about the case for war. 
4. WHY DID THE US GO TO WAR? 
The invasion of Iraq was an American initiative. To explain the British decisions on Iraq, then, 
we would do well to understand the American context in which the UK government was 
making its policy. The American planning process as it was experienced by the British will be 
discussed throughout the empirical chapters; here we will discuss why the United States 
went to war. The issue remains contentious, although theories abound: for oil86, because of 
the Israel lobby87, as a failed attempt to pursue American hegemony88, for Bush’s personal 
reasons (relating to his father).89 Official explanations have encompassed a terrorist threat 
emanating from Iraq, a link with al-Qaeda, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and the 
liberation of the Iraqi people.90 The scholarly debate has evolved with time. In 2006, Cramer 
and Thrall did a survey of 222 foreign policy experts, asking for their assessment of why the 
United States went to war.91 Their survey was prompted by an impression – confirmed by the 
survey – that there was a marked discrepancy between public academic debate and views 
privately held by experts.  
                                                             
85 Unless one wants to make the argument that plans or plausible analysis on which to base one’s 
decisions are unnecessary. Such an argument would need to claim one of two things. Either it would 
need to claim that the future is so complicated that there is no point trying to make any plans; in which 
case, all planning departments in the world might as well throw in the towel. The other option is a 
belief in political instinct so strong as to belief that a politician can ‘intuitively’ judge the idea of a war 
to radically transform a society mostly unknown to him. This, too, seems a stretch and flies in the fact 
of the set-up of existing government departments. 
86 Michael T. Klare, “Blood for Oil, in Iraq and Elsewhere,” in Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?, ed. 
Jane K Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 129–44. 
87 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Middle East 
Policy 13, no. 3 (2006): 29–87. 
88 Michael Lind, “Neoconservatism and American Hegemony,” in Why Did the United States Invade 
Iraq?, ed. Jane K. Kramer and A. Trevor Thrall (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 114–28. 
89 Jane K. Cramer and A. Trevor Thrall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2012). 
90 U.S. Department of State, “Winning the War on Terror,” 2003, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/documents/organization/24172.pdf. 
For the link between Al-Qaeda and Baghdad, see: 
Stephen F. Haynes, “Case Closed,” The Weekly Standard, November 24, 2003, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/4618. 
91 Cramer and Thrall, Why Did the United States Invade Iraq?, 2. 
47 
 
In 2006, most experts – contrary to much of the American public – had dismissed official 
reasons for the war.92 There was broad consensus that weapons of mass destruction, the fight 
against terrorism, and the liberation of the Iraqi people, the arguments put forward by the 
administration, were not the primary reasons why the United States attacked. Instead, more 
than half of the experts indicated that reshaping the Middle East and its democratic process 
was a factor in the invasion, and over a quarter indicated that oil was a reason.93 Another 
quarter mentioned weapons of mass destruction, and slightly less people argued that ousting 
Saddam to liberate the Iraqis was part of the picture. Israel’s security interests, US hegemony, 
neoconservative ideology and terrorism were each mentioned by 13% of experts.94  
That said, different motives were attributed to different key players. Vice President Cheney 
was most often cited by academics as very influential in the American decision for war (by 
93% of those responding to the survey), followed by neoconservatives as a group (83%), 
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld (79%) and only then President Bush (74%).95 Cheney 
was thought to be primarily motived by asserting American dominance and by promoting 
American corporate oil interests.96 A variety of motives were attributed to the neo-
conservatives. The most important ones, supported by over half the academics, were 
asserting US dominance, removing Saddam Hussein’s threat to Middle-Eastern stability, 
finishing the 1991 Gulf War, defending Israel and promoting democracy in the Middle-East.97 
Rumsfeld, too, was thought to be motivated by asserting Washington’s dominance in a New 
American Century, while Bush was thought to be motivated by American dominance and 
because he wanted to finish his father’s 1991 war.98 On the whole, the research indicated that 
even key players not traditionally associated with neo-conservatism (including Bush, Cheney 
and Rumsfeld) were thought to respond to neo-conservative ideologies and work within this 
framework – although there was wide disagreement on what that meant, precisely.99 
Cramer and Thrall identified three areas in which there remained sharp disagreement: 
whether weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were a genuine worry of the American 
administration or a pretext only; whether 9/11 provided a catalyst for the invasion or merely 
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a window of opportunity; and whether the invasion was the result of a ‘perfect storm’ of 
colliding rationales or driven by one main motive.100 There is little doubt that the 
administration exaggerated the threat of weapons of mass destruction to the American 
public, and that it suppressed evidence to the contrary. Most experts on the war believe that 
concerns about the weapons were definitely not the primary cause for going to war, even if 
one accepts that there was some possible long-term concern about them.101 A minority, 
including Robert Jervis, sharply disagrees.102 They argue that group-think, arrogance or an 
absolute zero-tolerance of risk, even improbable risk, made it possible for the administration 
to genuinely worry about the threat.103 They do not see the manipulation of evidence in the 
public as mutually exclusive with actual concerns about the WMD threat. 
The second issue that is still debated is the role of 9/11.104 There is wide-spread academic 
consensus (over 85% of the respondents) that ‘9/11 was critical’ to the decision to invade 
Iraq in that it provided policy-makers with a window of opportunity to do so.105 However, the 
question remains whether 9/11 merely provided the opportunity for an invasion that key 
policy-makers wanted to happen all along (with some even arguing that the invasion would 
have happened even without the attacks on the Twin Towers) or whether 9/11 was also 
critical by changing leaders’ views on the threat emanating from Baghdad. Some experts have 
also argued that it was the war in Afghanistan – itself a reaction to 9/11 – that spurred the 
subsequent invasion of Iraq, by leading to excessive optimism about the low costs and high 
success that could be achieved by disposing of Hussein.106 Others have argued that 9/11 
showed the risk of Islamist extremism and that this heightened risk changed Washington’s 
calculus about Saudi-Arabia.107 One argument in this vein is that the Americans wanted more 
control over oil that was not dependent on Saudi-Arabia, in case the country would come 
under stronger Islamist influence. Another is that attacking Iraq would allow America to 
withdraw its troops from Saudi-Arabia (as they were there to protect that country against 
Saddam Hussein).  
The third question is whether America went to war because of a multitude of factors or for 
one dominant reason.108 Some academics consider the invasion the result of a ‘perfect storm’ 
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of cooperating factors. ‘However, despite most experts combining these multiple reasons (...) 
many (...) stressed the invasion was definitely not the result of a ‘perfect storm’. It was 
striking how many respondents emphasized one set of factors while simply excluding or even 
sharply denying other factors’ (my emphasis).109 In other words, while in 2006 almost a third 
of surveyed expert academics said that oil was an important factor behind the invasion of 
Iraq, many other academics explicitly felt oil was not a factor. Similarly, the idea that a 
powerful Israel lobby was an important factor in the invasion is more widely supported by 
this survey than one would have expected (given the lack of scholarship on the issue and the 
lack of public support for Mearsheimer and Walt when they put forward the argument in 
2006).110 Many scholars who did not explicitly mention Israel as a factor nonetheless 
identified the neoconservatives as a highly influential group in the policy-making process, 
and Israel as an important general concern for neoconservatives. That said, the idea of Israel 
as a casus belli of the Iraq war was far from universally supported and often explicitly 
disavowed.111  
In any case, academic debate has since started to drift away from a focus on the 
neoconservative angle. This is not because the neoconservative angle has been discredited; ‘it 
is more that assessments of the importance of the top leaders of Cheney, Rumsfeld and Bush 
has increased, especially as it has become clear that the top leaders likely very much wanted 
to invade Iraq prior to 9/11 and were thus not likely persuaded by neoconservatives after 
9/11 to invade. Instead, it appears the top leaders did not have a way to build support for this 
project before 9/11, and 9/11 created an opportunity’.112 In other words, the invasion only 
happened after 9/11 because that date provided a possibility to go to war, but the 
neoconservatives did not fundamentally change the minds of other policy-makers (or did so 
earlier).  
Cramer and Duggan make this argument. They argue that Cheney’s public statements 
throughout the 1990s, in which he professed happiness that the First Gulf War stopped at the 
Iraqi border, were a form a loyalty to his former boss, Bush senior (and that this loyalty paid 
off when Cheney became vice-president to Bush junior).113 They point to a number of 
instances, private and public, in which Cheney did seem to support the overthrow of Hussein 
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long before 9/11. Similarly, but much more well-known, Secretary Rumsfeld supported 
regime change in Iraq before taking office: he co-signed the 1998 letter to then-President 
Clinton in which the Project for the New American Century called for Hussein to be ousted.114 
Together Cheney and Rumsfeld appointed Paul Wolfowitz as Undersecretary of Defence; 
Cheney also made Scooter Libby both Special Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to 
Cheney.115 Wolfowitz and Libby were two of the best-known neo-conservatives advocating 
the removal of Saddam Hussein. Cramer and Duggan admit that Bush’s support for regime 
change pre-9/11 is more ambiguous. Nonetheless, they give various instances in which the 
43rd President suggested that he would ‘finish the job’ his father started, if given the 
opportunity.116 
In summary, then, clearly the United States’ rationale will be the subject of considerable 
debate for the foreseeable future. However, some general impressions that the British had of 
American policy are worth pointing out at this point (they will be demonstrated in the 
empirical chapters). To a large extent, the exact reasons for the Americans’ wish to invade 
were unclear to those involved in policy-making in London. However, it was clear that from 
London’s perspective, 9/11 was the trigger for Washington. Nonetheless, it took several 
months for Whitehall to fully catch up on how seriously, and in what degree of detail, the 
Americans were pursuing the Iraq route. There were several reasons for this. There was no 
direct link between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, leading the British initially to 
believe that Baghdad was not a priority. Blair, better aware of American plans than most of 
his civil servants, urged the Americans to concentrate on terrorism and Afghanistan first. The 
British military in particular had its hands full with the quick invasion of Afghanistan. 
Moreover, initially the British were purposefully kept out of the American planning loop.117  
The other point worth making about London’s impressions of Washington internal politics is 
that they did not – as detailed in the three empirical chapters – see the American invasion as 
pre-ordained and inevitable. Rather, the British saw it as an internal struggle in the Bush 
administration, with the Pentagon on one side (pro-war) and Colin Powell’s State 
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Department (against unilateral action) on the other side. British civil servants’ testimonies to 
the Iraq Inquiry give the distinct impression that the British policy-makers felt President 
Bush was somewhere in the middle, wavering between various domestic factions. In other 
words, the British seem to have interpreted events in the American capital city more as a 
pattern of neo-conservatives pushing for war (as much of the academic community had it in 
2006) than as driven by President Bush (an idea examined in more recent works). I mention 
this not to convincingly solve the question of why the United States went to war – the 
question is well outside the scope of this thesis – but to frame British understandings of the 
partner they were negotiating with. 
5. AMERICAN PLANNING FOR THE POST-INVASION PHASE 
Perhaps even more relevant to this dissertation is the question of American preparation for 
the post-invasion phase. That something went wrong cannot be denied even by proponents 
of the war. Manifestly the US administration and its partners did not achieve what they set 
out to do. Here, the literature gives three dominant lines of argument: a lack of personnel; 
that American decision-making was dominated by an ideology that failed to recognise the 
need for post-war planning; and that the war was unwinnable for reasons internal to Iraq. 
Before evaluating these arguments, let us briefly sketch the American preparations. 
Iraq policy under review before 9/11 
Despite the sharp disagreement in the academic literature on key aspects on the American 
reason for going to war, we can trace (some of) the preparation for war in the Bush 
administration. Regardless of whether 9/11 provided the rationale or the window of 
opportunity for invading Iraq, and regardless of the precise role neoconservative factions 
within the government played in promoting the invasion within the administration, it is clear 
that well before 9/11, the incoming Bush administration was reviewing its Iraq policy of 
sanctions. Between 31 May and 26 July 2001, Stephen Hadley (Rice’s deputy) convened the 
deputies four times to work on Iraq policy and on 5 February 2001, National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice had chaired the Principals Committee meeting addressing Iraq policy.118 On 
1 March it had been decided that Secretary of State Colin Powell should focus on a plan to 
‘refocus the U.N. economic sanctions on weapons control’.119 This is in the same period in 
which Britain was also reviewing its sanctions policy and devising plans for smarter (more 
targeted) sanctions. 
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However, regime change had also been the official stated goal of American Iraq policy since 
the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. This Act, as spelled out in an accompanying press release 
from the Office of the Press Secretary of 31 October 1998, makes clear that ‘the United States 
should support those elements of the Iraqi opposition that advocate a very different future 
for Iraq than the bitter reality …. that the current regime in Baghdad now offers’, with the 
United States ‘providing support to opposition groups from all sectors of the Iraqi community 
that could lead to a popularly supported government’.120  
Many of the people who had advocated for a policy a more severe course of action against 
Iraq in an open letter to president Clinton in January 1998 were now a part of the Bush 
government, including Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and (perhaps more 
surprisingly in later light) Richard L. Armitage.121 As said, together vice-president Cheney and 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had appointed Paul Wolfowitz as Undersecretary of Defence; 
Cheney also made Scooter Libby both Special Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to 
Cheney.122 Wolfowitz and Libby were two of the best-known neo-conservatives advocating 
the removal of Saddam Hussein.  
Now, in government, they once more started advocating for a stronger course against Iraq, 
focusing on the opposition groups as an ally to dethrone Saddam Hussein.123 As early as late 
spring 2001, Condoleezza Rice produced a proposal to free the Iraqi people which includes a 
proposal for training the opposition, although the idea failed to gain traction.124 On 1 August, 
the deputies handed the principals a paper called ‘A Liberation Strategy’, which proposed a 
strategy of pressuring Hussein that ‘relied heavily on the Iraqi opposition’.125 A further paper 
on options short of war of 8 November 2001, prepared by Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of 
Defence for Policy, for Rumsfeld, included using the Iraq Liberation Act to aid the Iraqi 
National Congress in serving as an umbrella organisation for Iraqi democratic opposition 
group.126 At its head was Ahmed Chalabi, a deeply divisive figure generally supported by the 
neoconservative factions but met with deep scepticism by the CIA and the State 
Department.127 Even Douglas Feith admits in his book that Chalabi saw himself as ‘the leader’ 
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of the political process.128 A paper by the British Overseas and Defence Secretariat described 
him in March 2002 as ‘a convicted fraudster popular on Capitol Hill’.129 
War plans under review 
Meanwhile, since early August 2001, Rumsfeld was going through various war plans in the 
Pentagon.130 He found most of them to be outdated and relying on too much personnel to get 
the plan to work. He felt that part of the reason was that at the lower levels, planners would 
not be able to accurately decide the level of risk that the plans should be willing to accept: the 
result would be to make sure all parts of the plan were robust enough, with enough 
manpower, rather than reflect what Rumsfeld would consider a more suitable risk/force 
level.131 He demanded the plans be rewritten more quickly than via usual procedures, asking 
‘to come back to me every six or eight weeks’. 132 
In November 2001, Rumsfeld asked CENTCOM Commander Franks for the beginning of a 
new war plan – a so-called commander’s estimate – within one week.133 They met again six 
days later; four days later; Rumsfeld gave a top secret planning order, do be done in three 
days instead of the usual thirty.134 Further iterations and presentations took place on 4 
December, 12 December, 19 December, 28 December, and 1 February.135 By now the old Op 
Plan 1003 had morphed into the Generated Start Plan.136 Over the following months, this 
would be further adapted until option Running Start was presented on 3 June 2002 and the 
Hybrid option was presented to 5 August 2002.137 During this last National Security Council 
meeting, it was clear that Franks expected to have 265.000 troops immediately after combat, 
to be drawn down to 50.000 over the course of 18 months.138 Afterwards, Powell warned the 
president extensively about the potential problems with the aftermath.139 
After 9/11 
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Two days after 9/11, Iraq was mentioned as a possible country against which action should 
be taken during the Deputies Committee meeting that met in preparation for the upcoming 
Camp David meeting.140 In advance of that meeting, Rumsfeld sent a strategy memo to the 
President and other National Security Council members.141 In it, he proposed that Iraq should 
be an immediate priority. Nonetheless, on 15 September at a Camp David meeting, none of 
the president’s top advisers – Cheney, Powell, White House Chief of Staff Card, Tenet, and 
Rumsfeld – voted in favour of Iraq as an initial target of war.142 Rumsfeld abstained. However, 
the impetus for addressing Iraq was there. On 29 January 2002, Iraq featured in the State of 
the Union speech as a country that was an axis of evil (the axis of evil, that is, between 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; not an axis between the three countries 
mentioned).143 Two and a half weeks later, on 16 February 2003, the president signed a new 
top secret Intelligence Order granting new authorities to conduct operations in Iraq.144 
In early 2002, Rice’s deputy Stephen Hadley began organising Deputies Lunches: close hold 
(meaning even the existence of the meetings had to be kept quiet) twice-weekly meetings to 
discuss Iraq policy to discuss Iraq policy more freely.145 Feith writes that the necessity of 
disarmament was generally accepted within this forum, and regime change was supposed to 
be necessary to achieve this. In addition to this group, in July 2002, Director of Strategic Plans 
and Policy of the Joint Staff George Casey set up the Iraq Political-Military Cell.146 This was 
an interagency group to coordinate planning between Washington and CENTCOM. An 
Executive Steering Group soon followed. 
Nonetheless, actual post-war planning never seemed to materialize. Feith, in War and 
Decision, writes that the ‘common accusation that the Administration neglected to conduct 
postwar planning for Iraq is wrong’, as was the idea that ‘the Pentagon’s civilian leaders 
believed no such planning was required’.147 However, even from his own book it is clear that 
no such planning materialized. By his telling of the story, CENTCOM’s Tommy Franks was 
responsible for post-war planning. Yet even by Feith’s own account, ‘[s]everal months [after 
October 2002], however, we were still trying to concentrate CENTCOM’s attention on these 
issues.’148 He describes at some length the efforts done by the Joint Staff to prod post-war 
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planning along – but the plans were not materialising. Eventually in January 2003, Rumsfeld 
directed Vice Admiral Edmund Giambastiani to create a Joint Task Force ‘to support 
CENTCOM’s postwar planning efforts’.149 
Interestingly enough, Franks seems to have been under the impression that Douglas Feith’s 
office was responsible for this part of the planning. In fall 2002, it had been decided that 
Defense would be put in charge of the entirety of the preparation for the conflict, explicitly 
including the responsibility to run postwar Iraq.150 The idea was to have unity of command 
for the entire conflict, which made Defense a more natural candidate than the State 
Department. Bob Woodward writes that there was a meeting between Rumsfeld, General 
Franks, Air Force Major General Renuart and Feith, in which Rumsfeld announces that 
Defence would be in charge.151 Franks and Feith had a famously bad relationship.152 
According to Woordward, ‘Feith agreed and said he wanted his policy operation to lead the 
postwar effort ... Feith would handle the job for Defense, Rumsfeld said.’153 When Franks and 
Renuart left the meeting, they concluded that this meant that Feith’s office ‘has responsibility 
for planning post-conflict and our responsibility is security. And we don't own the 
reconstruction stuff’, concluding they might have ‘dodged a big bullet’.154 To augment 
capacity, the Office of Special Plans (meant to be for Iraq policy) was established in Feith’s 
organization.155 It is clear that Feith wrote – as he was wont to do – conceptual notes. 
However, he or his office did not write – and never intended to write – operational plans, 
later dismissing as ‘ludicrous’ the idea that they could have done so.156 
In other words, although there might have been a theoretical understanding that planning 
was needed for Phase IV, such planning did not materialise. Moreover, the (conceptual) 
planning that had been done had a number of assumptions that were rapidly undone by 
Bremer after the war – such as using parts of the Iraqi army as a reconstruction force.157 It 
would seem that the need for extensive planning was felt less keenly because the 
neoconservatives wanted to hand over power to the exiles and other Iraqis as soon as 
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possible as ‘the only partners available’.158 These Iraqis seem to have promised a vision of a 
liberated Iraq that proved wildly optimistic, including in a meeting with President Bush and 
Cheney in a private meeting on 10 January 2003.159  
Ultimately, though, for this dissertation’s analysis, the primary reasons for the American lack 
of preparation are less relevant than the fact that the Americans were not prepared for an 
occupation and that – as later chapters will show – the British were aware of this. Although 
they were a junior partner, they subscribed to participation in the conflict, despite realising 
the plans were likely insufficient and despite having established earlier that a solid plan – for 
all stages of the conflict – was a necessary condition for Britain to participate in military 
action. Therein lies the interest of this dissertation. 
Existing interpretations of this failure to be prepared  
How to interpret this American failure to be prepared? The first interpretation of this failure 
to prepare well in the literature is that “the founding sin of the occupation was its chronic 
lack of personnel and coercive capacity”.160 In this reading, blame for the failure to establish 
safety and security in the territory of Iraq after the fall of Baghdad lies with those in the 
American administration who drove down troop numbers to skeletal levels. 
The second type of explanation, as argued by Dodge, focuses on the rivalries within the US 
administration, which saw neoconservatives in a fight with the Realists in the State 
department.161 The neoconservative reading of the failure in Iraq would then be as follows: 
there was a workable plan to topple Saddam Hussein, replace him with a body of suitable 
Iraqis friendly to American interests (such as Ahmed Chalabi) and withdraw quickly the 
minimal amounts of troops that had invaded. The Iraqis themselves would then be able to 
improve the situation, including the liberalisation of the economy and the establishment of 
democracy. However, this plan was scuppered by Realists like Colin Powell, whose negative 
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outlook, needless turf wars and slanderous treatment of Chalabi caused avoidable problems. 
The neoconservative plan did not fail; it was never implemented. 
The Realist version would be this: once the neoconservatives got hold of post-war planning, 
they ignored Realist assessments of potential problems as well as the preparation done until 
then by the State department. They had no grasp of the difficulties inherent in an invasion 
and the remodelling of a society and, frankly, did not seem to care. Instead, they wanted to 
put in charge a deeply unsuited Iraqi with no recent knowledge of, or deep ties to, the 
country he was supposed to run. In addition, there was no vision on how this would lead to a 
democracy that was both genuine and pro-American. When this non-plan was put the test, it 
imploded just as one could have expected. 
Both these readings acknowledge that neoconservative thinking held that relatively little 
American involvement would be needed once Saddam Hussein had been toppled. Building on 
this, Dodge, in a series of publications, examines whence this ideological view that little 
preparation was needed.162 His argument is that while neo-conservatism has ideological tools 
and concepts to argue for American exceptionalism; for democracy; and for an aggressive, 
unilateral foreign policy to unite American, it has little to say about how any invasion should 
proceed. In other words, neo-conservative thinking can explain why America went to war; 
what it has little to say about are the preparation or plans for such a war. 
According to Dodge, this conceptual vacuum was filled by neo-liberal concepts, more 
specifically the neoliberal ideas of the individual, the market, the state, and democracy.163 At 
the heart of neoliberalism is the rational individual that, once liberated, will use its liberty 
and rationality to create wealth through and derive benefits from the free market. The state 
has an ambiguous role. Foremost, it is an institution whose power, easily to great, must be 
feared and constrained.164 Democracy, the fourth concept, is meant to keep state power in 
check. On the other hand, the state has a role to play in achieving liberal values: as the 
guarantor of security, of market functions, of property rights; but also, in the reading of 
kinetic neoliberalism, by bringing democracy and free markets to unfree people. 
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Dodge goes on to argue that liberalism’s trust in individuals and mistrust of the state 
impacted preparations for war in Iraq by framing the Iraqi problem as one of a too-dominant 
state oppressing rational people yearning to be free. The solution for post-Saddam Iraq, 
therefore, did not rely on extensive state building. It relied on getting Saddam Hussein out, 
followed by getting out of the way. In this view, the underpreparedness of the American 
administration went further than technocratic discussions about the force levels needed. 
Rather, there was no understanding of the need for state building. After the invasion, it 
became clear that the Iraqi state institutions had been nigh completely hollowed out by three 
decades of sanctions designed to break the state.165 It had been replaced, to a large extent, by 
an informal, personal shadow network of influence centred around the dictator. Dodge 
argues convincingly that for Iraq to become a democracy, it was the shadow system that 
needed to be dismantled. The state needed building up. For ideological reasons, the US had 
not anticipated this need and was accordingly unprepared. 
The third type of explanation is the type of explanation put forward by Jonathan Steele in 
Defeat: Losing Iraq and the Future of the Middle East.166 This explanation is that the war in 
Iraq was lost because it was unwinnable for reasons internal to Iraq. According to this 
rationale, no Anglo-American occupation of Iraq was ever going to work out well, for Iraqis 
would necessarily rapidly grow weary of those invaders (who have a bad reputation in the 
region based on history). At various point in his work, Steele seems to suggest that quick 
withdrawal could have led to better results – a result, no doubt, of his relentless journalistic 
account of signs that the Americans and their partners were overstaying their welcome. At 
times, this line of argumentation – although never fully developed – runs close to the 
neoconservative argument. If he considers a successful prolonged occupation clearly 
impossible, it is less clear what Steele would have thought of an invasion followed by 
immediate withdrawal. On the one hand, his focus on prolonged American-British presence 
as the source of all failure seems to suggest it would have been the better option.  
On the other hand, at various other moments in the book, his descriptions of the difficulties in 
Iraq suggest that while different groups in Iraq might have all wanted the Americans to leave, 
they also had different and incompatible views on the future of the state. It is not so clear, 
then, whether Iraqis would have been able to achieve any success in constructing a stable, 
prosperous nation on their own. In this book as well as many other descriptions of the 
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situation on the ground, we find much to believe that Dodge’s analysis is right: the Iraqi state 
was weak vis-à-vis the old shadow structures of Saddam Hussein and needed to be built up.  
6. THE BRITISH FAILURE TO BE PREPARED: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIS 
DISSERTATION 
How do these three types of arguments – low levels of troops and other ‘practical’ failures in 
preparation; ideological reasons for un(der)preparedness; and the idea that occupation of 
Iraq will always fail for reasons intrinsic to Iraq – relate to this dissertation’s explanation for 
the British mispreparation for the post-invasion phase? Or, put differently: what is the value 
of this thesis’ contribution, given the explanations that already exist? Let us begin with 
Jonathan Steele’s argument, that Iraq could never be successfully occupied by the Americans 
and the British. This argument merits attention not only because it emerges as a possible 
competing explanation, but all the more so because Steele explicitly phrases it as an 
alternative to a theory of bad preparation (which is what I provide).  
The very beginning of his introduction sets out the stakes: 
The bad decisions … made after the fall of Saddam Hussein have been extensively 
reported by US officials who worked in Iraq and became disillusioned. On returning 
home, they wrote illuminating accounts of incompetence, stupidity, arrogance, and 
corruption. Their common argument is that Bush and Blair failed to plan for the post-
war, then compounded this blunder with a series of mistakes. … The assumption … is 
that with better pre-war preparation and post-war management, the USA could have 
won the peace as impressively as it had won the opening phase of the war.167 
Steele goes on to explain that his thesis is more fundamental, as no invasion of Iraq could 
have succeeded.168 
This dissertation, like the accounts that Steele refers to, considers pre-war preparation 
(although not post-war management). My argument is that the pre-war preparation was 
flawed and that its failures need to be understood more specifically and properly to avoid 
similar mistakes in future. Indeed, as set out in the next chapter, the argument is that the 
consistent use of a preferred alternative can help prevent (some of) these harms. However, 
there is no underlying assumption in this dissertation that a better preparation would have 
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guaranteed success. The idea that there can be only one cause of failure is patently false. I 
thus reject Steele’s dichotomy: there can be multiple causes of failure.  
This is important for several reasons. First, to say that the successful invasion of Iraq was an 
impossible task, as suggested by Steele, does not mean one can leave behind questions of 
preparation. Rather, this raises a crucial question: why was this alleged impossibility not 
picked up before going to war? Either the invasion was unwinnable from the outset and 
something in the policy process went wrong, leading to the failure to recognise this; or the 
invasion was lost at a later stage and preparation becomes a relevant topic of analysis. (A 
third possibility, that the invasion failed for reasons internal to Iraq that could not have been 
discovered beforehand, is clearly not the argument Steele puts forward and is moot.)  
The other problem with Steele’s approach is the following: his insistence on a monocausal 
explanation that discards policy preparation as a cause of failure, does not allow for any 
lessons to be drawn from those other failures. It is very well possible that the United States 
and Britain prepared badly and that there were unanticipated difficulties because of the 
nature of an invasion of Iraq (arguably a preparation failure in and of itself). However, 
focusing only on the latter and presuming that this makes the former irrelevant, means 
forgoing all possibility for inquiry and learning from those mistakes.  Yet as this dissertation 
shows, Britain had difficulties preparing for Iraq not only in the sense that the policy did not 
match the ambitions (an argument that might please Steele) but also in the sense that the 
plans it conceived in theory were not adequately prepared, let alone implemented in practice. 
This internal incoherence is a failure in and of itself, one with potential wider ramifications 
than just the invasion of Iraq. 
In that sense, this dissertation is much more sympathetic to Dodge. Indeed, I believe much of 
value can be found in his analysis to understand the American failure to prepare. However, to 
explain the American failure to prepare is not to explain the British failure to prepare. The 
British decision to go to war happened – this hardly needs repetition – because the United 
States went to war. Had the US not gone to war, the UK would not have faced this choice 
between joining the United States or stepping aside. In that sense, British Iraq policy was 
shaped and constrained by American decisions – just as it was shaped and constrained by the 
behaviour of Iraq, France, and other countries. Nonetheless, the British decision for war was 
an autonomous decision by an independent nation, neither automatic nor following the same 
rationale as that of the United States. No (academic) observer explains the British invasion of 
Iraq in terms of neo-conservatism, oil, the Israel lobby, or half a dozen other reasons that are 
61 
 
thought to have shaped the US decision. A prima facie case therefore exists that the British 
failure to prepare well similarly has a dynamic of its own. 
That is not to say, of course, that we need to presume that the UK intended to have, or would 
have been expected to have, an independent post-invasion plan. In the words of Dominick 
Chilcott from the Foreign Office: “The first thing to say about the plan is that there was only 
ever going to be one plan. That would be the coalition plan, which would largely be an 
American plan.”169 However, two elements still applied. The first is that the UK did intend to 
prepare (and indeed did prepare) its own plans within the framework of the American plan. 
To say that there would be no independent British plan is not to say that there would be no 
British planning or plans. It is clear, both from the contemporary records and from later 
writing and testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, that civil servants across Whitehall departments 
felt planning was needed. Planning was being done. Yet at the end of the day, it was not 
suitable for the circumstances under which Britain ended up joining the invasion. This 
specific British aspect merits attention for it reveals flaws in British decision-making and 
policy preparation.  
Secondly, British policy from the outset was that Britain would only join an American-led 
invasion if several conditions were fulfilled. A clear plan to achieve the goals was one of those 
conditions. This means that one of two things must be explained: either one must show that 
the British also took the combination of neoconservative and neoliberal views that made 
post-war preparation superfluous for large parts of the American administration (though 
certainly not all); or one must explain why Britain went along with a partner with a half-
baked plan for an invasion. There are no indications that the former was the case. Perhaps 
the prime minister comes closest to following the neoconservative view that no preparation 
was needed; not because of neoconservative views but as a result of his optimism and dislike 
of details. However, even  Tony Blair, whenever he was confronted with the question of 
preparation, indicated the British civil service should prepare for an ‘exemplary’ role and 
make available what was needed. As for the FCO and DFID, indications are that they were 
deeply worried about the lack of post-war planning. 
In other words, two elements remain that merit attention and analysis. The first is that those 
plans for the aftermath that were made by Britain, were internally incoherent and unsuited 
for the invasion that the UK chose to pursue. The second is that despite this – and despite, it 
would seem, being aware of this to at least a certain extent – Britain did go to war under 
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circumstances it would have previously deemed unacceptable. This puzzle, which has not yet 
been addressed fully, is the precise topic of this dissertation. Indeed, the argument of this 
dissertation is that these two failures are connected. How Britain decided on war impacted 
how it was able to prepare for this war. For this reason, we cannot content ourselves to 
knowing why the United Kingdom invaded alongside the United States (to the extent that 
such a consensus has emerged). We must also understand the failure to be properly 
prepared; that this failure can be (partly) addressed by a structural mechanism, the preferred 
alternative, that is applicable not only to Iraq; and whether such planning failures can be 
avoided in future. That is the contribution of this dissertation. 
It is worth restating clearly at this point that my goal is not to explain the British failure on 
the ground in Iraq. Indeed, my metric of failure is not the post-war situation on the ground 
(unlike virtually all academic work on Iraq). I do not argue that British policy preparation 
was bad because it failed to provide good results in Iraq. After all – as follows from Steele’s 
argument – it is in principle possible to have the best possible preparation and still lose a war 
or an invasion. Defeat is not an appropriate metric for the quality of preparation. Therefore, 
instead I judge the quality of preparation and plans by several conditions that have the 
propensity to bring about good results. These are that good plans are internally coherent; that 
they are appropriate (rationally connecting ends and means); and well-developed.  
The argument of this dissertation, introduced in the next chapter, is that the systematic use of 
the ‘preferred alternative’ is more likely to lead to internally coherent, well-developed, 
appropriate plans. Note that it is perfectly possible to have plans that are internally coherent, 
well-developed, and appropriate without ever establishing a preferred alternative. Likewise, 
establishing a preferred alternative does not automatically mean plans will be internally 
coherent or well-developed. The independent and dependent variable are both theoretically 
and practically distinct. However, as theorized in the next chapter and demonstrated in the 
empirical chapter, the systematic use of preferred alternatives makes better plans (defined as 
coherent, developed, and appropriate) more likely.  
7. CONCLUSION  
This chapter started off by setting out existing FPA of the British involvement in the Iraq 
conflict. Much of this analysis has focused on Tony Blair’s personality and characteristics. A 
constraint challenger with a high need for power, a tendency to black-and-white thinking and 
a high belief in himself, Tony Blair was willing to go against substantial domestic opposition 
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to pursue his preferred policy.170 Whether he did so under false pretences remains a matter 
of debate. Hoggett has argued that the Prime Minister must be understood as self-
deceiving.171 Daddow, meanwhile, explains Tony Blair’s Iraq choices as the choices of 
someone who came into power with no articular interest in foreign policy and who was 
subsequently shaped by his military success in the Kosovo campaign.172 Biographers, by 
contrast, have focused on his upbringing and religious beliefs to account for his policy 
tendencies.173  
Other writers remind us not to consider British Iraq policy in a vacuum. Williams reminds us 
that policy is made by a variety of actors and that, although British Iraq policy in 2001-2003 
is often considered as a radical break with the past, three rather traditional ideas underlay 
Labours foreign policy agenda: multilateralism, Atlanticism, and neoliberalism.174 O’Malley 
highlights the options prime ministers have to impact policy by structuring the choices other 
actors face.175 Kettell focuses on the features of the British political system, which according 
to him promotes strong leadership and fails to provide formal checks and balances.176 Strong, 
however, also points out that systems change and traces the growth of the parliamentary 
prerogative to decide on war in the years since Iraq.177 The wider context of Anglo-American 
relations has also widely been understood as a factor shaping British Iraq policy. Danchev 
puts the so-called Special Relationship in historical perspective.178 Most scholars, including 
Porter, are sceptical of the actual existence of a relationship that is extraordinary enough to 
be special.179 Certainly, the consensus is that Britain came out of the Iraq episode impaired.  
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To understand the Iraq conflict, however, we must not only understand the factors that 
shaped British policy. We must also understand what precisely the British case for war was. 
This case can be summarized (roughly) as follows: Saddam Hussein is a threat and Britain, 
like the rest of the international community, must address this threat.180 The usual method of 
containment is not good enough, both because it fails to depose Saddam Hussein and because 
it leads to great humanitarian suffering, which is wrong in itself and which also makes 
containment politically unviable. Moreover, 9/11 shows terrorists willing to attack as lethally 
as possible. This raises the spectre of a combination of terrorism and weapons of mass 
destruction. We cannot be sure that Saddam Hussein currently has weapons of mass 
destruction, but we can safely assume he has bad intentions and a bad record, which makes 
him a big enough risk even without further intelligence. 9/11 also jolts the United States in 
action, which provides a window of opportunity to deal with Saddam Hussein – which in any 
case had always been the right course of action. It is the moral duty of the international 
community to face this danger together, but if the Security Council fails to act, that does not 
excuse Britain from not fulfilling its moral duty.  
Thus, Britain joins the American invasion. Given the security risk posed by Saddam Hussein, 
something must happen. Out of two options – further containment and military disarmament 
– one is wrong for humanitarian reasons and ineffective in addressing the security concern: 
containment leaves Saddam Hussein in power to oppress minorities, sanctions hurt the Iraqi 
population further and the Iraqi leader seems to be able to work his way around sanctions to 
a significant extent. Hence the British government takes the least evil road and invades Iraq. 
To be clear, I argue that this case is illogical and unfairly argued. It portrays Britain’s Iraq 
options as dichotomous, failing to engage with the option of Smart Sanctions. It has an 
element of catastrophic thinking. Most importantly, sanctions are dismissed because they are 
not guaranteed to work, but the alternative of an invasion is not even submitted to that same 
litmus test. Thus, policy is made using unfair limitations and incoherent metrics. 
The American reasons for going to war were and are hotly debated by the public and 
academics alike.181 There is no agreement why America went to war when it did; whether 
weapons of mass destruction were a genuine worry of the American administration (and if 
so, of which parts of the US Administration); whether 9/11 provided a rationale or a window 
of opportunity.182 Nor is the precise role of the neoconservative faction within government 
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clear.183 Is has been convincingly established that they pushed for a stronger take on Iraq 
well before 9/11 (and, for many, before they were in government), but it is unclear whether 
they convinced the president or whether Bush and others were willing to take stronger 
action against Bagdad in any case.184 
It is clear that the Americans extensively planned for Phase III of the war, which involved 
toppling Baghdad and ’liberating’ the country. It is equally clear that not much preparation 
was done to prepare for any occupation of Iraq. Dodge has convincingly argued that this can 
partly be attributed to a failure to see the need for much planning to build up the state, as the 
American analysis of the Iraqi problem concluded that the Iraqi state was too strong rather 
than too weak.185 Similarly, exiled Iraqis were giving a rosy picture of Iraq after the 
liberation.186 However, this is likely not the full story. There seem to also have been more 
banal problems such as no clear, unambiguous locus of responsibility for the post-war phase 
within the Administration; personality and departmental clashes preventing coordination; 
and a glossing over differences which meant that contradictory plans could be made.187 
Examples of the latter are questions on whether there would be long transition period before 
power would be handed over to the Iraqis (and to which Iraqis), as well as an assumption in 
certain plans that parts of the Iraqi army would be kept whereas this decision was reversed 
soon after the invasion by Bremer.188 
Various arguments have been put forward to explain this American lack of planning; it is 
important to articulate why these worthwhile contributions nonetheless do not answer the 
question asked in this dissertation. That question is the following: how did Britain fail to 
develop appropriate plans for the conflict in Iraq, most notably for the post-war phase, and 
decide to nonetheless participate in the American-led invasion under conditions it would 
have previously deemed unacceptable?  
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The first argument that needs to be engaged with is the idea that the failure to prepare can be 
explained not as a failure to implement planning preparation, but as a failure to recognise the 
need for planning.189 This line of argument would build on the idea that those in charge of 
making Iraq policy had ideological reasons to believe that post-invasion planning was 
unnecessary and therefore did not attempt to plan. I demonstrate that this line of thinking is 
not sufficient – nor necessary – to explain the British failure to prepare for Phase IV. In 
Britain, at least, the need to prepare was recognised. The concept was honoured in the breach 
at all times.  
There is no reason to believe this honouring in the breach was disingenuous; there are many 
elements that indicate most and perhaps all key actors in the British system believed in and 
recognised the need to prepare. It is the failure to act on these insights that needs to be 
explained. This is true even if Britain resumed the US would be responsible for most of the 
Phase IV planning: Britain realised such planning was necessary; it knew it was missing; it 
nonetheless went to war with this lack of plan. Moreover, as demonstrated at length in the 
empirical chapters, the problem was not just that Americans did not see the need for Phase 
IV planning: British planning too was incoherent, inappropriate, and underdeveloped. This 
remains to be explained.  
The second alternative explanation for failure is the idea that the war in Iraq could not be 
won for reasons internal to Iraq.190 This line of thought suggests that conditions in Iraq 
meant that the ambitions embraced by the United States and (without much thought) by the 
United Kingdom were never realistic. Failure in Iraq, therefore, must be understood as a 
function of goals that were impossible to begin with because of circumstances outside of 
Britain. I do not deny that there might have been causes for failure intrinsic to the country of 
Iraq. Nor, however, is this incompatible with my argument, which is that the preparation 
done by Britain was internally contradictory. Moreover, this new argument opens new 
perspectives for lessons on how to avoid this type of policy failure, important in and of itself. 
If one argues that Iraq cannot be invaded (and rebuild) successfully, the lesson to take away 
is: do not invade Iraq. My analysis allows for a different and additional kind of lesson: how to 
avoid internal incoherence in your plans. The applicability and importance of this lesson is 
broader than to warn politicians about repeating the invasion of Iraq. 
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Chapter II: The Importance of Knowing What You 
Want 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation identifies a problem in 2001-2003 Iraq policy: the plans prepared were not 
suitable for the policy eventually chosen. It gives an argument about the root cause of this 
problem: there was no clarity about the limits of the policy pursued by the government. It 
also gives a remedy that would have prevented such a lack of clarity: the conscious use of a 
‘preferred alternative to the pursued policy’. This dissertation thus makes claims about the 
content of British Iraq policy as well as about the policy-making process. The last chapter 
introduced existing understandings of British Iraq policy; this chapter introduces the 
dissertation’s arguments about the policy-making process. The first argument is that 
governments, in this case the British government, should have clear limits when defining 
their foreign policies, in this case Iraq policy. The second and principal argument is that those 
limits, or minimal requirements, are best established by consciously determining the 
preferred alternative to the pursued policy, a tool analogous to the well-known ‘best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement’. 
This ‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’, or BATNA, finds its origins in the Harvard 
Negotiation Project. It was meant as a practical tool to help negotiators determine whether 
they should accept a proposed deal or walk away from the negotiations. I argue that the 
concept can be adapted and extended to be of use in foreign policy decision-making (where I 
will call it the ‘preferred alternative’ to the pursued policy). Indeed, in such circumstances, 
the preferred alternative and the ‘minimal requirements’ that can be derived from it have 
benefits beyond those originally envisaged by Fisher and Ury: they enhance the 
interdepartmental coherence of policy and the communication between government and civil 
service. After introducing the original and the reworked concept, I detail how the transfer of 
the original concept to a foreign policy decision-making context is plausible. 
The next section then addresses how the preferred alternative fits in with existing 
understandings of foreign policy decision-making. Discussing rationalist and cognitive 
models of decision-making, I argue that the former pose problems of process validity, 
whereas the latter are weaker on outcome validity. For the purposes of my argument, 
however, it is crucial that any theory in which I locate the dissertation has both process and 
outcome validity, as I propose a heuristic tool – the preferred alternative – to achieve better 
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policy outcomes. To be workable, the preferred alternative must be compatible with how 
policy-makers decide on foreign policy; to be useful, it must be compatible with ensuring 
good outcomes. I go on to argue that poliheuristic theory has good results on both counts. 
This is where I locate my contribution to the FPA literature. 
The argument of this chapter is not merely that the transfer of BATNAs from a negotiation 
context to a foreign policy-making context can work; it is also that the use of the preferred 
alternative has additional benefits not attributed to the original BATNA. As set out in the fifth 
section, the preferred alternative allows governments to delineate more clearly the limits of 
the policy it intends to pursue (by providing an alternative to which the original policy can be 
benchmarked). This determining of ‘minimal requirements’ is likely to keep policy better 
defined, coordinated, and less likely to be subject to drift. I briefly set out how this argument 
relates to existing understandings of principal-agent problems. 
The next three sections are more practical. The first discusses how preferred alternatives are 
to be used in practice, providing a set of guidelines to better illuminate how the theory can be 
made to work. It stresses that the tool proposed in this chapter should not be expected to be 
a fail-safe way to make policy; rather, it makes good policy and good policy outcomes more 
likely. This is true even if policy-makers will not, for practical reasons, manage to use the 
preferred alternative perfectly. The comparison to the policy goal and strategy illuminates 
this. The second section sets out how this chapter’s argument will be applied, in the rest of 
the dissertation, to the British preparation for the invasion of Iraq. The last section, 
meanwhile, discuss my methodology, including source selection and working methods during 
the empirical research.  
This chapter’s goal is to introduce the concept of the preferred alternative to a pursued policy 
and corresponding minimal requirements. The argument is that without a preferred 
alternative, governments are more likely to be ill-prepared for the policies they end up 
pursuing; they are also more likely to make a suboptimal choice in negotiations because 
without knowledge of their preferred alternative, they have lost both their leverage and their 
capacity to clearly assess the merits of the negotiated agreement offered to them. The 
following four chapters will argue that this is exactly what happened to British Iraq policy 
between 2001 and 2003. Chapters III-V will describe the development of the United 
Kingdom’s Iraq policy from 9/11 to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq in new empirical 
research. Chapter VI will summarize these developments from the angle set out in this 
chapter. 
2. BEST ALTERNATIVES IN NEGOTIATIONS: THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT 
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The Harvard Negotiation Project – since renamed to Program on Negotiation – was set up in 
1979 to study negotiation and conflict resolution. 191 It was (and is) conceived as a practical 
project. As a result from this project, in 1981 Roger Fisher and William Ury published their 
now-famous Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In.192 The book is a 
practical guide to negotiations and focuses on the concept of ‘principled negotiation’, to find 
durable solutions for all parties involved. The book has since become a staple of negotiation 
training in countries across the world. 
One of the concepts made widely known by the publication of Getting to Yes was that of a so-
called ‘BATNA’, the ‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’. In negotiations, the 
argument goes, people should consider their best available path if the negotiation were to 
break down. This ‘best alternative’ should then be used as a benchmark to decide whether to 
accept the final deal offered in the negotiations or whether to walk away. This idea is 
straightforward: people negotiate because they expect ‘to produce something better than the 
results you can obtain without negotiating’.193 If the result is worse than what you could have 
obtained without the negotiations, you would be better off walking away from the table. In 
other words, people should compare any offer in the negotiations to the best they would be 
able to get by walking away: their best alternative to a negotiated solution. ‘That is the 
standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured’.194 
This might sound trivially true; Fisher and Ury argued that it is not. They wrote that when 
people prepare for negotiations, they usually have a ‘bottom line’ in mind: an idea of how far 
they are willing to go in the negotiations. However, negotiating with such a bottom line in 
mind has drawbacks as well as advantages: 
Negotiators commonly try to protect themselves against [accepting an outcome they ought to 
reject] by establishing in advance the worst acceptable outcome – their ‘bottom line’. (…) 
Having a bottom line makes it easier to resist pressure and temptations of the moment. (...) 
But the protection afforded by adopting a bottom line involves high costs. It limits your ability 
to benefit from what you learn during negotiation (…) inhibits imagination (…) [and] is likely 
to be set too high. An arbitrarily selected [bottom line] is no measure of what you should 
accept.195 
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In other words, people will often set limits on what they are willing to accept, but they do not 
typically do so by considering their alternatives. Yet they ought to be considering their best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement for two distinct reasons. The first is the 
straightforward assumption that people want the outcome that they consider best. If this is 
true, it only makes sense to compare the available options and pick the best one – which is 
exactly what a BATNA does. Yet Fisher and Ury have a second reason for focusing on the 
BATNA rather than bottom lines per se: their focus is on creating win/win situation, and an 
overly narrow focus on bottom lines might hinder people to come up with alternatives. 
The heads of the Harvard Negotiation Project also observed that those without a clear idea of 
their BATNA might become overly optimistic or pessimistic about their alternatives beyond 
the negotiated agreement.196 In most circumstances, they argue, ‘the greater danger is that 
you are too committed to reaching agreement. Not having developed any alternative to a 
negotiated solution, you are unduly pessimistic about what would happen if negotiations 
broke off.’197 Fear of the unknown and wishful thinking about the outcome of the negotiation 
combined can lead parties to accept even negotiated agreements they ought to reject. 
Sometimes the opposite happens: people are overly optimistic about their alternatives, for 
instances because they consider all the alternatives they have without considering that these 
alternatives are mutually exclusive198: If I did not go to graduate school, I could earn a lot of 
money, or travel, or set up my own company, or spend more time with my children. A BATNA 
thus is not only useful if negotiations fail: it is valuable for the ongoing negotiation itself. 
BATNAs should not just be a fall-back option; they are an integral part of the initial 
negotiations. 
Even when still pursuing negotiations, understanding, choosing, and developing a BATNA is 
crucial because ‘[a]ttractive alternatives are not just sitting there waiting for you: you usually 
have to develop them’.199 Not choosing a BATNA might leave people unsure or insecure about 
their options and lead them to accept an unnecessarily negative outcome rather than walk 
away from the negotiation table. But not developing the BATNA can also force people to 
accept a worse-than-necessary deal at the negotiation table because this lack of preparation 
has foreclosed the best alternative. Indeed, negotiating parties that fail to prepare a viable 
best alternative during their negotiations might well be justified in their fear for the 
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unknown alternative and their desire to settle in less than ideal circumstances. A well-
developed BATNA would prevent this from occurring. 
3. PREFERED ALTERNATIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING 
This dissertation applies the core concept of the ‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’ 
to a different environment, namely that of policy makers making internal decisions on which 
policy option to pursue. To distinguish between the original concept and the modified 
version proposed in this dissertation, the new version will here be called the ‘preferred 
alternative’. This not only helps distinguish the original concept from the modified use 
proposed here: in choosing the words ‘preferred alternative’, I also stress that in many 
scenarios, there might be a limited number of several alternatives for which one could 
reasonably argue, rather than one clearly superior, objectively best alternative policy. My 
argument is not about which alternative should prevail in intragovernmental decision-
making, but rather that agreement about the preferred alternative is crucial. Likewise, on the 
topic of the Iraq war, the argument is not that Tony Blair’s preferred alternative to 
disarmament via the Security Council was the wrong choice. The argument is rather that the 
confusion about which alternative was the preferred alternative wreaked havoc on the 
government’s capacity to prepare in a timely and relevant manner. 
However, it should also be clear that while I call it a ‘preferred alternative’, I refer to the one 
alternative that the government has a whole has identified as the alternative of choice in case 
the original policy needs to be abandoned. Two elements are important. First, this alternative 
of choice does not refer to what would be chosen in an ideal world. ‘Preferred alternative’ 
does not refer to the ideal alternative in a perfect world that would by hypothetically 
preferable. Rather, it refers to that choice of alternative that has been identified, given the 
circumstances, as the government’s preferred option if the first policy were to fail. Second, 
not everyone without government needs to prefer this alternative. It is quite possible that 
different people or departments have different private (or even public) preferences. 
‘Preferred alternative’, again, means only that the people with decision-making power have 
decided that this is the alternative that is, on balance, given circumstances, the preferred way 
of handling the failure of the original policy. 
The core argument of this chapter is the following: when formulating foreign policy, 
politicians and other policy-makers should not only determine their foreign policy 
goal and their strategy (as they habitually do). They should also, already at the time 
when they are still determining and then pursuing this original policy, determine their 
preferred alternative if this first policy must be abandoned. Moreover, they should use 
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this new-found sense of their preferred alternative to determine the minimal 
requirements they wish to attach to the policy they are pursuing. In other words, a 
foreign policy stance should consist of four elements instead of the usual two: not only of 
policy goal and strategy, but also of preferred alternative and corresponding minimal 
requirements. 
What do I mean by minimal requirements (a concept only implicitly present in Getting to 
Yes)? Very few policy goals are worth pursuing at all costs and under all circumstances. There 
thus being limitations to the applicability of each policy option, policy-makers should be 
mindful of those limitations to prevent choosing policies that are no(t) (longer) suitable for 
the circumstances. Thus, they should establish the limits of any foreign policy goal they 
intend to pursue. Of course, one might argue that to do so, politicians and other policy-
makers should simply establish ‘red lines’, that is to say non-negotiable, fixed conditions that 
trigger certain reactions, including the enactment or abandonment of a certain policy. The 
many cartoons about Obama drawing red lines for Syria are but one reminder of this idea of 
red lines as part of smart policy-making. 
However, the insight of the Harvard Negotiation Program is precisely the idea that random 
red lines (what Ury and Fisher call ‘bottom lines’) are not the best way of determining one’s 
position. As they put it regarding negotiations: 
The reason you negotiate is to produce something better than the results you can obtain 
without negotiating. What are those results? What is that alternative? (...) That is the standard 
against which any proposed agreement should be measured.200 (my emphasis) 
Similarly, one should abandon a policy if not abandoning it would lead to worse. But one can 
only make that judgement by comparing the policy one is pursuing with the alternative one 
would have if one decided to abandon the original policy. Abandoning one policy to end up in 
a worse situation does not constitute a wise course of action. Only your assessment of your 
next best option – your preferred alternative (or ‘best alternative’ in Ury and Fisher’s 
language) – can give you a clear indication of whether to stick with a certain policy. Thus, just 
as your negotiation limits should depend on your best alternative to the negotiated 
agreement, your ‘red lines’ in foreign policy decision-making should depend on your chosen 
preferred alternative – your best plan-B – to the policy you originally tried to pursue. Red 
lines thus defined are what I refer to as ‘minimal requirements’. 
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How would the preferred alternative relate to the original policy (which is a combination of a 
goal and a strategy)? Depending on the scenario, the preferred alternative could involve a 
change of strategy, an adjustment of the goal, or a combination of those. The minimal 
requirements are the circumstances under which a change of policy would be triggered. Of 
course, this ‘preferred alternative’ can change as circumstances change and as policy-makers’ 
evaluation or judgements change – much in the same way that policy goals and other aspects 
of policy-making can change as circumstances change. The important element, however, is 
that although this preferred alternative can be subject to change, it should be established at 
the same time when the original policy – policy A – is made. Policy-makers should not await 
the failure of policy A before defining their preferred alternative. 
Just as it is possible for reasonable policy-makers to disagree with each other on what a 
certain policy should be, it is possible for reasonable policy-makers to disagree on what the 
alternative should be if the first policy were to fail. Indeed, this is one reason the preferred 
alternative should be explicitly defined: it is not self-evident. We are not, therefore, looking 
for policy-makers to define the very ‘best’ alternative by one invariable objective metric, 
although we do reasonably expect them to advocate for what they think is the best course of 
action for their government at that particular time, by the metrics they judge most 
appropriate. Nor do we expect them to choose their ‘preferred’ option in a hypothetical world 
where all conceivable options would be on the table. Rather, we expect them to judge, to the 
best of their capacities, what alternative routes would be available if the first policy were to 
fail; and we expect them to agree on one preferred alternative to be shared across 
government and the civil service, much in the same way that they determine a policy goal and 
strategy.  
4. TRANSFERABILITY OF THE CONCEPT  
Applying the concept of the BATNA in a foreign policy decision-making context as a preferred 
alternative raises questions of transferability. Indeed, while the value of the concept will be 
best proven by its application to a variety of cases – of which this dissertation proposes a first 
one – it is worth reflecting on the underlying assumptions on circumstances that constrain 
the original BATNA and ask whether these are similar to the circumstances in which I deploy 
the preferred alternative, to see whether such a transfer is likely to be successful. Four 
elements will be discussed in turn: (the idea) that the BATNA presumes one decision-maker, 
whereas the preferred alternative assumes shared decision-making amongst policy-makers 
as well as a bureaucracy to implement those decisions; that the BATNA is focused on a 
specific negotiation with a topic, unlike foreign policy-making; that the BATNA deals with a 
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minimum of one other party, whereas the preferred alternative is chosen in a circumstance in 
which there is not necessary another party; and that a BATNA is conceptualised as being 
used when the decision-maker is pursuing one goal, whereas policy-makers using preferred 
alternatives are pursuing a wide agenda of goals or policies at the same time. 
One decision-maker versus shared decision-making 
The direct style in which it is written might suggest that Getting to Yes would be aimed at the 
individual negotiator (the ‘you’ to whom the authors are directly speaking). Indeed, the 
recommendations that are given seem personal and might involve understanding your 
constituency, but do not focus on the importance of reaching agreement within one’s ingroup 
before negotiating nor on the challenges that exist herein. The focus is on the engagement of 
the negotiating individual with the other side. That is not to say, though, that the many real-
life examples in the book focus on individuals negotiating on their own behalf. On the 
contrary, the book extensively references IR or foreign policy problems: the Western Sahara, 
the Irish peace agreement, the Law of the Sea Conference, India and Pakistan on the water of 
the Indus River, the Vietnam war, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and so on.201 
In other words, the recommendations made in the book are meant to also – explicitly – apply 
to protracted problems of foreign policy. By virtue of how these problems are engaged with 
in the international realm, and given the authors’ experience, it is therefore clear that these 
recommendations were (also) meant for use by negotiators who were representing the view 
of a government. Although the internal difficulties of coming to a foreign policy position (and 
by extension a negotiation stance) are not the subject of the book, they are compatible with 
the book. Indeed, Getting to Yes focuses on how negotiators should craft their negotiation 
stance, by given four general guidelines (separate the people from the problem; focus on 
interests; invent options for mutual gain; insist on objective criteria) and a number of more 
specific techniques (develop a BATNA among them). However, it is clear that often 
negotiators, such as diplomats, only follow the instructions given by capitals. The lessons in 
the book, including that of the BATNA, should therefore be interpreted to apply not only to 
the individual speaking at the negotiation table, but all those involved in crafting the policy.  
That a bureaucracy is often needed to implement decisions reached is again no objection per 
se against the approaches used in the book. The foreign policy examples in the book in 
practice all were implemented by institutions and organisations larger than one individual. 
This was not the scope of Getting to Yes, but the lessons were clearly meant for large 
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organisations and governments as well. In other words, it is not so much that I argue that the 
idea of a BATNA is transferable from one decision-maker to shared decision-making 
situations: rather, I argue that a close reading of Getting to Yes suggests that this was the 
intention – although not the focus – all along. 
Negotiation on one defined topic versus foreign policy-making on an issue 
Negotiations presume a relatively defined topic. This matters for the use of a BATNA as far as 
a BATNA cannot be determined if there is no definition of topic. A ‘preferred alternative’ on 
anything to anything is not understandable, not useful, and cannot be evaluated. In other 
words, for a preferred alternative to be useful in a foreign policy context, there must equally 
be a relatively defined topic of interest. I argue that in foreign policy, this is typically the case. 
As foreign policy issues emerge, they do so within a temporal, geographical, cultural, and 
historical context. The foreign policy issue comes to the attention of policy-makers to a large 
extent predefined. (Indeed, how these topics emerge and get defined, is a research area in its 
own right, albeit one that falls outside the scope of this dissertation.) There are only a limited 
number of routes that can be envisaged, taken, or implemented. Thus, I would argue that in 
foreign policy topics as in negotiations, the problem is rarely that the topic is not defined 
enough: rather, the bigger issue might be that it is framed so narrowly as to prohibit creative 
understandings of or solutions to the problem. This suggests that preferred alternatives can 
be meaningfully used in a foreign policy context as well as in a more specific negotiation 
context. In that sense, too, the idea of the BATNA is transferable to a foreign policy context 
more generally. 
Negotiating with a party versus acting in foreign policy 
Negotiation presupposes interaction with another player. However, the same is true of 
foreign policy. By its nature, the foreign policy of a government will impact other actors. In 
negotiations, one is in a position where one has both common and divergent interests with 
another party or other parties. If one were to have no common interests, there would be no 
basis for negotiation at all; without divergence in interests there would be no need. As 
Schelling has pointed out, whether others are conceived as friends or enemies makes little 
different from the point of view of strategically dealing with them: even friends have some 
divergences in priorities and concerns and even the severest enemies usually have some 
common interests (for example, to not make Earth unliveable).202 
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To that extent, even if one is not in formalized conversation with others, such as would be the 
case in open negotiations, one is impacting and being impacted by others with whom one has 
divergences and shared interests. These others are likely to react to your foreign policy, too. 
For that reason, estimating the reactions of different actors when making foreign policy, and 
seeing whether these reactions should be accommodated, punished, or ignored, is similar in 
foreign policy-making as in formal negotiations. So then, is the possibility of conceiving of the 
best alternative to determining whether a given policy course is worth its cost.  
Dealing with one issue versus pursuing multiple foreign policy goals 
A BATNA is a tool in a context wherein the decision-maker has one goal (a good outcome to 
the negotiations), whereas policy-makers typically pursue a wide agenda of goals or policies 
at the same time. Does this harm the transferability of the concept to a policy-making 
context? I would argue that it does not, for two reasons. First, even in the original 
conceptualisation of the BATNA, which is used during negotiations, these negotiations 
themselves usually take place in a context in which government (and people within 
government) have multiple goals. Indeed, the majority of examples discussed in Getting to 
Yes are foreign policy episodes.203 Second, and more fundamentally, there is no reason that 
the preferred alternative, or indeed the first policy that is being pursued by the government, 
should only take into account concerns related most narrowly to the topic at hand. This 
dissertation does not prescribe a particular, narrow metric by which to determine the 
preferred alternative; it stresses the importance of choosing one preferred alternative, 
shared across government. Thus, I would argue, firstly, that BATNAs were already used in a 
context where negotiators have multiple goals and, secondly, the preferred alternatives in 
any case have this scope. The BATNA can thus be meaningfully introduced to foreign policy-
maker as the ‘preferred alternative’.  
5. PREFERRED ALTERNATIVES AND POLIHEURISTIC THEORY 
How does the argument about preferred alternatives fit in with existing conceptions of 
foreign policy-decision making? Insights in decisions made by people can roughly be divided 
in two types: rationalist models and cognitive models. The crux of this debate is the 
following: are decisions best explained by an assumption that people have connected, 
transitive desires which they try to realise through purposeful, instrumental action 
(rationalist school); or are they best explained through a focus on the various cognitive and 
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psychological processes that distort the ways in which humans make decisions (cognitive 
school)? In the field of international relations as a whole, the rational actor model remains 
the leading paradigm (often with the state as the rational actor, rather than the various 
humans that make the foreign policy of that state). In Foreign Policy Analysis, however, with 
its explicit focus on the human decision-maker and with its interest in how decisions get 
made as well as what decisions get made, the debate has been livelier. 
Bueno de Mesquita (and Lalman) can be cited as a prime proponent of the rational model, in 
which forward-looking leaders make decisions on the basis of “the value they attach to 
alternative outcomes and the beliefs they hold regarding how their adversary will respond to 
their strategic decisions”.204 In this logic, actors are assumed to have the time, processing 
power, knowledge, and skills necessary to make optimal decisions in near-perfect conditions. 
Other cognitive models likewise presume an optimising, (expected-)utility-maximizing 
decision-maker, but work on the assumption that the rationality of actors is circumscribed as 
their decisions are made under various constraints. Either way, these models presume that 
all facets of the problem can be reduced to one dimension (expected utility), which is then 
measured to select the best outcome. 
This has two implications. The first is that such models are compensatory models: “in choice 
situations, if a certain alternative (e.g., use of force) is low on a given dimension then a high 
score on another dimension can compensate for it, and hence the alternative is adopted”. The 
second is that such an approach ultimately reduces all considered elements of all possible 
outcomes to one dimension (expected utility), as if policy-makers have only one goal. Such 
analytic models have been successfully used to predict policy decisions and outcomes. 
However, even a cursory glance at the cognitive literature on how people make suggestions, 
makes clear that such rational weighing up of all possible options along one dimension in a 
transitive way is not how humans do, in fact, make decisions. Indeed, many studies on foreign 
policy have detailed a variety of cognitive shortcuts to rational decision-making that people 
adopt when faced with complexity or uncertainty.205 These works show that ‘decision makers 
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often process information in a different way from that suggested by the expected utility and 
cybernetic political use of force models’.206 In other words, they indicate severe cognitive 
limits on the rationalist approach to foreign policy-making.  
How to weigh these two different approaches? To some extent, the cognitive-rationalist 
debate can be understood as a discussion between the importance of outcome validity versus 
that of process validity.207 Rational actor models have had great success in predicting policy 
outcomes even though much of the research coming from the cognitive school suggests that 
the rational model is a poor reflection of how decisions actually get made.208 The cognitive 
approach, meanwhile, while generally recognised to provide more insight into the way in 
which decisions are made, has struggled to generate as much predictive (or even postdictive) 
explanatory power as rational approaches.209  
For the purposes of this thesis, however, neither is sufficient. It is crucial that any theory of 
foreign policy decision-making in which we locate our argument has both outcome validity 
and process validity. Some of the main arguments underlying this dissertation are (a) that 
policy-making in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq can be better understood through the 
lens of the preferred alternative and (b) that foreign policy decision-making can be improved 
using the concept of the preferred alternative. As these arguments are about the policy-
making process – how decisions are (not) made and how they should be made – a plausible 
case must be made that the preferred alternative, as a heuristic tool, is indeed compatible 
with how policy is actually made.  
At the same time, the goal of improving policy-making by determining a preferred alternative 
is outcome-based: I am not arguing for the inclusion of a preferred alternative because I think 
it would make the process better, with the process as the end goal. Rather, the argument 
underlying this dissertation is that the systematic use of the preferred alternative would 
improve the process and thereby policy outcomes. Herek, Janis and Huth have studied the 
relationship between process and outcome in foreign policy and find that poor-quality 
procedures in decision-making lead to avoidable errors that increase the likelihood of 
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unsatisfactory outcomes.210 Our goal is to improve decision-making procedures in a way that 
is easy enough to be realistically implementable (especially important given that humans 
tend to use shortcuts when confronted with demanding cognitive tasks) and targeted enough 
to improve policy-making. Thus, the preferred alternative needs to be compatible with 
theories that reasonably predict policy outcomes. 
Luckily, the cognitive-rationalist debate has moved forward in a promising way in the last 
twenty-five years by the development of poliheuristic theory – and it is here that preferred 
alternatives fit in the existing FPA literature. At its core, poliheuristic theory argues that 
foreign policy decision-makers use a variety of strategies in the decision-making process.211 
More specifically, two phases can be distinguished.212 In the first stage, policy-makers weed 
out policy-options that are not good enough tout court, before moving on to a second stage, in 
which the remaining options are compared and a choice is thus made. The first phase of this 
process is non-compensatory: the evaluation of options does not happen in an alternative-
based way, in which each alternative is considered in its different facets (and in which a high 
score on one aspect can compensate for a weak score on another aspect, as is the case with 
compensatory decision strategies).213 Rather, a dimension-based search finds place. If a 
particular option is underwhelming in a crucial dimension, it disappears of the table 
altogether without an evaluation of the other aspects of that option.214  
In the second phase, by contrast, policy-makers do move to an alternative-based strategy. 
They look at the remaining choice set – those policy options that have not been weeded out – 
and, at this stage, having weeded out that which is not good enough, try to choose the best 
solution. At this point decision-making becomes compensatory. This second stage involves 
the ‘analytic processing of surviving alternatives’ and thereby ‘corresponds to rational choice 
theory’, although poliheuristic theory at its core remains agnostic about which type of 
compensatory mechanism will be used in the second phase: lexicographic or maximizing 
decision rules might both be used, depending on context.215 Likewise, poliheuristic theory 
does not specify what types of heuristics or shortcuts will be used in the first phase; only that 
non-compensatory approaches will be used to whittle down choice.  
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The integration of the cognitive and rationalist approach achieved by poliheuristic theory is a 
major advance in foreign policy decision-making analysis. towards a theory that has both 
process validity and outcome validity. Indeed, poliheuristic theory, which has been applied 
and tested extensively in the past decades, has a good track record in both.216 In a sense, this 
is not surprising: as Goertz perceptively points out, rationalist theories often argue that 
utility theorists ‘see actors as maximizing their utilities under constraints’ (my emphasis).217 
Poliheuristic theory effectively provides a framework for understanding these constraints 
and explaining how the choice set considered in (more or less) rationalist fashion came 
about. It thus endogenizes these constraints, making for a stronger, more comprehensive 
theory.218  
Moreover, the non-compensatory phase means that it is not assumed that policy-makers 
must reduce all facets of a policy option to one dimension, thereby implicitly assuming that 
policy-makers have one goal. Poliheuristic theory thus allows a conception of foreign policy-
makers as having multiple goals and working under multiple constraints.219 In rationalist 
approaches, the researcher must define the ‘primary’ goal of a policy-maker. In reality, such a 
primary goal might not be a meaningful concept as policy-makers weigh up various concerns 
and interests. Compared to purely cognitive approaches, meanwhile, poliheuristic theory, 
drawing on the sharper insights from rationalist framework in the second phase, is better at 
explaining policy outcomes.220  
The poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision-making clarifies not only that there is 
some rationality and weighing-up of options involved when making decisions; it also 
specifies that people are capable of spontaneously and automatically reducing an unlimited 
amount of theoretical options to a more limited set of options that will actually be 
considered. In this way, poliheuristic theory illuminates how the ‘BATNA’ and its brother 
concept of the ‘preferred alternative’ work in practice. In theory, the preferred alternative 
could be said to be impossible to develop, for the number of theoretical possibilities are 
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endless. Unless a way is found to pair these possibilities down to a more limited set of 
options, the preferred alternative is so demanding that it cannot work in practice. 
Poliheuristic theory, by contrast, articulates an argument for why BATNAs work in practice 
(and so can the preferred alternative): humans are capable of passing through a first, non-
compensatory phase in decision-making, in which they limit the number of realistic options. 
Whatever loss occurs in this phase by humans dismissing options that would have been 
judged more valuable by compensatory metrics, is compensated by the fact that this first 
stage makes the process workable. 
At the same time, as poliheuristic theory also articulates, this does not imply that decision-
making is always fast, non-compensatory, and mostly unthinking. On the contrary, once the 
decision-set is narrowed down to a manageable number of options, people do have the 
capacity to think through those options in a systematic, analytic way. Rational choice is not 
dead, just applied more judiciously. Thus, in the process of human decision-making, there is 
scope for the preferred alternative to be considered, analysed, and used. People are capable, 
poliheuristic theory strongly suggests, both of narrowing down options efficiently and of 
thinking through a limited range of plausible options analytically. These insights into the 
foreign policy decision-making process support the notion that the preferred alternative is 
compatible with how humans make decisions (the process validity requirement) and with 
ensuring better outcomes (the outcome validity requirement). In other words, the 
contribution of poliheuristic theory to the preferred alternative and the BATNA is that 
poliheuristic theory helps articulate why BATNAs work and preferred alternatives are likely 
to also work. 
The contribution of the preferred alternative to the FPA literature on foreign policy decision-
making, meanwhile, is that the preferred alternative gives a concrete, implementable 
suggestion on how foreign policy-making can be improved. It is broad and flexible enough to 
be applicable to a wide range of situations, yet precise enough to constitute a real advance in 
the policy-making process. Indeed, as pointed out elsewhere, the use of a preferred 
alternative might seem intuitive once attention is drawn to it; in practice, however, it is not. 
The empirical chapters will demonstrate how preferred alternative was indeed lacking when 
Britain made its Iraq policy and how the policy suffered because of that lack. I argue that 
articulating the concept of the preferred alternative and raising awareness of its benefits is 
the first step to rectifying the situation. Indeed, if policy-makers were to understand the 
usefulness of the concept, it would not only be easier for politicians to take the concept into 
account; it would also give critics of government policy a more precise way of articulating 
their critiques. Policy-making could only benefit. 
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6. PREFERRED ALTERNATIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY: OTHER BENEFITS 
There is a further element to my proposal to use preferred alternatives in a foreign policy 
context: I argue that establishing preferred alternatives in foreign policy-making has further 
advantages that were not a part of the original work on BATNAs. Getting to Yes did not 
consider the difficulties of making and executing decisions in groups and organizations and 
the impact the BATNA might have on such difficulties. I argue that in a foreign policy 
decision-making context, the preferred alternative does have an impact on those elements of 
policy coordination. More specifically, I argue that establishing a preferred alternative and 
drawing minimal requirements from this preferred alternative is likely to keep policy more 
coordinated, defined precisely, and robust. 
In the section above, I have already argued why a preferred alternative is the logical way to 
set minimal requirements (because the judgement of what constitutes good policy depends 
largely on the alternatives one has). Here, then, I will focus on how these minimal 
requirements are useful. In short, I argue that they make accidental policy changes less likely; 
make purposeful manipulation of policy more difficult; and strengthen the execution of the 
chosen (original) policy. They do so because articulating minimal requirements forces policy-
makers to think hard about the trade-offs they are willing to make and their priorities. 
Making explicit these requirements helps convey decision-makers’ priorities and trade-offs 
to other people – notably the Whitehall departments – involved in the preparation and 
execution of the policy through the extra information and clarity they provide.  
This part of the argument can be read as an argument speaking to the bureaucratic drift 
literature as well as the principal-agent literature more generally. Both that literature and 
this dissertation examine the discrepancy between the policy intent of the government and 
the civil servants’ enactment of that policy.  In other words, minimal requirements address a 
problem that could be framed as a principal-agent problem or more specifically a question 
for the bureaucratic drift literature. However, we have a somewhat different interpretation of 
the problem and, as a result, of the solution. 
Principal-agent problems are complications that arise when an entity (the agent) is entrusted 
with decisions on behalf of another entity (the principal) and is then able to use this agency 
to make decisions that diverge from the principal’s choices or interests. 221  The literature on 
bureaucratic drift examines ‘how – or indeed, whether – elected political officials can 
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reasonably effectively assure that their policy intentions will be carried out’.222 In other 
words, it examines how the will and intentions of the principal get twisted or thwarted 
throughout the execution of their will. 
Bureaucratic drift is mostly seen as driven by the bureaucrats in the civil service. In the 
words of McCubbins, Noll & Weingast: 
The fundamental premise of this literature is that bureaucrats have personal preferences 
which conflict with members of Congress and the president. (…) The choices of agency 
officials are not subjected to electoral discipline. Consequently, in the absence of effective 
oversight, they are likely to reflect personal preferences, derived from some combination of 
private political values, personal career objectives, and, all else equal, an aversion to effort, 
especially effort that does not serve personal interests.223 
One of the reasons bureaucrats can actually do this is information asymmetry: ‘A 
consequence of delegating authority to bureaucrats is that they may become more expert 
about their policy responsibilities than the elected representatives who created their bureau. 
(…) As in all agency relationships, it may be possible for the agency to take advantage of its 
private information.’224 This literature understands that it is impossible for the principal to 
achieve total control over the agent, for several reasons, but it looks at ways to maximise 
control while limiting the costs of such control. Since McCubbins, Noll & Weingast’s 1987 
article, this literature has expanded by not only looking at the way in which civil servants can 
change policy, but also how other actors – future legislators, lobby groups, stake holders – 
affect legislation and implementation. How to limit bureaucratic drift through legislative, 
executive, or judicial oversight has also received widespread attention.225  
This reading of the situation presupposes that the principal has a clear idea of the policy to be 
implemented. By contrast, I argue that Britain’s 2001-2003 Iraq policy was characterized by 
a lack of clear view of the policy that was to be implemented and prepared for by the relevant 
government departments. Britain’s government and its civil service did not have a clear, 
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shared idea of the policy to be implemented; the fault lines even ran through Cabinet. For this 
reason, an approach that construes the gap between intentions and execution as a gap caused 
by agents knowingly subverting political intentions, is not accurate for understanding the 
lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. That is not to say, of course, that there was no instance of 
bureaucratic drift in the traditional sense of the word. However, treating Iraq policy as given 
and explaining the failure to prepare as the result of civil servants’ desire not to enact that 
policy misses the point. Instead, we need to find a practical way to limit the scope for 
intragovernmental miscommunication and obfuscation. Minimal requirements can help with 
this. 
Let us go back to the original dilemma of the civil service enacting what the government 
wants it to do. Even if the civil service (the agent) does exactly what Cabinet (the principal) 
wants it to do, the civil service will encounter many moments where decisions are needed 
and have a degree of freedom. This is true in all circumstances except for the most minor 
projects; after all, the civil service exists because no one Secretary of State would be able to 
do the work alone. This means that departments must take autonomous decisions under 
almost all circumstances. However, if the boundaries of what they are meant to do are 
unclear, there is a greater risk that these autonomous decisions will be for the worse. The 
departments will lack a metric for knowing how to plan. Their interpretations of and 
decisions on the policy might well differ from those made in other departments that are 
working on other aspects of the same policy. As later chapters will show, in the United 
Kingdom’s preparation for the invasion of Iraq, such different interpretations led to severe 
interdepartmental mismatches. 
The last paragraph assumed that agents are (trying to) acting consistently with the policy set 
out by the principal. Clearly articulated limits to the policy are also useful if the agent is not 
doing so. In other words, clear limits on the policy handed down by the principal will also 
make bureaucratic drift (of the type discussed in the bureaucratic drift literature) less likely. 
As McCubbins, Noll and Weingast have argued, politicians are best able to control 
bureaucratic drift by placing ex ante constraints on the decision-making process (rather than 
try to correct it afterwards).226 Moreover, bureaucratic drift is facilitated by circumstances of 
plausible deniability: agents are not so much able to explicitly challenge government 
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decisions as to look for wriggle room. If no-one knows where the boundaries are, how can 
anyone notice or flag up when they are crossed?  
Lastly, reconsider the problem of information asymmetry. Typically, the idea of information 
asymmetry refers to the agents’ capacity to subvert the principal’s will. Even when it is 
acknowledged that an asymmetrical information advantage exists on both sides, this is 
presented as a strategic advantage on both sides – in other words, information asymmetry is 
seen as an opportunity for other side to gain more power. However, information asymmetry 
can also have a more benign face: when principal and agent would want to communicate 
relevant information, but do not know what information is relevant and ought to be conveyed 
as a matter of priority. This kind of information symmetry is still a problem; it can be made 
better by clearly conveying the preferred alternative and the minimal requirements of the 
policy to those meant to realise that policy. 
Every policy plan made by a government department will have built into it assumptions 
about the circumstances under which the policy will be executed. These limit the range of 
circumstances for which the policy is suitable. If circumstances subsequently change, the 
plans might or might not still be usable. This means that the limits to a certain policy – and 
the circumstances under which that policy will (not) be abandoned – are crucial information 
to those preparing the concrete plans to realise that policy. Conversely, if the civil service 
departments know that the limitations inherent in their plans do not match the limits on the 
policy envisaged by the Cabinet (for example for practical reasons of which the politicians 
might not be aware), they must warn the Cabinet. They must know when to warn the Cabinet. 
Such necessary communication depends on clarity about both the policy pursued and the 
limits to that policy. 
In summary, explicitly articulated, shared understandings on those limits lessen the civil 
service’s scope of autonomous interpretation. This makes interdepartmental differences of 
interpretation less likely, and their consequences less severe where they still occur. It is also 
likely to reduce bureaucratic drift in the traditional sense of the word, whereby actors 
respond to incentives other than their principal’s wishes, again because their space to do so 
is more explicitly constrained. Moreover, this explicit guidance can help civil service 
departments understand what limitations their plans can and should have (or avoid). It also 
allows them to better know when and which intrinsic limitations of the planning and the 
plans to convey to Cabinet – namely, those that clash with the limits the principal had 
originally envisaged. Overall, well thought-out and communicated minimal requirements are 
likely to make for better communication between those setting policy and those preparing 
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for it. This is an additional benefit of the use of preferred alternatives and related minimal 
requirements not yet analysed by Ury and Fisher. 
7. PRACTICAL USE OF THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE IN FOREIGN POLICY-
MAKING 
How would preferred alternatives and their corresponding minimal requirements function in 
practice if they were to be used in making foreign policy? They would have roles that are 
quite similar (and complementary) to policy goals and strategy. Few policy-makers doubt 
that to make good policy, one needs to have a goal and a strategy. The argument of this 
dissertation is that to improve foreign policy-making, preferred alternatives and the derived 
minimal requirements should be added to goal and strategy to form a more complete policy 
position. Knowing what you want is meaningless without knowing how much you want it 
(and whether you can get it). Knowing that you are willing to walk away under certain 
circumstances is of limited use if you have no idea where you would walk to, and no clear 
grasp of what circumstances ought to make you leave. 
Just like a government ought to have a clearly defined policy goal, it ought to have a clearly 
defined preferred alternative. Just like with policy goals, it is not enough for the government 
to discuss potential preferred alternatives: a common policy position must be agreed upon. 
After all, a preferred alternative is not meant to function merely as a thinking exercise or a 
brainstorming session: it is a continuous benchmark to evaluate policy. It clearly delineates 
the policy position within which departments must prepare for the agreed-on policy. Like 
policy goals and strategy, the preferred alternative can change over time because of changing 
preferences, changing circumstances or new information becoming available. Of course, one’s 
preferred alternative need not always be disclosed during negotiations, although it can 
sometimes be useful to do so. Just like with policy goals, the full advantages will only happen 
if the preferred alternative is clearly defined, with transitive preferences, and shared across 
government.  
It needs to be stressed that the preferred alternative is not put forward here as a benefit per 
se. Rather, the argument is that the use of a preferred alternative makes internally coherent, 
appropriate (rationally connecting ends and means) and well-developed plans more likely. 
This is the aim that the preferred alternative is meant to achieve. The argument is thus not 
tautological. Indeed, I also do not claim that the use of a preferred alternative will 
automatically and inevitably lead to well-developed, suitable, coherent plans. Nor do I 
consider it impossible that such good plans can be developed without the use of a preferred 
alternative. Clearly, governments manage quite regularly to make good plans for a policy 
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even when that policy has been determined without reference to a preferred alternative. 
Nonetheless, for more complicated issues, such as many foreign policy issues, it is difficult to 
develop such good plans – and the use of a preferred alternative is one practical way to 
define more precisely, narrowly and efficiently under what conditions a certain policy is 
worth pursuing. On these conditions will depend the preparation, which is turn will impact 
the possibilities policy-makers have.  
In other words, the independent variable is whether a preferred alternative is used when 
choosing a policy; the dependent variable is whether the plans to execute that policy are 
coherent, appropriate, and well-developed. The causal relationship between them is neither 
that one will automatically lead to the other, nor is it that one cannot occur without the other. 
Rather, the use of a preferred alternative makes it more likely that the plans for that policy 
are coherent, appropriate, and well-developed. Coherent, appropriate, and well-developed 
plans in turn have a propensity to bring about good results. This, again, is not inevitable; and 
vice versa, good results can sometimes happen despite bad preparation. For this reason, the 
outcome in any particular foreign policy episode is a very flawed metric to evaluate the 
quality of the planning and preparation. Wars can be won on a fluke or lost despite the best 
possible campaign. For this reason, this dissertation does not judge British preparation for 
Iraq by the metric of victory or failure on the ground.   
That a preferred alternative must be shared across the government and civil service 
preparing policy does not imply that everyone must like it. Most of the time, though, everyone 
involved has the professional duty to follow and carry out the policy decided upon by the 
Cabinet. In this, the preferred alternative is no different from a policy goal or any other aspect 
of a full policy position. However, because this dissertation analyses the case of Iraq, in which 
many doubts have been raised about the good intentions and/or honesty about several of the 
key players involved – from Tony Blair to Jack Straw to Clare Short – let us also consider the 
use of a preferred alternative in circumstances in which not everyone demonstrates ‘good 
faith’, as well as the circumstances in which everyone is trying to follow the government’s full 
policy position (including goal, strategy, preferred alternative and minimal requirements ). 
Either way, policy-making is better with a preferred alternative than without. 
When everyone is of good will, a preferred alternative and corresponding minimal 
requirements are still useful because of most of the reasons mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
Determining a preferred alternative is the best way to establish sensible, minimal 
requirements. Without these clear boundaries, government departments are left to 
themselves to interpret policy, which heightens the risk for misunderstandings or 
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inconsistent preparation across departments. This is true even if departments do not search 
to abuse the discretion they have. When departments are unaware of the limits of the policy 
to be followed, knowing what information to communicate up the chain becomes more 
difficult, which may well lead to decision-makers not having all the relevant information to 
shape their decisions. During negotiation aspects of making foreign policy, the preferred 
alternative will allow governments to communicate much more clearly to those negotiating 
on their behalf what room they have for making concessions or demanding more. Back at 
home, too, it will make it easier for anyone arguing either for or against a certain policy to 
rationalise why a certain road should be followed. It improves the standards of decision-
making, analysis, and debate. 
No system can account for all the problems that will arise when someone is purposefully 
trying to subvert the system. There are no fail-safe systems against deception by a minister 
or passive resistance from a Whitehall department. However, even in those circumstances 
preferred alternatives have their use and are better than not having a preferred alternative. 
For one, an unequivocal articulation of all aspects of the policy position makes it much harder 
to plead ignorance. There will be fewer plausible excuses to derail or skew policy, both vis-à-
vis other and vis-à-vis oneself (in a case of wishful thinking). It also makes it easier to spot 
and point out any problems, and people will have much stronger grounds on which to object: 
the control mechanism is both easier and stronger. Lastly, even if all else fails and the policy 
still ends up hijacked by someone refusing to fall in line, it will be much easier to attribute 
blame later. Articulated preferred alternatives take away plausible deniability. For all these 
reasons, even in the worst-case scenario of outright ill will against any policy, a defined 
preferred alternative is far preferable to not having one.  
Although the usefulness of determining clear policy goals and a suitable strategy is clear as a 
concept, in practice neither is very easy. Yet the very fact that the concepts exist helps policy-
makers focus on them and think through the complications and implications of both goal and 
strategy. This is trivially true; a large literature, both academic and from practitioners, 
discusses both policy goals and policy strategies. Preferred alternatives and the 
corresponding minimal requirements should be used in a similar fashion: not because 
governments are likely to use them in a perfect way, but because an awareness of the 
concepts and their usefulness and importance makes it easier to make better policy. To this 
end, preferred alternatives and corresponding minimal requirements can be as important as 
goals and strategy.  
8. BRITISH IRAQ POLICY FROM 2001 TO 2003 
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In the period between 2001 and 2003, when London was setting out and pursuing a new Iraq 
policy, the government was pursuing one relatively clear policy: pursue Saddam Hussein’s 
disarmament through the Security Council, if necessary (and it probably would be necessary) 
with force.227 However, there was no explicit preferred alternative if this policy were to fail. 
Neither was there an implicit preferred alternative: on the contrary, underlying British policy 
were two different – mutually exclusive – ideas of what the preferred alternative would look 
like. One preferred alternative, assumed by Tony Blair, was disarmament with force (if 
necessary) without the Security Council. The Prime Minister’s way of pursuing Iraq policy 
reflected this stance. For most of Whitehall, and certainly for the Foreign Office and the 
Department for International Development, as I show, the preferred alternative was 
following the Security Council without disarming Saddam Hussein (by ‘preferred’ I do not 
mean to convey that this was their own preference, rather that they presumed this would be 
the plan-B preferred by decision-makers). Their planning was based on this reading of the 
preferred alternative. 
Two related but distinct problems in Britain’s Iraq policy resulted from not having a clear 
preferred alternative. The first problem was that London was badly prepared for the 
invasion, in the sense of having plans that were underdeveloped, mutually contradictory and 
based on unsuitable assumptions. The plans were unsuitable for the invasion as it happened 
because they were meant for use in different circumstances. Certain assumptions were built 
into the plans, and these assumptions built on a particular understanding of plan B: namely, 
that plan B, the preferred alternative, was to not go to war but stick with the Security Council 
as long as there was no international support for the invasion. In this scenario, international 
support can be presumed, in both option A and option B, and consequently it can be built into 
the plans as a reasonable assumption. As it turned out, the British government proved willing 
to go to war without Security Council support (even though it claimed legality for its actions) 
and plans that had a built-in presumption of international support became unworkable. 
In the same vein, Whitehall’s plans were mutually contradictory because different 
departments had different interpretations of the preferred alternative and corresponding 
minimal requirements of government policy. The assumptions made in one department – 
about the situation in Iraq as well as about the various government departments’ role in the 
invasion and post-invasion phase – were different from, and incompatible with, assumptions 
and plans in another department. Finally, there are arguably many reasons why the plans 
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were insufficient – not least the enormity of the task and the limited time available – but here 
once more, the long period of uncertainty about the exact nature of the policy to be followed 
(which includes knowing the limits of that policy) worsened an all-ready-difficult task. 
The second curiosity, and problem, in British Iraq policy is that despite being aware of those 
problems (albeit perhaps not of their full extent), the British government went ahead and 
decided to invade. This puzzling decision is explained well by the dynamics described by Ury 
and Fisher: without a best (in my words: preferred) alternative, people are likely to become 
overly pessimistic about alternative policy options.228 Often, this is even justified, because 
through lack of preparation they have effectively closed off alternative routes for themselves. 
When they subsequently find themselves in a vacuum with no clear next step, they are likely 
to press ahead with whatever is closest to the plan they hoped to be able to fulfil, even when 
doing so no longer is the best option – or even a good option. 
The following four chapters develop this argument based on original research, mostly using 
sources made available via the Iraq Inquiry. Chapter I has already demonstrated that Blair’s 
views on foreign policy were rather different from those generally held across government 
departments. It is this difference in views that explains how later, two different implicit 
preferred alternatives developed. Chapter III traces the decision to go to war. It shows that 
the United Kingdom’s capital, not developing its preferred alternative, effectively negotiated 
itself into a corner. The following chapter IV charts Whitehall departments’ preparation for 
war – which, for most departments, was implicitly based on a different preferred alternative 
from that which guided London’s eventual decision to go to war. As Chapter V then 
demonstrates, the result was policy plans not suited for the policy decision that was taken. 
The last chapter draws together these empirical observations and analyses how the failure to 
have a preferred alternative explains the curious aspects of British Iraq policy between 2001 
and 2003. 
9. METHODOLOGY 
The three empirical chapters are (overwhelmingly) based on primary material made 
available through the Iraq Inquiry; in this section I briefly describe how I approached the 
material. During the period in which the majority of gathering and analysing of data took 
place, mostly the academic years 2013-2014 and 2014-2015, the report of the Inquiry had 
not yet been published. However, the transcripts of the interviews were available on the 
website; I compiled them into one document (for ease of work). This transcript document ran 
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to just over 12,000 pages. I also gathered, chronologically, the contemporary documents 
made available through the Iraq inquiry. To these were added key documents that had been 
leaked, as well as the results of approximately fifteen Freedom of Information Requests (not 
all successful). Although these documents together consisted of less than 400 pages, these 
would later form the backbone of my story (being more reliable, in many ways, than oral 
testimony given much later). Other supporting documents I collated were a detailed timeline 
and an aggregation of polls (excluding non-scientific polls; 516 polling questions in total, 
from a variety of polling organisations).   
I started reading this material without a precise research hypothesis in mind, simply aiming 
to understand how the invasion had unfolded. This first cursory reading of all documents led 
me to focus on the preparation and more specifically the gap between the decision that were 
made and those that were implemented. I reread the most relevant material more closely, 
annotating. This second, more targeting reading used the contemporary written notes as its 
backbone, despite the pages of oral testimony being many more. These key documents, 
written in preparation for the conflict, would be likely to be a more accurate reflection of 
what happened than those memories recalled, for a purpose, in front of an inquiry, almost a 
decade later.  Overall, though, I was struck not by discrepancies but by the coherence of the 
story that emerged. 
This is not to say, of course, that the story that emerged was coherent across witnesses and 
departments – on the contrary, and this dissertation is testimony to that. However, despite 
these clear cleavages of opinion and interpretation, there were few contradictions on the 
practicalities of what had occurred; and when such contradictions occurred, the multitude of 
voices usually allowed us to establish with relative certainty what had happened. An example 
of a clear difference of opinion is between Tony Blair and Clare Short: although they have 
different views on what Iraq preparation should have looked like, for example, they (and 
third speakers) agree, directly or indirectly, that discussions in Cabinet were limited, focused 
on details, and of little substance. An example of contradictions that can nonetheless be 
hashed out are Sally Keeble’s statements that Clare Short forbade DFID from timely 
engagement with external partners; many other (often better-placed) sources confirm this 
was, in fact, a Cabinet ban that Clare Short partly disregarded.229  
The sheer amount of material also allows for triangulation of, certainly not all facts and 
details, but the facts crucial enough to feature in the dissertation. For example, when I write 
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about the meeting Tim Cross had in December 2002 in DFID, I do not have to take his word 
for it: Suma Chakrabarti and Nicola Bremer likewise confirm this meeting.230 While the 
interpretation of evidence remains a judgement call, some general guidelines proved useful 
in my handling of the material: contemporary documents are more solid sources than 
witness testimonies a decade later; assume people know (much) more about their own area 
of expertise and are more likely to misinterpret the actions of people further outside their 
realm of expertise or culture (which partly explains the distrust of motives between some of 
the military and some staff members of FDFID); people are more likely to justify themselves 
or close confidantes than people they know less well; they will explain and justify themselves 
according to their own values and their own views on what should have happened. In 
addition, I do not attribute to malice that which can be plausibly explained by other causes. 
The second reading of the documents on preparation led to the general argument underlying 
this dissertation. Thus, having identified the topics of most interest, I went through the 
pertinent materials a third time (again with the documentary trail as the backbone), making 
copious (separate) notes by subject. As the source materials was collated into only two 
documents of respectively 12,000 and 380 pages, this was straightforward. Thus, when a 
subject refaced with a different witness, I would go back to this topic in m notes and add the 
new sources and information. This allowed for a genuine triangulation and combining of the 
information. The notes for the first empirical chapter were approximately 81 pages long; 
those for the second empirical chapter were 51 pages; those for the third chapter, on 
assumptions in the policy-making process (based more on analysis and less on new facts), 
were 14 pages long. This shortening reflects partly that these notes built on each other and 
partly a more efficient notation style as time went on.  
The empirical chapters were drafted based on these notes and the primary materials. With 
some exceptions for details that give depth but do not fundamentally change the arguments, 
all events and interpretations were triangulated, either between documentary evidence and 
witness testimonies or between witnesses (usually those not known to be close and not 
known to have common interests). To avoid misquoting individuals and the spirit of what 
they meant to convey, an extra benchmark was used: except for details, their views would 
have needed to be repeated on at least two occasions (including during the same witness 
testimony) to be taken as a correct expression of their views.  
10. CONCLUSION  
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This chapter has introduced the theoretical argument that underpins this dissertation. The 
argument is that governments, when making foreign policy, should define their preferred 
alternative to the chosen course and corresponding minimal requirements as well as their 
policy goal and strategy. They must do so because (a) governments need a clear idea of the 
circumstances under which they ought to abandon their charted policy course and (b) 
considering the preferred alternative is the best way of determining what those minimal 
requirements should be. This argument is a variation and elaboration on an argument 
originally put forward by collaborators of the Harvard Negotiation Project in the early 1980s. 
Ury and Fisher’s original argument, written for negotiations, was that people should consider 
their ‘best alternative to [the] negotiated agreement’ (BATNA) while negotiating. This, they 
argued, is the standard by which people should decide whether to accept the deal under 
negotiation or whether to walk away. They argued that a BATNA – as compared to more 
commonly used bottom lines – leads to better outcomes. I argue that their insights can be 
modified and expanded to be applicable to governments making foreign policy, and indeed 
that in this context, the preferred alternative can have benefits beyond those discussed by 
Ury and Fisher. Consciously considering and articulating a ‘preferred alternative’ to the 
policy that is pursued helps governments internally. As the preferred alternative allows 
governments to also articulate their minimal requirements, these minimal requirements can 
be a crucial tool in coordinating and streamlining policy across the government and the civil 
service.  
In large organizations, a defined preferred alternative to the policy pursued makes it easier 
to understand and convey to all involved the limits of the policy and the priorities that 
underlie it. It thus can mitigate the risk of accidental policy drift or simply policy plans that, 
because they are based on undefined assumptions, vary so much from department to 
department as to be incompatible. Preferred alternatives also make it easier for civil servants 
to discern which details are most likely to matter to their political masters, improving 
bottom-up communication of the most relevant technical aspects and of limitations built into 
the plans conceived to implement the policy. Finally, even in a government of ill will, 
preferred alternatives are likely to improve policy because they take away plausible 
deniability of ill will: because a preferred alternative must now explicitly be defined, fissures 
in policy are easier to spot and easier to critique. 
Preferred alternatives are particularly useful because they give a practical, implementable 
guideline on how to manage the uncertainty involved in foreign policy-making. They fit into 
the existing FPA literature on foreign policy decision-making. More precisely, poliheuristic 
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theory is the strand within FPA that offers the best academic ‘home’ for the preferred 
alternative, for poliheuristic theory has good process validity as well as good outcome 
validity. Both are necessary for the preferred alternative: as a practical tool to improve 
foreign policy decision-making, preferred alternatives need to be compatible with how 
foreign policy is being made. One of the issues hereby is that the preferred alternative cannot 
be so unwieldy as to be practically impossible. However, poliheuristic theory shows that 
people are capable of quickly reducing large amounts of theoretical possibilities to a 
manageable choice set, thus articulating how preferred alternatives are feasible in practice. 
With regards to outcome validity and the preferred alternative’s capacity for improving 
policy-making, poliheuristic theory also articulates that people are capable of analysing a 
limited choice set to make rational decisions. This allows us to conclude that preferred 
alternatives should be able to impact decision-making in a rationalist way in the second stage 
of the process. This dissertation’s contribution to that literature is a practical way to improve 
decision-making. 
The last three sections of the chapter are more practical. The first consists of practical 
guidelines for the use of the preferred alternative and minimal requirements in practice. The 
third discusses my methodology during my primary research of the chapters that are to 
follow. The second outlines how this chapter’s argument will be used through the rest of the 
dissertation to examine British preparation for the war in Iraq. The following chapters use 
the case of British Iraq policy to examine practical policy-making without a defined preferred 
alternative. Chapter III focuses on the decision for war. Building on Chapter I’s understanding 
of the wide gap between Iraq policy as usual and Tony Blair’s inclinations, it narrates the 
difficult decision to go to war and the circumstances in which it was made. It shows that the 
British government backed itself into a corner – committed to an invasion to disarm, but 
without the reassurance and preparation it had wanted to have justifiable confidence in such 
an invasion – and decided to support an American invasion under circumstances it would 
have previously deemed unacceptable.  
Chapter IV shows how the Ministry of Defence, the Department for International 
Development, the Foreign Office, and the Cabinet Office prepared Iraq policy. It tracks the 
planning, the plans and the assumptions that underlay those plans. Chapter V shows the clash 
between the political decisions of Chapter III and the practical preparations of Chapter IV and 
the failure to have a coherent policy. Chapter VI, finally, brings together the thesis by 
highlighting the mechanisms theoretically outlaid here and demonstrated in the empirical 
chapters. Its key point is this: the British government’s failure to articulate a preferred 
alternative to the Iraq policy it was pursuing, harmed British Iraq policy in two ways. It 
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harmed Britain in its negotiations with the United States and the United Nations, inducing it 
to accept an outcome that was not acceptable by the United Kingdom’s own standards. It also 
harmed the country’s preparation for the scenario it had now chosen to enact, making 
London curiously ill-prepared for this invasion of its own choosing. 
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Chapter III: Deciding on War 
1. INTRODUCTION  
This is the first of three chapters based on primary research of testimonies and documents 
made available (for the most part) through the Iraq Inquiry (www.iraqinquiry.org.uk). 
Together, these chapters describe how the British government decided to go to war, 
prepared for the war, and found themselves on Iraqi soil with plans that hardly matched the 
circumstances. This chapter is about the political process by which London – the Prime 
Minister, his advisors, Cabinet, the Attorney General, and Parliament – decided on the 
invasion. It demonstrates how after a period of ambiguity and a failure to achieve the initial 
policy goal of disarmament through the Security Council, Tony Blair’s preferred alternative 
prevailed: invasion alongside the United States despite the Security Council’s unhappiness. 
This chapter consists of three parts. The first section ‘From 9/11 to Crawford’, described the 
evolution from an Iraq policy of containment, established in the nineties after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, to the commitment that prime minister Blair made at Crawford after 
9/11, in April 2002. It describes how the failure of containment led the British towards smart 
sanctions before the terrorist attacks of 2001 kicked everything into a higher gear. At that 
point, the Prime Minister’s eagerness to stand by the United States as a matter of principle, 
even before it is clear what its exact policy intentions are, becomes of essence. Tony Blair 
promises the American president he will stand by him to ‘deal’ with Saddam Hussein. 
The translation of that commitment to policy, however, is less straightforward. As detailed in 
the second section, ‘From commitment to policy’, for the rest of the policy-makers – advisors, 
the Foreign Secretary, civil servants drafting actual policy – policy continues much more 
along the usual lines: Iraq can only be dealt with through the Security Council and Britain can 
and will only support the United States under particular conditions. The resulting policy is a 
hybrid: de facto Britain ends up pursuing disarmament through the Security Council. A 
preferred alternative to this difficult negotiation with the United States and the Security 
Council is never developed, nor are there coherent minimal requirements across the 
government for the Iraq policy. 
The policy has some success – the American president goes back to the United Nations in 
September 2002 rather than decide on immediate unilateral action – but ultimately fails. It 
becomes clear that the Security Council will not agree to military intervention in a time frame 
and with a burden of proof on Baghdad that the United States is willing to accept. Washington 
is unwilling to wait any longer, and the policy of disarmament through the Security Council 
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becomes a dead end. At this point, there is no obvious policy alternative: the preferred 
alternative has never been developed. The Prime Minister’s preferred alternative at this 
point is disarmament without the Security Council (cloaked, on a dubious technicality, as 
disarmament ‘with’ the Security Council’s ‘permission’ which equals ‘support’); most other 
policy makers and civil servants involved had assumed that the alternative was staying on 
the Security Council road instead of invading Iraq with the United States. Yet because the 
limits of the initial policy were never clearly defined, and because no alternative has been 
developed, the Prime Minister’s alternative provides most continuity, and the policy of going 
to war with only (dubious) technical permission of the Security Council is chosen. 
The last section, the ‘Endgame’, discusses those who had to approve (or only ended up 
approving) policy after it was formed: Attorney General, Cabinet, and Parliament. This 
dissertation is not a dissertation by an international lawyer or on international law. 
Analysing the merit of legal arguments would be outside the remits of this project. However, 
we can observe that for most of the period leading up to the invasion of Iraq, the Attorney 
General favoured one legal interpretation. At the last minute, he came to prefer another. This 
section examines the reasons the Attorney General gave for switching from one legal 
rationale to another and finds them highly dubious. Circumstantial evidence further indicates 
that the Attorney General was under many kinds of pressures from the government. Either 
way, the Attorney General approved of the war contingent on a political judgment that war 
was necessary. Cabinet was then told war was legal (without understanding that this was 
contingent on a political judgment) and voted in favour. It seems that Cabinet resigned itself 
to the war in order not to fracture a successful Labour government. Parliament had 
technically no role to play but also voted in favour of war. 
2. FROM 9/11 TO CRAWFORD 
British Iraq policy in the nineties 
The Iraq policy that Britain maintained throughout the nineties had its roots in Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.231 The Security Council reacted within a day with 
Resolution 660, ‘condemn[ing] the Iraq invasion of Kuwait’ and ‘demand[ing] that Iraq 
withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were 
located on 1 August 1990’ before the attack.232 This resolution was followed by Resolution 
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661, subjecting Iraq to a near-total trade and financial embargo; Resolution 665, authorizing 
a naval blockade to enforce these embargoes; and Resolution 678.233 The latter demanded 
Iraq withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991, giving other states ‘all necessary means’ to 
force the Iraqi forces out after that date.234 Thirteen years later, SCR 678 will be crucial in 
justifying a full-scale invasion of Iraq. 
Though Iraqi troops are withdrawn from Kuwait by February 1991, attention is now drawn 
to the State of Iraq and in April 1991, the Security Council passes SCR 687.235 This resolution 
draws attention to ‘[Iraq’s] prior use of chemical weapons’ as well as ‘reports … that Iraq has 
attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme’.236 It thus moves away 
from the more narrow issue of the invasion of Kuwait to Iraq’s general international 
obligations, and asks Iraq to ‘unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering 
harmless, under international supervision’ of all its chemical and biological weapons and 
related stock and facilities, as well as of its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 
kilometres.237 This resolution will become crucial a decade later, because of the ‘revival 
argument’: the argument that the Security Council can take action against Iraq if it violates its 
obligations as set out in SCR 687 on the basis of SCR 678 (which allows for ‘all necessary 
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means’ to guarantee peace and security in the region).238 This was the British legal basis for 
its invasion of March 2003.239 
British Iraq policy after the invasion of Kuwait was a regime of containment built on two 
pillars: sanctions, including trade and financial embargoes and weapons inspections, and 
deterrence in the form of no-fly zones.240 The goal of the sanctions was to thwart ‘Saddam 
Hussein’s ambitions to redevelop weapons of mass destruction but also containment of the 
threat which Iraq pos[es] to the region’.241 The goal of the no-fly zone was at least two-fold: 
set up initially and officially as a necessary condition for the ‘humanitarian relief efforts’ 
called for in Security Council Resolution 688, the zones are also useful in containing Baghdad 
and gaining information about the military state and plans of Hussein’s regime.242  
In late 1997, the situation between Iraq and the Security Council and the Western countries 
enforcing a no-fly zone deteriorates; United States Congress passes the Iraq Liberation Act 
and Iraq stops communicating with the UN weapon inspectors altogether. 243 The situation 
escalates to Operation DESERT FOX, a four-night-long bombing campaign by American and 
British forces throughout Iraq from 17 to 20 December 1998 to weaken Iraq’s weapon 
capacities.244  The Security Council passes Resolution 1284 to replace UNSCOM with the 
United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC).245  
Hereafter, British policy still aims to contain Iraq, but inspectors are no longer allowed into 
Iraq.  
In this new and worsened context, Britain adds a third pillar to its policy of sanctions and 
deterrence: that of incentives. The incentives can be found in Security Council Resolution 
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1284: it promises the suspension of sanctions 120 days after Iraq has accepted the return of 
weapons inspectors.246 In other words, the ultimate British policy goal vis-à-vis Iraq remains 
the same: containment. Initially both sanctions and inspections helped achieve that goal, but 
now that Iraq has banned weapon inspections, Britain is willing to give up sanctions to 
improve inspections.247 In addition to ‘incentives’ to reverse the interdiction of weapons 
inspectors, the embargoes and no-fly zones also remain. 
The Early 2000s: A Failing Policy of Containment 
By the beginning of the new millennium, however, the policy of containment is seen to be 
‘failing and the rate of failure [is] accelerating’.248 All three strands of the British policy – 
deterrence, sanctions, and incentives – have problems.249 Deterrence in the form of the no-fly 
zones is risky and the British press – like the international press – is critical.250 There are 
growing legal concerns about the no-fly zones (as they depended on their humanitarian 
necessity), as well as growing concerns about the risks pilots are running as Iraq is 
improving its air defence capabilities.251 Equally, there is confusion about the proper 
response if an Allied aircraft were shot down.252 The zones are also unpopular, with France 
openly opposing them and many countries feeling they have lost their necessity.253  
Meanwhile, the sanctions are leaking. Many neighbouring countries have a more immediate 
interest in doing business with Baghdad than in keeping the sanctions tight.254 A new pipeline 
through Syria worsens the smuggling of oil. The oil-for-food programme is misused, and the 
continued suffering of the Iraqi people means growing opposition against the sanctions 
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regime as a whole.255 Jutta Burghardt, the head of the United Nations World Food 
Programme, resigns in protest, as do Denis Halliday, the United Nations Humanitarian 
Coordinator in Iraq, and his successor Hans von Sponeck.256 As for the third strand, Saddam 
Hussein clearly prefers less and less effective sanctions over the incentives offered.257 This 
means that incentives fail to have an important effect: the incentives strand never gets off the 
ground and Iraq is as closed as ever.258 
Thus, in October 2000, the Middle East and North Africa Department of the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office was reviewing its Iraq policy of containment as spelled out in the 1999 
paper ‘Iraq: Future’.259 The conclusion from this review was that the United Kingdom should 
move to ‘smart sanctions’: narrower better targeted sanctions. Other options, including 
regime change, were briefly discussed but summarily dismissed.260 In targeting sanctions 
more narrowly, fewer aspects of Iraqi life would be under international control. This would 
address the humanitarian concerns for the suffering of ordinary Iraqi people caught up in the 
restrictions of the sanctions and quell international opposition to the sanctions.261 Better 
targeting restrictions, meanwhile, on weapons and military materials, would up the pressure 
on Saddam Hussein and stop leaks in the existing sanctions regime.262 From mid-2001 
onwards the United Kingdom submitted a series of draft resolutions in the Security Council, 
which were repeatedly opposed by Russia, while the incoming US administration mostly 
focused on domestic issues.263  
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This policy of ‘smart sanctions’ was not only conceived to reassure countries worried about 
the impact of harsh sanctions on Iraq; it was a balance struck to also deal with the incoming 
Bush administration, which was likely to have tougher views than Britain and indeed most 
other countries.264 Indeed, the Republicans had systematically criticized the Clinton 
administration for not being tough enough on Baghdad: the Bush team had already stressed 
publicly that it wanted ‘to see sanctions on Iraq tightened, not loosened’.265 Part of the British 
plan thus was to dissuade the new Bush administration from taking a tough stance on Iraq 
from which it would be difficult to back down.266 Moreover, Britain also wanted to avoid 
being in a position where it looked like it was backing down.267 It considered withdrawing 
from the Southern No Fly Zone but would only do so seemingly in response to a positive 
action by Saddam Hussein and did not consider giving up sanctions before Baghdad let 
inspectors back in.268  
The Cabinet Office briefing prepared for the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Bush in 
February 2001 also made a case for including regime change as part of the British policy (it 
had been official American policy since Clinton).269 This was meant as a symbolic stance to 
show that Britain is not happy to ‘simply assum[e] an indefinite stalemate’ and to ‘hold out to 
the Iraqi people the prospect of a brighter future post-Saddam’.270 This would perhaps have 
encouraged those Iraqi people to overthrow Hussein, although in reality, both the Foreign 
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Secretary and the Cabinet Office judged, the likelihood of this was slim.271 The paper judged 
that it was best to continue with the No-Fly Zones.272 Stopping them and flying in only in 
response to a move from Baghdad would be riskier, and abolishing them while maintaining 
the goal of defending Kuwait would mean replacing them with a much more expensive 
ground force.273 
‘Iraq: New Policy Framework’ was a confidential document that outlined what the British 
proposal for Smart Sanctions might look like in detail.274 It was sent around internally as well 
as to the British diplomatic posts in New York and Washington on 7 March 2001.275 One 
month later, an update on that policy indicated that the United States and Britain ‘appear[ed] 
to be in agreement on the broad directions’, in particular ‘on the case for moving towards a 
single list of goods subject to UN controls’, which would make the sanctions narrower.276 
However, there was no agreement yet on whether to reduce the No-Fly Zones; it was also 
clear that the United States agreed with Britain in broad lines more in order to ‘be in a 
position to set out our ideas to the French and the Russians’ than because they agreed in 
detail.277 It is also worth noting that the American Department that Her Majesty’s 
Government was dealing with at this stage was that of Colin Powell, who throughout took a 
‘softer’, more multilateral approach to the Iraq issue than many of his colleagues.278  
At this stage, many countries were weary of negotiating a new resolution outlining (more 
precise but stricter) sanctions on Iraq, particularly as the new consensus that Britain was 
looking for would still include that ‘pending [a change in Baghdad’s behaviour and lack of 
cooperation], military measures … would have to be at least tolerated’.279 Discussions 
happened in the Security Council over the next months, but even by 18 September 2001, 
‘French support overall was tepid’ and Russia still had objections.280 There was a natural 
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timeline for discussions about Iraq in all this: existing Oil for Food provisions only covered 
the period until November 2001.281 A straight continuation of these provisions would be ‘a 
defeat for the US Administration, strengthening the hands of the hawks’ (as it would mean 
Saddam Hussein was comfortable with the current status-quo, which was not severe enough 
on his regime).282 By contrast, for those who opposed sanctions, it would be a ‘continuation of 
a policy to penalise ordinary Iraqis’.283  
If the draft resolution on smarter sanctions backed by the United Kingdom could be passed, 
that would be good: but the risk of failure was high, particularly if Iraq’s neighbours were not 
convinced it was in their interest to stop trading with Iraq and stop smuggling oil.284 A 
revised draft resolution, without the proposals ‘to tighten existing controls and the 
references to neighbouring states’, might be easier to obtain but would be weaker and thus 
disliked by the American administration.285 Nonetheless, the British government judged in 18 
September 2001, this solution might be the most likely to pass and would also help form ‘the 
broad coalition which the US were seeking in their war against terrorism’.286 (Note that this 
language on a war against terrorism already comes up one week after the terrorist attacks on 
the Twin Towers.) This third, revised option is indeed what was passed in May 2002.287 
Smarter sanctions were now in place, but without strict border controls.288 Of course, by this 
time and in the aftermath of 9/11, the new solution was quickly becoming obsolete as the 
British and American heads of state had become convinced that even this improved threat-
containment was no longer good enough.289 
From 9/11 to Crawford: A commitment is made 
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9/11 provoked a worldwide outpouring of sympathy and support for the United States.290 Of 
course Britain, one of the countries closest to the United States, was no exception. 
Christopher Meyer – the British ambassador to Washington – and Condoleezza Rice spoke on 
the phone on the day itself: she immediately confirmed that it was without doubt an Al-Qaeda 
attack but mentioned that the Administration was looking into a possible connection with 
Iraq.291 On 14 September 2001, Blair also called Bush to express his condolences and 
support: Bush mentioned the same possibility to Tony Blair.292 However, this remote 
possibility was discarded almost immediately: British Intelligence Assessment Staff reported 
on 18 September 2001 that there was no reason to assume a link.293 This has long since 
become the standard interpretation. 
Nonetheless, noises about Iraq started coming out of the traumatized States in the weeks and 
months that followed.294 Some of them explicitly – and wrongly – linked Saddam Hussein and 
the attacks.295 Unsurprisingly, a sizeable minority of Americans – a majority according to 
some polls – assumed there was a link between Iraq and the terrorist attacks.296 Members of 
the administration, including Vice-President Dick Cheney, certainly suggested there was a 
link.297 Not all calls for action on Iraq alluded to a connection with 9/11 per se, though: the 7 
December 2001 congressional letter to President Bush urging action on Iraq, for instance, is 
based on a lower tolerance for risk in general. It argued that ‘the events of September 11 have 
highlighted the vulnerability of the United States to determined terrorists. As we work to 
clean up Afghanistan and destroy al Qaeda, it is imperative that we plan to eliminate the 
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threat from Iraq’ ‘by beginning immediately to assist the Iraqi opposition on the ground 
inside Iraq by providing them money and assistance’.298 
Reaction by politicians and close policy-advisors 
It is still hard to know exactly what Tony Blair’s reaction was in his interactions with the 
American President. Important relevant documents remain classified.299 Nonetheless, those 
documents that are available – the (leaked) March 2002 Options Paper, the 14 March 2002 
letter from David Manning in Washington to Tony Blair, the 17 March 2002 letter from Blair 
to his chief of staff, Meyer’s 18 March 2002 briefing of his conversation with American 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, the 25 March 2002 warning from Jack Straw to Tony 
Blair – clearly indicate that Tony Blair had given support for (some form of) regime change 
and that those representing him on other occasions confirmed this stance in their 
conversations with American officials.300 Of course, Blair himself confirmed this in his 
testimony to the Inquiry: he testified that immediately after 9/11, he offered the United 
States his support and the promise that he would stand by them on Iraq, because not doing 
anything was no longer an option.301 The kind of threat posed by Saddam Hussein was a 
threat to everyone and could no longer be tolerated.302 In this interconnected world, it was 
‘our’ duty and interest to act.303  
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On 14 March 2002, David Manning informed Tony Blair that he had told Rice ‘that you [Blair] 
would not budge in your support for regime change … [and] you would not budge either in 
your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce 
the right result. Failure was not an option’.304 Three days later, Christopher Meyer also 
confirmed to Wolfowitz that the United Kingdom ‘backed regime change, but the plan had to 
be clever and failure was not an option’.305 The Ministry of Defence by now has also got the 
message: ‘[on] Iraq, we should support President Bush and be ready for a military 
contribution’.306 The Foreign Secretary also implicitly acknowledged the intention of being 
with the United States, for military action if necessary, when he discussed the domestic 
political risks of doing so on 25 March, as did MI5.307 
The secret ‘Iraq: Options Paper’ of 8 March 2003 was the first (publicly known) policy 
document that sets out a reasoning for supporting regime change through a full-scale ground 
campaign (as opposed to only fomenting rebellion in Iraq or give air support to opposition 
groups).308 It said that while containment had been partially successful, it had not removed 
Saddam Hussein who probably continued to develop weapons of mass destruction.309 
Britain’s goal should be the reintegration of a law-abiding Iraq into the international 
community, which could not happen with Saddam Hussein in power.310 Even tougher 
containment would probably not topple the dictator.311 When it came to regime change, 
simply supporting the divided internal Iraqi opposition might not be enough to topple 
Saddam.312 Even the second option, an air campaign providing support to opposition groups, 
would have no guarantee of success.313 In particular, this idea was discarded because ‘there is 
no guarantee that another Sunni autocrat would be better’ and London was ‘not aware of any 
Karzai figure able to command respect inside and outside Iraq’.314  
The third option, a military invasion, would raise difficulties – especially in making and 
maintaining a coalition – but ‘the greater investment of Western forces, the greater our 
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control over Iraq’s future’.315 The paper then concluded that ‘despite the considerable 
difficulties, the use of overriding force in a ground campaign is the only option that we can be 
confident will remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international community’.316 This 
is bizarre, because it does not discuss how one would get from military action to finding an 
end-state – despite the lack of clearly defined end-state with corresponding strategy being 
the reason the other two options got rejected.317 The paper also noted that regime change 
‘has no basis in international law’, and would need to pass through the Security Council one 
way or another.318 Jonathan Powell perhaps spotted that problem, because on 17 March he 
told Tony Blair that ‘[in] all my papers, I do not have a proper worked-out strategy on how 
we would do it’.319 The question, of course, was not only ‘how’ they would do ‘it’. The first 
question should be what ‘it’ precisely is.  
Reaction in the departments that prepare policy 
During the same period between December 2001 and April 2002, policy departments in 
London also started taking into account the idea that the United States might be heading ‘for 
direct action’.320 A letter from the Secret Intelligence Service to David Manning of 3 December 
2001 outlined the stakes in such action.321 It contained a long litany of risks associated with 
American attacks on Iraq: among many others, it cited ‘increased distrust of [American and 
British] motives throughout the Islamic world’, ‘increase in radical Islamist extremism’ and 
heightened risk of terrorism, ‘renewed splits’ in the Security Council, ‘major 
political/diplomatic disturbance’, the risk of an attack on Israel, no good envisaged end-state 
for Iraq beyond Saddam and the risk of bolstering him internally.322 Another part of the 
document outlined how difficult it would be to gain support from various international 
institutions and states.323 The concern of the British government and Jack Straw was to find 
ways to divert the United States ‘to an alternative course’.324  
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One way of doing this that was considered was to encourage regime change in Baghdad by 
providing ‘air support to coup makers’ on quite short notice (‘to meet US impatience’), 
although the first point on that letter (of 3 December 2001) noted that there is a serious 
problem of legality with that idea.325 A Foreign and Commonwealth Office document of the 
same day similarly dismissed both the attractiveness and legality of regime change.326 It also 
pointed out that ‘a new [Security Council Resolution] would almost certainly be needed’ ‘to 
construct a (threadbare) legal case for military action’ and that a ‘strategy to deal with the 
WMD threat will require ratcheting up our present policy of containment’.327  
A further document (of 27 February 2002) on the 2002 State of the Union Speech of the 
American president and his comments on ‘an axis of evil’ re-emphasized the need to 
encourage ‘a broad-based approach’, but also suggested that London should not ‘rule out UK 
participation … if that is the only way … and a worthwhile and legal option exists at the 
time’.328 Nonetheless, this Ministry of Defence paper further noted that, while the American 
concerns are ‘valid’ (albeit ‘stated excessively starkly’), it was hard to see any ‘satisfactory 
end-states which should be the objective of military operations’.329 The policy stance this 
paper recommended, which is in line with what the Foreign Office was saying, was to 
acknowledge the concerns of Washington while advocating different solutions.330 
Crawford 
When Tony Blair and George W. Bush met in Crawford in April 2002, he had given a 
commitment to regime change already, yet the policy recommended and planned by 
Whitehall was one of guiding Washington away from the war path. These slightly different 
tacks could be and were – for the time being at least – more or less squared by Tony Blair 
committing in principle to regime change if it became absolutely inevitable, while also 
pushing hard to convince the Americans to take the United Nations route. In other words, the 
British government ended up in a policy of pursuing disarmament through the Security 
Council as a practical means to be able to support the United States. If that route worked 
optimally, it might be possible to disarm Saddam Hussein without force. Even if Baghdad did 
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not give in, however, the Security Council could well provide the legal justification for regime 
change based on disarmament.  
An extract from an FCO diplomatic telegram of 10 April 2002 shows that this is indeed what 
happened: the Prime Minister and the President had agreed that ‘Iraq’s WMD programmes 
were a major threat to the international community, particularly when coupled with 
Saddam’s proven track record on using these weapons. Letting that programme continue 
unhindered was not an option. The Prime Minister and President Bush agreed that action in 
the UN was the priority.’331 The last two sentences perfectly sum up the tension and 
compromise: Tony Blair agreed that something had to be done. As a Ministry of Defence 
document put it: ‘To achieve a successful regime change, the UK would need to be actively 
involved (one might also argue that the Prime Minister has effectively committed us)’.332 
President Bush had seemed to agree that that something should preferably be the United 
Nations. 
3. FROM COMMITMENT TO POLICY 
A commitment with strings attached 
In April 2002, then, the Prime Minister had made a commitment to see Iraq through. Of 
course, the British government and the Prime Minister himself later denied accusations that 
Britain had committed to war at Crawford.333 It can be argued that technically, that defence is 
correct. There was no decision to go to war yet as such: the commitment was not so much for 
regime change through force per se.334 It was about doing something about Iraq, with high 
hopes that that something could be disarmament through the Security Council.335 However, it 
was also a commitment that implicitly meant a commitment to ‘no longer tolerate the threat 
of Iraq’ even if that peaceful route would not work.336 
One of the crucial questions then is whether this commitment was unconditional. Yes, said 
Blair: even though we were giving them advice about the smart way to do it (the UN route 
and a coalition), at the end of the day alliances were not made by friends throwing conditions 
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at each other.337 This went back, of course, to the fact that for Blair the first right thing was to 
do something about Saddam Hussein.338 The second right thing was to do so through the 
United Nations, to strengthen that institution and to promote the internationalist project, and 
also to help the United States gain more allies.339 But even if this second element failed, for 
instance because members of the Security Council were incapable of recognising the 
important and right thing to do, the risk coming out of Baghdad could not be tolerated any 
longer.340 Of course any commitment given at Crawford was not unconditional, maintains 
Jack Straw: if nothing else, that would have been completely impossible for legal reasons to 
honour this kind of promise.341 It was also totally out of line with official British policy, which 
was the disarmament of Iraq through the United Nations.342  
The ‘conditions’ were the following: the UN route needed to be exhausted; there needed to be 
progress in the Middle East Peace Process (what that entailed was rather unclear); and the 
public (both domestically and in the Middle East) needed to be clearly informed and ideally 
convinced so as to make any force politically viable.343 After Crawford if not before, these did 
in fact become conditions in the policy pursued by the Foreign Office.344 Nonetheless, it is 
also clear that the message received from London by the embassies was still rather mixed: 
although Meyer was aware of the British line and the existence of these conditions, he only 
saw them formally listed in a Cabinet Note of July 2002 (that was leaked).345 He has also said 
that it was never quite clear to him just how iron these conditions actually were meant to 
be.346 Even though Manning and Straw insisted they were binding indeed, the United States 
did seem less than impressed and little inclined to follow them, with the exception of the 
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United Nations route, to which it eventually agreed.347 Nothing much ever came of the other 
conditions.348 
Of course, while the Middle East Peace Process and the public opinion campaign were 
desirable for political reasons and to improve the chances of success of the operation, the 
Security Council route was crucially important for legal reasons. There is absolutely no doubt 
that it would have been illegal for Britain to participate in military action had the United 
Nations route not been taken (‘exhausting the UN route’, as Blair put it, also would not in se 
have been enough to make war legal).349 Nonetheless, the legal issue seemed to be a non-
issue for many policy-makers involved, and both the legal advisors of the Foreign Office and 
the Attorney General regularly had to intervene to emphasize the limits to what could be 
done.350 The United Nations route was a condition whether the Prime Minister agreed with 
that or not: it is highly unlikely that the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Armed 
Forces, Cabinet, the Attorney General, Parliament, the Civil Service and the country would 
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have stood for such a flagrant violation of British customary policy respecting international 
law.351 
In any case, Britain started preparing for contingent participation in military action with the 
United States – and had to repeatedly point out that participation was contingent indeed.352 
Meanwhile, in September 2002, the American president agreed to go (back) to the Security 
Council.353 In the immediate sense, this was a clear victory for both Britain and those within 
the American Administration who would prefer a multilateral and maybe even peaceful 
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solution to an immediate unilateral invasion.354 In a wider sense though, Bush agreeing to go 
to the Council probably also meant that, if this did not work, Britain might now be under 
more pressure to make good on its promise (with a logic along the lines of ‘we will stand by 
you, just come to the United Nations first’), even if that meant the use of force. 
Negotiations in the Security Council and SCR 1441 
In essence, this is what happened: the United States went back to the Security Council; SCR 
1441 got passed; inspectors went back into Iraq and reported back to the Security Council; 
there was major disagreement in the Security Council as to its implications of both SCR 1441 
and the reports; further progress in the Council became impossible; military preparation was 
pressing ahead; and the United Kingdom got desperately stuck between its commitment to 
the United States and its (legal) position on the Security Council.355 Its legal problem was 
partly caused by the fact that the Attorney General was not involved in the drafting of the 
resolution; nor was the legal advice clearly and properly integrated in London’s advice to the 
UK Mission in New York in the usual way.356 In other words, the policy that it had ended up 
agreeing on by necessity, namely pursuing disarmament via the Security Council, was under 
threat: it seemed ever more likely that the United Kingdom would not be able to obtain both 
disarmament and Security Council support. 
Securing one resolution instead of two 
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The Security Council – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Guinea, Ireland, Mexico, Mauritius, Norway, Singapore and Syria – 
passed SCR 1441 on 8 November 2002.357 Despite its unanimity, their vote hid substantial 
differences between their positions.358 SCR 1441 and its meaning have become much 
contested – as the British ambassador to the United Nations said, diplomacy got ‘too clever’ 
for its own good.359 One notable aspect of this controversy is the claim that SCR 1441 was 
always meant as the first of two resolutions; and that the failure of the United Kingdom to 
achieve a second resolution meant that London went to war illegally.360 Regardless of the 
legal merits of SCR 1441 as it was adopted, though (which will be discussed later), it is clear 
that the United Kingdom always intended the resolution to be self-contained: the Foreign 
Office wrote that ‘[it] will be important that the draft should provide legal cover for military 
action without further Council action’.361 Moreover, the resolution being self-containing was 
a conditio sine qua non for the United States to accept the final version of SCR 1441, as 
Washington did not want the Security Council to limit its option of taking unilateral action.362 
Negotiation goals of the countries 
Different countries in the Council had different reasons for agreeing to a resolution. The 
United States wanted to deal with Iraq and did not feel it needed any (new) Security Council 
permission to do so: it was negotiating on the draft as a political favour to Britain (and to 
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parts of its own administration).363 Its policy goal vis-à-vis Iraq was regime change. This 
meant that Washington had an interest in making the resolution as difficult as possible for 
Baghdad to obey.364 By contrast, the United Kingdom was pursuing disarmament. Its goal was 
therefore a resolution setting disarmament conditions that Saddam Hussein could easily 
comply with (within the limits of proper disarmament, of course).365 It did not want to set the 
bar too high.366  
France and Russia, on the other side of the political spectrum, did not want an invasion of 
Iraq.367 They had come to the negotiation table to prevent unilateral action by the United 
States.368 Their goal was a resolution that was attainable for Iraq and that would not lead to 
military action; at the very least not without the green light of the Council. Paris was insisting 
on a two-resolution approach.369 Most of the smaller countries were hesitant about following 
the American-British axis, under a lot of pressure from Washington to nonetheless support 
its plans, and unhappy to be dragged into this clash.370 
Content and meaning of SCR 1441 
The resolution stated that Iraq was still in material breach of its disarmament obligations.371 
Nonetheless, the country would be given ‘a final opportunity to comply’, by letting weapons 
inspectors back in and by submitting a new ‘currently accurate, full, and complete’ 
declaration on the state of its weapons programmes.372 SCR 1441 also specified that any 
further ‘false statements or omissions in the declarations (…) and failure (…) to comply’ 
would constitute a further material breach.373 It further specified that the Security Council 
shall ‘convene immediately’ ‘to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with 
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all of the relevant Council resolutions’ and pointed out that Iraq ‘will face serious 
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations’.374 
It is clear that Iraq was given at least one more opportunity to avoid action by the Security 
Council by cooperating properly; there is also no real discussion that a material breach 
needed to consist of both false statements in Baghdad’s declarations and non-compliance 
with the inspections (as opposed to either).375 However, what should happen if there was a 
further material breach was less clear. Her Majesty’s Government has argued that the 
resolution did not say that the Security Council had to make a new decision if there was a 
further material breach to decide on the punishment: it only needed to consider the situation 
again (implying that individual nations might be able to notice a further material breach and 
mete out the punishment).376 By contrast, the resolution also did not explicitly authorize 
military action without a further decision by the Security Council – usually the only body that 
can determine whether any breach constitutes a material breach and what the consequence 
should be – and many people and countries have felt and argued that SCR 1441 in itself did 
not authorize military action.377 
Inspections and the attempt for a second resolution 
After the adoption of SCR 1441, Baghdad did allow inspectors back into Iraq.378 It also 
submitted a declaration on 7 December 2002, which was mostly recycled from earlier 
reports and generally judged unhelpful by London and Washington.379 It got severe criticism 
from the weapon inspectors too: their first report was overall negative about Iraq’s 
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cooperation.380 Some in the American administration argued that this in and of itself gave the 
green light to war, but that argument did not get any traction.381 This gave London less hope 
of spontaneous disarmament by Baghdad – which had always seemed an unlikely option – 
but it also meant that the Council might now agree that Baghdad was failing its duties, and 
thus needed to be dealt with. It made a successful second resolution more likely.382 The 
Americans agreed to try and get a second resolution, while maintaining that they did not 
need it to undertake action.383 However, the process led to nothing but a renewed fracturing 
of the Security Council on the issue of Iraq.384 
Moreover, London was still in trouble over the legal issue: the Attorney General felt at that 
time that the SCR 1441 on its own provided dubious legal grounds and recommended a 
second resolution to solve the problem.385 Although Tony Blair, Jack Straw and those in the 
New York embassy felt that SCR 1441 was certainly self-containing (not that their view had 
any authoritative value from a British legal perspective), they would have had no choice but 
to accept the Attorney General’s judgement – which in any case was in line with both the 
Foreign Office’s legal advisors’ view and that of many states.386 There was an additional value 
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to maintaining the initiative in the Security Council, even though a second resolution 
certainly carried with it the risk of making SCR 1441 seem less self-sufficient if it failed.387 
Fail it did. It was clear that the Security Council had no appetite for approving the use of force 
against Iraq, particularly without any further time for the inspections to work and for 
Saddam Hussein to be brought to compliance.388 The United Kingdom in particular was 
lobbying hard – desperately – for a second resolution, but the permanent members were still 
opposed and the smaller countries reluctant.389 On 10 March 2003, France announced that it 
would vote against a second resolution authorizing military force ‘in all circumstances’.390 It 
quickly became clear from diplomatic interaction with Paris as well as from the context that 
Paris did not mean that it would always on principle oppose dealing with Iraq.391 Rather, it 
would never vote for war as things stood.  
Regardless, the explicitness of the French stance meant that it was now much easier for the 
smaller countries in the Council to not vote with the United States and Britain: why vote for 
such an unpopular resolution if it would not pass either way?392 While the blame that the 
British government subsequently and publicly put on the French was misplaced and 
disingenuous, it had become clear that a second resolution explicitly authorizing force was 
not about to happen without giving the inspections more time.393 But the military time table 
was pressing ahead and the United States did no longer want to wait.394 The Security Council 
route had run its course.395  
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When the negotiations fail, what is the preferred alternative? 
This is when the tension in British policy really cornered the British government. All along, 
there had been substantial underlying problems with the British policy, in particular about 
any alternatives to the pursued policy. Any commitment to the United States to be with them 
outside the United Nations was quite simply legally – and politically – untenable. Yet all 
throughout this saga, little attention had been paid to that by those preferring this route. The 
Foreign Office had been formally clear throughout that regime change itself could not be the 
basis for any action, and that the UN route was the only route; yet de facto, the office had 
indeed been working on something that amounted to regime change. The Prime Minister had 
been clear in his promises to the United States. The effect, though, was that there was no 
clear alternative.396  
By March 2003, London was hopelessly stuck between its commitments to international law, 
the role of the United Nations, the United States and of course the fact that its military was 
planned in in the American plan for the invasion. Even though the military contribution of 
Britain was very significant – one third of fighting troops in Iraq, an entire division, were 
British – Washington was quite clear that it could fight on its own and that London could 
withdraw from the coalition if it wanted or needed to.397 This was anathema to Tony Blair. 
Instead, his attitude of wenn schon, denn schon (‘if you go for it, you really go for it’) meant 
that he did not back out of the coalition.398 Instead, he wagered all his political capital on the 
war being legal and on getting permission from Cabinet and Parliament.399  
Former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook resigned as Leader of the House of Commons, but the 
Prime Minister succeeded.400 After weeks of doubt, the Attorney General did change his mind 
in the last week before the invasion and decided that the better view would be, after all, that 
the war was legal.401 The Foreign Office’s Deputy Legal Adviser resigned in reaction to this.402 
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After a political thriller, Cabinet agreed to and Parliament voted in favour of war.403 Thus, 
with the Security Council route now exhausted and war on the basis of its resolutions legal 
from a British domestic point of view, Britain went to war on the eve of 20 March 2003. 
4.  ENDGAME  
Attorney General 
International opinion on the legality of the invasion and the role of the Attorney General 
The story of the Attorney General’s involvement in, and perspective of, the development of 
Iraq policy between September 2001 and March 2003 is regrettably short. A lot has of course 
been written about the legality of the invasion. Both academics and governments have 
argued in no unclear terms that the invasion was utterly illegal under international law; 
many others have been more diplomatic in tone but essentially agree.404 The United Nations 
Secretary General explicitly called the war illegal.405 There are various lines of arguments as 
to why the war were illegal. Some legal opinions do not recognise the ‘revival’ argument, 
which is the argument that UNSCR 678 of 1990, which allows states to take measures against 
Iraq to restore peace in Kuwait and in the region as a whole, could be ‘revived’ if and when 
Saddam Hussein were to not comply with all of the demands made on him by the Security 
Council, including complete disarmament and verification of that disarmament by the United 
Nations.406 Another, related question is not the revival argument in principle but its 
applicability.407  
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Secondly, here are further questions over whether, even if it was provisionally revived in 
1441 (that is to say: would have automatically been revived by a further material breach of 
Saddam Hussein) the United States and the United Kingdom would have been authorized to 
conclude such a breach on their own, rather than wait for the United Nations to conclude that 
Saddam Hussein had gone too far and materially breached Resolution 1441.408 Lastly, 
although this has not been cause of so much contention, there is the issue of proportionality 
and whether a large-scale invasion of Iraq was a justified response to lack of cooperation and 
clarity about Iraq’s weapon programmes.409 
However, from a domestic legal point of view in the United Kingdom, the person that 
authoritatively pronounces on the legality of any such matter is the Attorney General. As the 
Attorney General at the time did judge the invasion of Iraq legal (contingent on the political 
judgement of the Prime Minister), and the Prime Minister made the judgement that the 
invasion was necessary because Iraq was in breach and an invasion was necessary to get full 
compliance with Iraq’s disarmament obligations, from a British official point of view the war 
was legal.410 This nonetheless leaves open the question of British policy-making and the role 
that the Attorney General and his legal advice had in this. 
Evolution of the Attorney General’s view on military intervention in Iraq 
March 2003 was not the first time that this British government had had to deal with Iraq. In 
1998 the British had participated in Operation Desert Fox, and they also had continued 
patrolling in the No-Fly Zones together with the United States and initially France. This 
means that some of the legal questions surrounding action in Iraq on the basis of Baghdad’s 
noncompliance with its UN obligations had previously come up.411 When Peter Goldsmith 
became Attorney General in June 2001, he confirmed and adopted the stances of his 
predecessor.412 He did recognise the principle of a revival argument based on SCR 687; he 
also judged that the Security Council would need to be the body assessing a material breach 
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for that revival to occur.413 In this way, the revival argument had been used to legally justify 
the No-Fly Zones (based on the humanitarian relief efforts called for in SCR 688) and the 
1998 bombings (based on the obligations put on Iraq in SCR 678, only conditionally 
suspended in SCR 687, and the ‘flagrant violation’ described in SCR 1205 reviving, for the 
United Kingdom, SCR 678).414  
The Attorney General did not attend Cabinet on a regular basis.415 This was a matter of 
tradition, not exclusion.416 Likewise, the advice of the Attorney General must be made 
available to Cabinet in full, but the Attorney must not be present.417 Another custom is that 
the advice of the Attorney General is not usually made public.418 Nor had it ever happened 
before, as happened now, that the Armed Forces and the Civil Service demand that the 
Attorney General give them explicit, written advice that participation in the invasion would 
be legal.419 In the first half of 2002, the Attorney General was not involved in policy 
discussions on Iraq, but presumed some were taking place.420 Likewise, he did not 
systematically receive intelligence.421  
Goldsmith got most of his information via the press.422 As the rumours about the possibility 
of military action mounted, Goldsmith asked for a briefing so as to assess the threat for 
himself.423 He was particularly concerned about American ideas of pre-emptive strikes.424 His 
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conclusion was that there was no sufficient threat for the time being.425 On 28 March 2002, 
the Attorney General wrote to Geoff Hoon.426 The Defence Secretary had publicly suggested – 
when cornered and while trying to avoid the question, Hoon later defended himself – that 
there might be a legal basis for military action.427 The Attorney General obviously strongly 
disagreed.428 The response – ‘I said that we would be entitled, in principle, to act in self-
defence, if it was shown that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction’ – he did not agree with 
either, but let it go.429 
Overall, the Attorney General testified to the Iraq Inquiry, his advice was not asked for, not 
even in preliminary form, and when it was given nonetheless – as is the Attorney General’s 
duty – it was unwelcome.430 His repeated stance to Downing Street was consistent with that 
of the previous years.431 Self-defence and humanitarian intervention would not, in this case, 
be an applicable basis for force, implying that the UN route was the only option.432 There, a 
new resolution clearly determining a material breach would be necessary; even if such a 
breach were decided on by the Security Council the use of force would have to be necessary 
and proportional; and regime change per se could never be the goal.433 The Attorney General 
felt compelled to give the Prime Minister a written reminder of this before he left for the 
United States after the summer.434 
The United States agreed to go down the UN route and negotiations on the future SCR 1441 
got on their way. The Attorney General was not asked for advice at all, not even in 
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preliminary form, yet drafting went on.435 (As said earlier, they negotiated and drafted it with 
the intention of there only being one resolution.) From what the Attorney General – and 
other legal officers in London – could tell, the draft did not look good enough, although it 
obviously still changed somewhat during later negotiation stages.436 On 18 October 2002 the 
Attorney General called Jack Straw to voice his concerns and disapproval, and four days later 
he met with Tony Blair.437 The Attorney General recalls it as a conversation in which regime 
change was a constant theme for the Prime Minister and in which he also brought up the 
concept of an ‘unreasonable veto’ à la Kosovo – even though Kosovo was based on different 
legal principles altogether.438 Moreover, in the case of Kosovo a Security Council veto was 
avoided, not ignored.439 
When SCR 1441 was adopted, it was not strong enough to warrant military action by itself.440 
The British legal case at this stage was the following: the Attorney General accepted the 
principle of the revival argument.441 He remained of the opinion that it was for the Security 
Council to determine whether or not a material breach has taken place.442 The resolution did 
not contain automaticity, in the sense that it was not in itself a green light to go to war.443 
However, it did contain, in the Attorney General’s (contested) view, another kind of 
automaticity: namely that if another breach of UN resolutions happened, that would 
automatically be considered a material breach, serious enough to allow for corrective 
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measures.444 So the opinion of the Attorney General was that SCR 1441 gave Iraq one last 
chance; if it failed to take that chance, the nature of that offence, and thus the appropriate 
punishment, was predetermined and pre-accepted by the resolution.445 However, the 
preliminary advice remained that the Security Council needed to decide whether such a 
material breach had taken place – and thus whether the punishment was justified.446 A 
second phase in the Security Council was certainly needed.447  
Once more, the Attorney General had to squash the overly optimistic thinking of the 
government, in which Chinese whispers were suggesting that he had agreed that war would 
now be legal.448 It was not. Weary once more of being boxed in, Goldsmith called Number 10 
to emphasize that he was not sure – and doubtful.449 Once more they said they understood. 
In December 2002, the Attorney General was eventually asked formally for advice through 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.450 The Foreign Office’s lawyers still judged – indeed, 
to this day judge – that war would be illegal.451 The legal advisor in New York, by contrast, 
assessed that no further resolution was needed.452 On 14 January 2003, the Attorney General 
gave a preliminary version of his advice to Blair.453 That advice still gave a red light to 
military action.454 It was still a draft; indeed, formal and final advice was still not deemed 
necessary at this stage.455 Goldsmith asked for more information to better understand the 
context and use of words in SCR 1441.456 It was suggested that he should go to the United 
States and meet with the British as well as the American negotiators of the resolution.457 On 
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23 January 2002 Peter Goldsmith met with Jeremy Greenstock, the British representative to 
the United Nations.458 He later described that in that conversation, Greenstock had ‘made 
some headway’, but had not convinced the Attorney General ‘yet’.459 Thus, when the Prime 
Minister went to see Bush at the end of the month, Goldsmith warned him that the legal 
answer was still a provisional ‘no’.460 
Jack Straw, meanwhile, did ‘not accept’ the legal advice.461 This was a most curious view, 
especially in the light of other arguments made later: in the meeting in which Cabinet 
approved of the war, most Cabinet members had been quite content with not debating the 
legal advice at all.462 Instead they simply accepted it. Several people, including Straw, have 
argued or accepted that this was the right thing to do, as arguing about the Attorney 
General’s legal opinion – which is binding – is necessarily a ‘slightly sterile exercise’.463 That 
did not stop Straw from debating the legal advice earlier.464 Objecting to Goldsmith’s advice, 
the Foreign Secretary also said that he wanted the ‘full range’ of legal opinions to be included 
and considered.465 Of course, in this he implicitly ignored that at the time, both the FCO 
lawyers and the Attorney General agreed on what the legal opinion should be: ‘no’. Goldsmith 
rebuked the Foreign Secretary.466  
In February 2003, the Attorney General flew to the United States to discuss the SCR 1441. It is 
this visit that changed his mind: on 27 February 2003 he thought that ‘a case can be made’ for 
the legality of an invasion.467 This in itself, by tradition, gave the green light for military 
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action: the standard by which the British government judges the legal feasibility of its actions 
is not whether something is certainly or even probably legal.468 Rather, the burden is whether 
there is a reasonable – defensible – case for legality.469 Whether this standard is too low could 
probably be a political debate in and of itself; but this is not a standard which stems from the 
beginning of 2003. Goldsmith now felt that it was not necessary for the Security Council to 
come to a conclusion about whether Saddam Hussein had committed a further material 
breach: it merely needed to have a debate.470 After ‘further reflection’, the Attorney General 
even concluded that this view was not only a reasonable, but ‘the better view’.471 
Of course, the entire government denies any form of undue pressure on the Attorney General 
that made him come to this decision.472 The legal rationale for the eventual British legal 
position is that SCR 1441 did not say that the Security Council needed to decide on further 
action; only that it needed to convene if this would occur.473 As such, it takes SCR 1441 
literally (although of course, it could just as easily be argued that SCR 1441 does not contain 
the words ‘all necessary means’, the United Nations code for military action).474 The 
professed argumentative rationale – the reason why out of two possible legal reasonings, 
Goldsmith eventually preferred the one that held that the Security Council need not make a 
further decision – of the Attorney General was essentially that he could not believe that the 
United States would have accepted SCR 1441 if the resolution had prevented them from 
acting.475 
In general, the Attorney General certainly recognised that the United States have a different 
stance on force and legality than the United Kingdom.476 Frankly, the position maintained by 
the United States is not only different from that of the United Kingdom, but from that of most 
of the rest of the world as well, not to mention from the Charter of the United Nations it 
signed (and which severely limits the acceptable rationales for the use of military force). Yet 
in this instance, the Attorney General reasoned that if the American negotiators held the view 
that they were not bound by this resolution in this way, then neither was the United 
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Kingdom.477 He implicitly trusted and shared the American view on international law and 
whether the United Nations and the Security Council are binding institutions when it comes 
to the use of force. As Clare Short pointed out, given Britain’s general stance on international 
law and the authority of the United Nations, the Bush administration ‘seems the most 
extraordinary place in the world to go and get advice about international law’.478  
Moreover, Goldsmith not only relied on the Americans making the right call on what they 
should have got out of the negotiation process: he also simply believed they must have 
necessarily got it, because they are too competent to have possibly made a mistake.479 By 
contrast, Goldsmith did not talk to any French negotiators, or indeed anyone else on the 
Security Council.480 He said it would have been impossible to ask and talk to the French.481 
Instead he relied on the Americans and the British saying that France and Russia ‘knew 
they’d lost’ when passing the resolution (for which he admittedly had to take Washington at 
its word).482 This disregards the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom also had 
not got everything that they wanted out of the resolution (particularly the expression ‘all 
necessary means’ instead of ‘serious consequences’) – the argument works both ways.483 
Also, presumably a Security Council resolution does not simply mean what the Permanent 
Five want or accept it to mean: the Council has fifteen members. Of course, none of this 
means in se that the Goldsmith’s final position was wrong; but it does make its justification 
rather shaky.  
This explanation shows why the Attorney General changed his mind when he did. It does not 
rely on undue pressure exerted by other members of government. It is also an alternative to a 
theory that holds that the Attorney General felt obliged to give the green light given the 
stakes Tony Blair had put on British participation: the military build-up in the region, the 
commitments to the United States, and indeed his own Prime Ministership and the most 
successful Labour government ever, a government that Goldsmith was a Cabinet member of 
and that had propelled him into the House of Lords.  
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It is an alternative that does not argue that Goldsmith was pressurised or effectively side-
lined by not being informed; by not being asked for advice; by annoyance when he did give 
advice; by Chinese whispers; by other members of government on several occasions 
disregarding and publicly contradicting his provisional legal advice; by legal judgements 
being challenged; by those at the heart of the policy asking repeatedly that negative legal 
advice be not put on paper or be kept provisional; by legal advice not being properly 
integrated into the policy guidelines sent out to the embassies.484 It does not argue that the 
British government cornered the Attorney General. It is certainly the most generous 
interpretation on why Britain changed its legal position in February 2002. It is likely to be at 
least one causal factor of why the Attorney General changed his mind.485 Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that even this explanation, ‘because the Americans would not have gotten it wrong,’ 
is a less than impressive argument for changing one’s mind and giving the green light for war. 
Cabinet and Parliament  
That the Attorney General had given the green light meant that the British government could 
go to war. The next question was whether it should. This political question had obviously 
been resolved a long time ago for the key players involved. It is not that they wanted to go to 
war from immediately after 9/11. Rather, after 9/11 Blair had decided that something 
needed to be done. Ideally, that would be disarmament through the United Nations. For Tony 
Blair, the preferred alternative had been disarmament without the United Nations, with 
military force if need be. For the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the preferred alternative 
was whatever else could be done in the United Nations, as acting outside of the Security 
Council would have been illegal and therefore impossible.  
However, now SCR 1441 had been passed and the Attorney General had decided that its 
meaning was that war would be legal – and backed by the authority of the Security Council. 
While peaceful disarmament through the Security Council had failed, this interpretation of 
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SCR 1441 nonetheless meant that military disarmament through that resolution was still 
possible. The official position then became that Britain could have disarmament by force 
through the Security Council. It was a trick of language that masked the fact that policy had 
shifted significantly from what the same words had meant at an earlier date. 
However, this decision still needed approval from both Cabinet and the Commons. Cabinet 
approval was obviously necessary as Cabinet was jointly responsible for the decisions of the 
government.486 The approval of Parliament was a new idea: it quickly set a precedent and 
since then, at least three Private Members Bills have been presented in Parliament to 
enshrine this new right of the House, although they have not been successful.487 Nonetheless, 
this vote was not binding. Its importance was political and symbolic, with Tony Blair hanging 
his Prime Ministership and the continuance of his Labour government on the outcome (he 
had Tory support, though).488  
Cabinet 
Unlike Parliament, Cabinet was not merely supposed to approve of Tony Blair’s Iraq policy: it 
was supposed to help shape it. In reality, Tony Blair had a tendency for limiting the people 
and formality involved in making policy decisions: his so-called 'sofa government' – has been 
well documented.489 The Prime Minister tended to rely on a handful of close advisors rather 
than his entire Cabinet.490 Cabinet meetings were short and did not allow for real discussion; 
there also usually were no papers beyond the agenda (‘leading members of Cabinet’ got 
access to them outside of Cabinet).491 The Butler Report noted its concern ‘that the 
informality and circumscribed character of the Government’s procedures which we saw in 
the context of policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective 
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political judgement’.492 It certainly seems – friends and enemies alike agree – that Tony 
Blair’s preferred way of doing things was solving them before they came to Cabinet.493 If 
people wanted to raise issues or critique parts of the official line, the Prime Minister would 
see them separately.494  
Cabinet did not discuss Iraq policy in any substantial way – none of the policy-makers 
involved deny this.495 For those who were involved in Tony Blair’s ad hoc meetings that 
replaced Cabinet, it was not a problem.496 Indeed, most of 10 Downing Street felt that enough 
critical discussions were taking place (albeit with them instead of the entire Cabinet), and 
senior Cabinet members that were involved in those extra-Cabinetarian discussions virtually 
unanimously distrusted Cabinet because of potential press leaks.497 Those excluded from the 
process were less than impressed.498 Cabinet did not have access to the options paper of 
March 2002, nor was there any discussion of its content.499 This meant that Cabinet was not 
involved in any fundamental policy discussion on Iraq, nor was it informed of or had a say in 
the strategy.500 It was only presented with the paper written for the Parliamentary Labour 
Party, which was written as (internal) propaganda material and did not discuss policy in any 
detail, let alone policy options or issues.501  
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This does not mean that Cabinet never discussed Iraq: it did.502 However, first of all there 
were no Cabinet discussions at all between 11 April 2002 and 23 September 2002 (with a 
very brief exception of Iraq being mentioned in the context of Afghanistan on 20 June 
2002).503 Secondly, when Cabinet was discussing Iraq, it was always focusing on details.504 
What Tony Blair describes as ‘detailed discussions’ are just that: discussions in which the 
strategy is just announced to Cabinet (or, in fact, often withheld, when Tony Blair quite 
disingenuously reassures Cabinet members that no decision had yet been made505) and in 
which Cabinet members only have the possibility to discuss minor concerns.506 Tony Blair 
was happy to take practical advice from his Cabinet; he and his close advisors were not 
happy to give them any real information (‘risk of leaks’). There is an interesting tension when 
Tony Blair claims both that his Cabinet could not be given any information because it might 
look bad when leaked to the media, and that they surely must have known what was going on 
without explicitly being informed, because he was continuously and openly given his opinion 
to the press.507 
By March or April 2002 Cabinet had, however implicitly, ‘endorsed’ the policy that meant 
going to the United Nations to peacefully resolve the outstanding problems with Iraq.508 One 
year later, that policy had not worked, but the preferred alternative of the Prime Minister – 
dealing with Iraq militarily – and that which the Foreign Office presumed to be the preferred 
alternative – doing whatever the United Nations allowed to disarm or at least contain 
Saddam Hussein – had sort of come together. The Attorney General’s approval of war based 
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on SCR 1441 meant that it was possible to invade to remove Saddam Hussein, for the purpose 
of disarmament and with the ‘legality’, if not the legitimacy, of Security Council-based action. 
The troop build-up had taken place and ‘key players’ agreed on policy. Many members of the 
government – particularly those who had been excluded – were pertinently unhappy with the 
course events had taken.509 Yet many of them also felt a real and deep desire to keep the 
government going.510 This Labour government was haunted by its history of deep internal 
division and ensuing lack of electoral success and success in government.511 This Labour 
government was arguably the most successful one in recent history. No-one wanted to rock 
the boat.512 
In addition, and crucially, Cabinet was not made aware of the full difficulties that had 
surrounded the legal discussion.513 It had not had access to papers throughout, it had gotten 
most of its news from the media, and communication within the government had shut 
down.514 When Cabinet was asked to give its stamp of approval to the military invasion of 
Iraq, it only knew that the war was considered legal by the Attorney General. It did not know 
of the many caveats in his advice, most notably the caveat that he had demanded that the 
Prime Minister vouch for the political necessity of war.515 A loop had effectively been created: 
the Attorney General said it was legal only pending the political judgment that was necessary. 
That judgment was given by the Prime Minister without discussion with his Cabinet. Cabinet 
then was told the war was legal tout court, and because of this endorsed the policy and 
political judgment of war.  
Of course, as many have argued in defence of Cabinet not having been given the full legal 
advice, it was not the task – or indeed the right – of Cabinet to squabble over legal opinion 
with the Attorney General.516 But on the other hand, it is Cabinet’s duty to make a political 
                                                             
509 Short, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 2 February 2010”, 84. 
Prescott, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 30 July 2010”, 21. 
510 Ibid., 21. 
Blair, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 21 January 2011”, 29. 
Straw, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 21 January 2010”, 110. 
511 Short, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 2 February 2010”, 84. 
Prescott, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 30 July 2010”, 21, 70-74. 
512 Short, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 2 February 2010”, 84. 
Prescott, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 30 July 2010”, 21. 
513 Powell, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 18 January 2010”, 110. 
514 O’Donnell, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 28 January 2011”, 39. 
Butler et al., “Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction”, 161-162, 174. 
515 O’Donnell, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 28 January 2011”, 39. 
Powell, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 18 January 2010”, 110. 
516 Prescott, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 30 July 2010”, 55-60 
Goldsmith, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 27 January 2010”, 217. 
Straw, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 February 2010”, 52. 
135 
 
judgement about whether it is wise to go to Iraq. The details of the legal advice certainly 
mattered in making that assessment and Cabinet is entitled to the full advice.517 It would have 
avoided this ‘loop’ in which Cabinet endorses a war because it was endorsed by the Attorney 
General because it was endorsed by the Prime Minister (who should have asked the Cabinet). 
As it was, Cabinet was told that the war would be legal and accepted that judgment.518 Clare 
Short tried to ask questions but was hushed down.519 The sphere was much fractured.520 
Robin Cook, former Foreign Secretary, was no longer present: he had resigned over Iraq.521 
Cabinet approved of military action, although, in the words of a Cabinet member, it was not 
so much whole-hearted approval as lack of objection.522 For all constitutional purposes, it 
meant the country would go to war soon. 
Parliament 
On 18 March 2003, Parliament was asked to vote on military intervention is Iraq.523 The 
stakes were wider than Iraq: Tony Blair had put his political survival on the line.524 Whips did 
a furious job trying to get guarantees from the MPs that they would back the government.525 
The Conservative Party too backed intervention; nonetheless, it was a fairly close call and the 
‘largest’ Labour revolt ever.526 Robin Cook resigned too.527 The parliamentary vote consisted 
of two separate votes.528 The first motion that was put to the floor was one accepting the 
invasion.529 Then an amendment to that motion was proposed, which urged for more time 
and a further UN resolution.530 This amendment was defeated by 396 to 217 votes.531 139 
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members from the Labour party had voted in favour of the amendment, thereby rebelling 
against the Prime Minister.532 After this defeat of the amendment, the vote on the original 
motion was easier: 412 MPs to 149 endorsed the decision for war.533 The invasion started the 
next day. 
5. CONCLUSION  
Three important points stand out from the way in which Britain decided to go to war. The 
first is that the shift from containment to disarmament was the result of competing 
pressures. Important standing principles in British foreign policy (such as a commitment to 
the United Nations), usual Iraq policy and international law all pointed policy in the direction 
of the Security Council and containment. Blair’s insistence that Iraq’s old regime could no 
longer be tolerated after the 2001 terrorist attacks was a force in favour of disarmament. In 
this, he made promises to the United States which at the time were both against British 
foreign policy (as defined by the Foreign Office and understood by the government as a 
whole) and quite possibly impossible to keep without breaking international law. To 
members of Cabinet, he gave the impression of not having given any clear commitments yet. 
Either way, the Foreign Office followed Blair’s direction but framed it within what it 
considered to be the minimal requirements for any Iraq policy. These included following the 
Security Council and a disavowal of illegal action. The resulting policy thus became 
disarmament via the Security Council. 
The second important point is that this policy was dependent on a complex negotiation with 
both the United States and the Security Council, yet the government did not develop a 
preferred alternative if this absolutely central negotiation were to fail. Instead, it had two 
implicit alternatives. For virtually everyone except the Prime Minister (and one or two 
advisors), the alternative was to stick with the Security Council and abandon disarmament by 
force if the Security Council would not agree to such action. Two minimal requirements that, 
if not fulfilled, would trigger this alternative were international law and a commitment to the 
Security Council. Moreover, because an invasion is a huge commitment, it should only be 
undertaken if there is a plan to bring it to success. Without a coherent strategy to link means 
and ends – a safe Iraq that was a stable neighbour in the region – the alternative was better 
than the policy of disarmament by force. This, too, was read as a minimal requirement. 
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For the Prime Minister, by contrast, the next best option would be disarmament without the 
Security Council. He paid lip service to the ideas of international law, legitimacy in the 
Security Council and the need to have a clear plan on how to do the invasion, but at the same 
time his behaviour made it abundantly clear that these concerns did not feature prominently 
in his thoughts. The best way to describe it seems to be that he preferred not to engage with 
those questions until they became unavoidable. As it turned out, he managed to obtain most 
minimal requirements (except for legality, for which a rather improbable deus ex machina 
occurred) until after the invasion itself. Before the invasion (until it was too late anyway), he 
was not willing to let the minimal requirements of the rest of the government – to which he 
nominally agreed – limit his chosen policy course. The only minimal requirement that carried 
weight for the Prime Minister was his own minimal requirement: Saddam Hussein must be 
disarmed. If that was not possible via the chosen route of disarmament through the Security 
Council, his favoured alternative was disarmament without its genuine approval. 
The third point is that the Prime Minister’s vision prevailed. In hindsight, and with a focus on 
the Prime Minister (the most common way of understanding the Iraq war), the invasion 
might seem inevitable: the very thing the Prime Minister had committed to – if it turned out 
necessary – as early as in Crawford, almost a year before the invasion, and perhaps even as 
early as immediately after 9/11. This reading underestimates the extent to which most policy 
departments as well as politicians continued Iraq policy along more traditional lines until 
early 2001. They were preparing for the possibility of an invasion, to be sure, but this was 
assumed to be in the context of a United Nations-approved military campaign. For a long 
time, what ended up as British policy existed only in the rhetoric and wishes of the Prime 
Minister.  
We must be unequivocally clear that a change of policy did happen: policy changed from 
disarmament via the Security Council to disarmament disregarding the Security Council in 
any meaningful sense. Because of a dubious interpretation of international law and with an 
overly generous interpretation of the Security Council’s wishes, one might try to argue – as 
the United Kingdom’s official stance has been since – that the United Kingdom did in the end 
go to war with Security Council approval, as had been the policy all along. This is not what 
happened. The Security Council did not approve in the meaningful sense that London had 
been pursuing all along, as demonstrated – amongst other aspects – by London’s frantic 
efforts to build consensus for a second resolution, to plead with the United States for more 




A policy shift therefore needs to be explained. Cabinet chose grudgingly, but in the end, it 
supported the preferred alternative put forward by Blair rather than the preferred 
alternative that had been implicit in policy preparations. It did so despite serious concerns 
about the post-invasion plans and despite lack of support from the international community. 
This has been explained as a desire to not rock the boat and make an already fractured 
situation in Cabinet worse. The Labour government decided to stick together. Still, it might be 
worth asking why it coalesced around this policy, and why it felt uncomfortable with internal 
critique.  
Looking at it through the lens of BATNAs, this reaction is expected. Policy options that are not 
prepared or thought about become unthinkable. Most people, when confronted with 
insecurity about the best alternative (or, as I call it, preferred alternatives), tend to be overly 
pessimistic about the alternative. Moreover, precisely because neither a preferred alternative 
nor minimal requirements were ever explicated, it was easy to accept the argument that this 
was simply a continuation of policy as it was meant all along – even though it was not. Thus, 
Cabinet was in a situation in which no alternatives to the policy were ever developed, in 
which minimal requirements have never been articulated clearly enough to easily argue that 
this was a change of policy, and in which one policy looked more like it was the original – 
prepared, imaginable – policy. This is the policy Cabinet ended up supporting. 
This chapter’s contribution to the overall thesis is that it demonstrated that the British 
government, in making policy, never clearly defined the limits of that policy. The policy that 
was pursued was disarmament via the Security Council; however, if that policy was to fail, it 
was never explicit what the preferred alternative would be. Nor did the government 
articulate any corresponding minimal requirements. There were two implicit preferred 
alternatives, though. One was disarmament without the support of the Security Council 
(which proves feasible only because of a technical claim of legality). This was Blair’s 
preferred alternative, and the alternative that won out politically, as demonstrated in this 
chapter. The lack of defined preferred alternative and minimal requirements probably made 
it easier for Blair to push through his idea of the preferred alternative, for his alternative 
looked quite close to the initial policy (even though it was substantially different). 
However, as the next chapter will show, another implicit preferred alternative had guided 
Whitehall’s preparation of Iraq policy. This preferred alternative was based on the 
presumption that Security Council support was a minimal requirement, and that therefore 
the British policy of pursuing disarmament would be abandoned without that support. In 
other words, the plans that Whitehall departments has been making for the Iraq policy were 
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all based on their old assumptions: on the idea that London would either disarm with the 
Security Council or not attack Baghdad without support of the Security Council and thus the 
United Nations. That Whitehall could prepare for one alternative and Cabinet vote on 
another, is the result of the failure to define the preferred alternative. As the fifth chapter 
demonstrates, this meant that the plans were not suited for the conditions in which Britain 
decided to go to war. As a result, London was badly prepared for its own invasion of Iraq, 





Chapter IV: Preparing for War 
1. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter is about the planning that took place in the various Whitehall departments 
before March 2003. It does not concern itself with the decision-making process on what 
policy to take: this was covered in chapter II. Instead, if focuses on the preparation of the 
policy. It also does not address the implementation of the policy: what happened when 
Britain invaded, and the policy and preparation were put to the test, is the remit of chapter 
IV. What the chapter addresses, then, is the civil service. It looks at how a government policy 
is made to work; how the words of Cabinet generate work in the various government 
departments. This planning is what this chapter addresses: it provides the link between 
words (in chapter II) and action (in chapter IV). 
The chapter covers the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Department for International 
Development (DFID), the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Cabinet, including the 
Cabinet's Defence Overseas Secretariat (ODS). For the first three, I will discuss the 
departmental context in which Iraq preparation took place; the planning process or timeline 
of the preparations; and the content of the plans that were made. I will then tease out the 
assumptions underlying those preparations and summarize what the department's plan and 
preparedness were on the eve of the invasion. For the Cabinet Office, I simply discuss first its 
function and then its failure to fulfil that role.  
Two distinct problems occurred during Whitehall’s preparation of Iraq policy. The first is 
that Whitehall’s plans were interdepartmentally incoherent and underdeveloped. This was 
worsened both by different departments having somewhat different understandings of the 
government’s preferred alternative, and by the fact that for some departments (DFID), the 
preferred alternative was much more important to the plans than for others (MOD). 
Secondly, these incoherent and underdeveloped plans became even more problematic when 
the government suddenly adopted an unforeseen preferred alternative: the plans suddenly 
also became unsuitable for the circumstances of the invasion. The next chapter shows that 
during the invasion, many of the plans were unusable indeed. This chapter shows how the 
plans were made and how which assumptions became imbedded in the plans. 




The core budget that is allocated to Defence in the normal government budget is meant to 
cover the costs of maintaining military forces ready for military action.534 It is not meant to 
fund any military action: the net additional cost of military operations is funded separately by 
the Treasury Reserve.535 Although the core budget was small and going down in term of 
purchasing power, there were few problems with the funding of the operation, that is the net 
additional cost of the invasion of Iraq.536 However, a third money stream was also necessary: 
money for reconstruction projects in Iraq.537 The Treasury was reluctant to free up money for 
this purpose.538 It assumed the money would have to primarily come from the (core) budget 
of DFID, and we will discuss this further under that heading later in this chapter.539 
There were other concerns and stresses at the time as well. Firstly, Britain was engaged in 
Afghanistan as well as Iraq. Secondly, in late 2002 there was a risk of a fire fighters’ strike, 
which meant that part of the military had to be kept in reserve for emergency cover.540 
Thirdly, during the preparation time for Iraq, the Ministry of Defence, like other departments 
across Whitehall, was moving to a different accounting system: from cash accounting to 
resource accounting.541 A misunderstanding of this new system led to unexpected savings 
that the Ministry of Defence needed to make: while they did their best to insulate Iraq from 
this, that itself inevitably meant that other parts of the system became less well funded.542  
Planning process 
September 2001 to April 2002: Afghanistan 
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After the ‘classical strategic shock’ that was 9/11, the British defence system went in 
overdrive.543 The United Kingdom joined the United States with Operation VERITAS, the 
initial British part of Operation Enduring Freedom and London also positioned a three-star 
officer at Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa (Jock Stirrup, for the Afghan operations, 
replaced in January 2002 by the Lieutenant Cedric Delves).544 In April 2002, Delves left his 
post in Tampa and was replaced by a two-star officer, a move that indicates that the British 
MOD saw no immediate need for a higher person there.545 At this stage, even if the United 
Kingdom had wanted too, it would not have been able to consider Iraq yet.546 However, MoD 
contributed to interdepartmental papers in advance of the Prime Minister’s visit to Crawford 
in April 2002.547 The advice in these papers, which were political rather than military in 
nature, was to not exclude any possibilities, including military action, assuming that a 
number of conditions would be met.548  
April 2002 to August 2002: Considering options 
From April 2002 on, the Ministry of Defence started to think about Iraq.549 After Crawford, it 
was clearer that military action might be a (remote) possibility.550 Afghanistan has also 
settled down by then, and at the very highest levels – Blair & confidantes – the British 
government was considering the Iraq problem. This thinking was mostly limited to the 
British military: whatever planning the Americans were doing at Tampa was 
compartmentalized and  British citizens stationed at Tampa were in the foreign exclusion 
category for Iraq. 551 Likewise, Lieutenant General Anthony Pigott, then Deputy Chief of the 
Defence Staff, and Desmond Bowen,  then the Director General for Operational Policy of the 
Defence Ministry, did not see any concrete change of American thinking in terms of military 
planning on Iraq yet.552 April was also when the three-star in Tampa was replaced with two-
star officer David Wilson, with a three-star officer ‘warned-off in readiness’, a sign that there 
were no formal American-British talks going on.553  
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Internally, by contrast, the United Kingdom put together a small planning cell after Crawford. 
This so-called ‘Pigott Group’ included the full Chiefs of Staff.554 Its goal was to do some 
scoping work.555 The operational headquarters of the single services also had small groups of 
people looking into Iraq in June 2002.556 Resources and Plans were asked to give broad cost 
estimates of the potential force packages, and it would have probably been around May 2002 
that Defence Secretary Hoon was brought up to speed on this preliminary exercise. 557 
Events moved quite quickly. In May 2002, CENTCOM commander Tommy Franks made clear 
to the British Chiefs of Staff that he assessed Iraq had become a matter of ‘if not when’.558 It 
also became clear then that the Pentagon was aiming for early 2003, which surprised the 
British military audience, as Franks had indicated earlier that the American forces would 
need 18 months to fully recuperate from Afghanistan.559 In late June 2002, the American 
planning opened up to the British, immediately before Pigott visited Central Command again 
on the 28th.560 Informal discussions between London and Tampa took place.561 The Prime 
Minister and Manning were aware of these discussions and asked what the options were.562 
At this point, the military only discussed options, no concrete plans, as the higher level 
political intent was still unclear.563 That said, and although British negotiators, politicians and 
civil servants often and repeated stressed the conditions to and conditionality of British 
participation, there was a widespread feeling on the American side that the British would 
support them (as Blair, optimistically, had pretty much assured them).564  
In Chief of Defence Staff Boyce’s view, this was certainly true for the American military: 
‘There was a huge reluctance by the Americans throughout the period of July [2002] through 
to March 17th, 2003, to accept that we were not going to commit our forces unless they 
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agreed … to go through the United Nations process and … Parliament as well.’565 ‘They just 
did not believe it, because they did not want to and it wasn’t really until about March [2003] 
that Rumsfeld finally got it … and he had that outburst saying, ‘If you don’t want to come, we 
will do it on our own’… that’s when they realised the truth.’566  
Air Chief Marshall Burridge (then Air Marshal), commander in the field during the invasion, 
disagrees with that assessment. He has said that between himself and Franks, there was no 
lack of clarity that British participation was conditional: ‘It wasn’t a matter of him winking at 
me and saying, yes, but we know you will be there on the day. It was absolutely clear that the 
[United Kingdom] had a view about the process that needed to be gone through.’567 Either 
way it probably depends on whom you were speaking too; the one thing everyone agrees on 
is that the American side of the planning was marred by a multitude of competing views and 
forces throughout.568 
August 2002 to November 2002: Making plans 
By July 2002, General Franks had developed the concept for a plan for Iraq, going through the 
North, which he had started working on as early as November 2001 (London did not know at 
the time).569 In August 2002, the military’s representatives attended the two-day CENTCOM 
Commander’s Conference.570 The British gave an early commentary on American 
preparations, lauding them while also making clear that it was too early for any form of 
commitments.571 Around this time, the British also ‘floated the notion that if everything was 
to fall into place … we might be able to make a contribution there [in the north]’.572 In any 
case, planning was still so provisional that it was still quite early for actual negotiations, 
conditions and commitments; but the first impression the British got from the Americans was 
‘relief and assurance from them’.573 The Americans also showed they would appreciate some 
of the British ‘military thinking power’ – ‘and then we all rushed off for hamburgers’.574 
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In September 2002 – as President Bush agreed to the United Nations route – the planning 
process shifts to a higher gear throughout Whitehall: this was the moment at which other 
departments started planning for the possibility of war, albeit initially without much clarity 
as to either the likelihood or timing of any conflict.575 However, the military advice to the 
Prime Minister on the options and military planning itself were still not very concrete, 
because the planning was still small and closed off.576 From a political point of view, it was 
important for London not to be seen to be preparing for war. From a military point of view, 
this was deeply frustrating, as Lord Boyce was ‘not allowed’ ‘to get on with the work that I 
needed to be doing at this stage’.577  
The British forces were planning for the third and biggest option – the contribution of an 
entire division – even though the expectation at this point was to contribute at best a brigade 
(the second option).578 They were planning for the third option because it was the most 
difficult one to deliver; if it prepared for the third option, the military would be able to 
deliver the others if so asked.579 However, this third option was not exposed or offered to 
Washington yet.580 The most likely reason is that London was not sure that it could deliver 
the big option, both because of concerns over the concurrent Operation Fresco (in which the 
military was kept in reserve to step in for the firefighting brigades as they went on strike) 
and because a timing of early 2003 seemed too early to be doable for the British forces, which 
were structured to need a 6-month lead-in time to an operation on that scale.581  
In October 2002, Brian Burridge, the three-star warned-off in readiness since April 2002, was 
designated as the British national contingent commander for any operations that might take 
place in Iraq – still probably package 2.582 He received briefings by the American State 
Department about the work that they had been preparing about Phase IV (the post-invasion 
phase).583 This was reassuring at the time, although it later turned out to be a false 
reassurance when responsibility for Phase IV moved to the Pentagon in January 2003 and 
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none of the preparatory work moved with it.584 Resources and Plans started to get its first 
series of permissions to spend on UORs (urgent operational requirements): first £150 
million, then another £150 million, and then £200 million.585 Not all UORs could be processed 
though: of the first batch of requirements, four out of 16 had to be held back by Defence 
Secretary Hoon for political reasons.586 Also in the autumn of 2002, Tim Cross was made the 
(provisional) two-star Joint Force Logistics Component Commander and began building 
provisional headquarters.587  
In November 2002, after Security Council Resolution 1441 had been passed, the Ministry of 
Defence got permission to ‘go totally overt and get on with starting implementing the 
planning’.588 November was also the time when planning teams at Tampa were trying to 
figure out whether Turkey would allow passage through its country, but visiting Chief of the 
Turkish General Staff Ozkok maintained that it would depend on the outcome of the 3 
November elections.589 Meanwhile, US headquarters started moving from Tampa to Qatar – a 
process that involves a lot of flying to and from, with staff working from both places – which 
meant that ‘half the brain power, the military planning intellectual capability’ and most of the 
planning moved to the Middle East.590 The Americans also now made a formal request for a 
division-sized contribution, although there was no clear British decision on the matter yet.591  
December 2002 to January 2003: The move to the Southern Option  
In December 2002, American and British forces did exercise Internal Look, a two-week-long 
full-scale Command Headquarters rehearsal in Qatar.592 The exercise allowed them to join up 
their command and go through three scenarios for the war-fighting phase: complete and 
early collapse of the regime; a sequential domino-collapse; and a drawing together of Iraqi 
troops in the capital leading to a Fortress Baghdad.593 Also at the end of 2002, London started 
considering a contribution through the south, although it was not until early January 2003 
that Ankara gave London a definitive nay and Lieutenant General Brims was instructed to 
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plan for the Southern Option.594 The American Fourth Division of the United States still 
planned on going through the north.595 It stayed in the north until right after the invasion 
actually started, which is why the British contribution in the south ended up being much 
more crucial then would have been envisaged otherwise.596  
January 2003 to March 2003: What have we not done yet?  
In January most of the important decisions were being finalized. In his estimate, Brims 
identified the lack of plans and resources for the south for Phase IV; what happened after he 
flagged up this problem he did not know.597 On 8 January, the British decision for the 
southern route was finalized.598 The exact timeline was still somewhat unclear. In the middle 
of January, there was a ministerial meeting in which the politicians approved of the plans, 
‘subject still to questions of clarifying the legal basis, to questions on how, after the initial 
event, things would be managed, and, of course, it was still contingent on the political 
decision’.599 The actual, official package of the third option came out on 20 January 2003.600 
With regard to that aftermath, only in January 2003 did the Permanent Joint Headquarters 
‘set up a cell, a planning cell, to engage with CENTCOM on the planning of the aftermath, of 
Phase [IV]’.601 It had not really been possible to do it earlier in any detail because London had 
no idea of where in Iraq it would end up.602 Detailed Phase IV planning then started only two 
months before the invasion. The United States was not doing much better: the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), was only created via a Presidential 
Directive on 20 January 2003 and this was done in reaction to a lack of preparation by 
CENTCOM.603 Crucially, as far as the (British) military was concerned, the Phase IV – and last 
phase – they needed to plan for was ‘the military phase where they are in charge and before 
                                                             
594 Ibid., 50, 55. 
Burridge and Brims, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 16-17. 
595 Tebbit and Boyce, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 December 2009”, 50-51. 
596 Ibid., 50-51, 63-64. 
Burridge and Brims, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 29-32. 
597 Ibid., 49. 
598 Tebbit and Boyce, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 December 2009”, 91-92. 
599 Ibid., 96, 114-115. 
600 Ibid., 91. 
601 Bowen, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 7 December 2009”, 25. 
602 Tebbit and Boyce, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 December 2009”, 103. 
603 Cross, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry: ‘Post-Invasion Iraq: The Planning and the Reality 
After the Invasion From Mid-2002 to the End of August 2003.’”, 7. 
Feith, War and Decision, 349. 
148 
 
civilian administration comes back into the frame’ (my emphasis).604 As we will see later, they 
expected the civilians in Iraq much earlier than the civilians expected to be there. 
In February, more cracks were appearing. Burridge and Franks put their headquarters side to 
side from 7 February 2003 on.605 There was a rock-drill from 20-22 February 2003 for the 
aftermath. MoD’s Tim Cross and FCO’s Dominick Chilcott were both present.606 To Cross, the 
rock-drill made ‘abundantly clear that there was no agreed strategic plan … [and] virtually no 
political direction as to what post-war Iraq was to look like … no declared End-State; no 
Campaign Plan’.607 In more delicate words: ‘Collectively it was agreed that the post-war 
planning was at best limited’.608 Not only were there lots of gaps in the Phase IV plan; it also 
seemed to Cross that that Garner was not at liberty to build a genuinely diverse team 
including people outside the neo-con paradigm.609 When he actually managed to find 
someone with relevant expertise and thinking – Tom Warrick – he was fired almost 
immediately on Pentagon orders.610 This was particularly problematic because the neo-con 
paradigm included no need for post-‘liberation’ planning at all.611 It was also clear that the 
United Nations ‘was seen virtually unanimously as a side-issue’.612 
March 2003 was mainly a political thriller. The military was deploying, remaining somewhat 
unsure of the time of a potential conflict until the very last moment – and, of course, still not 
sure that war would happen, as it depended on the political drama that was playing out. On 
the eve of war, commander Robin Brims judged that his troops were ready (this is a bottom-
up process with all commanders on the ground signalling up that their units are ready).613 
Partly, this judgement depended on the (correct) assessment that the enemy was not 
particularly strong.614 The shortfalls in preparation time, then, were ‘not operationally 
significant’ in the words of Kevin Tebbit.615 Moreover, while more time to train was one 
desirable element, there was also a risk of the troops in Kuwait being sitting ducks for a WMD 
                                                             
604 Bowen, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 7 December 2009”, 25. 
605 Burridge and Brims, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 5. 
606 Cross, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry: ‘Post-Invasion Iraq: The Planning and the Reality 
After the Invasion From Mid-2002 to the End of August 2003.’”, 10. 
607 Ibid., 10. 
608 Ibid., 10. 
609 Ibid., 10-13. 
610 Ibid., 10. 
Feith, War and Decision, 377-379. 
611 Tebbit and Boyce, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 December 2009”, 62, 108, 109-110. 
Cross, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry: ‘Post-Invasion Iraq: The Planning and the Reality After 
the Invasion From Mid-2002 to the End of August 2003.’”, 14. 
612 Ibid., 13. 
613 Burridge and Brims, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 17-21. 
614 Ibid., 21-22. 
615 Tebbit, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 February 2010”, 28. 
149 
 
attack.616 In March, therefore, the United Kingdom military judged itself ready for and went 
to war. 
Plans 
Phase III: Plans for military action 
From 1003 Operational Plan to the 5-Front Plan 
General Franks had been invited to produce a concept for military action in Iraq as early as 
November 2001.617 The 1003 operational plan for Iraq had not been considered in detail or 
updated since ‘Desert Badger’618, which was a plan of action if an American aircraft were shot 
down patrolling the No-Fly Zones.619 It was based on the Powell doctrine of optimum force.620 
Rumsfeld, who did not subscribe to this doctrine, ordered General Franks to come up with a 
plan that needed less – much less – boots on the ground.621 The scenarios that Franks 
considered all had regime change coupled with WMD removal as their end-state. He 
considered three scenarios: one in which all the ‘enablers fell into place’, which meant that all 
countries that were needed to provide support (for staging, basing, and overflight…) would 
give that support; a reduced option where he did not get all of that; and a worst-case option 
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where he did not get any of that.622 These scenarios and provisional plans were done by the 
end of July 2002, morphing into the first big plan called ‘Generated Start’.623  
Generated Start involved a gradual build-up and force levels that were significantly higher 
than what the United States eventually ended up with. It had a five-front approach: special 
forces in the west; preventing the enemy from going up north;  main entry in the south 
through; an air component; and an information war to disguise Western intentions.624 Later, 
the US Fourth Infantry Division was added in the north in addition to special operational 
forces.625 The slow troop build-up of some 90 days posed risks if Iraq were to use chemical 
and biological weapons. An alternative American plan, ‘Running Start’, was therefore added 
to the options.626 Later plans involved elements of both plans: a quicker deployment than 
Generated Start, a short air campaign and Special Forces operations, and going in with boots 
on the ground. The risks with this plan included both ‘disastrous success’ – an immediate or 
early collapse of the regime – and the nightmare of a Fortress Baghdad with immense civilian 
losses. 
Envisaged British Contribution to the North Plan 
By that time military planning opened up to the UK, the plan on the table involved the US 
Fourth Division going through the north, based on a dormant NATO plan that had been 
‘dusted off and reshaped’.627 This ‘North option’ had a strong south component going through 
Kuwait but the British contribution would have been in the north.628 There seems to have 
been no particular reasons for the British to contribute in the north – rather, it was suggested 
during the CENTCOM Conference and firmed up in the aftermath – but there were a few good 
arguments for it.629 It would allow Britain to play a role in protecting the Kurds.630 They 
already had Northern Fly Zone experience, and of course the northern oil fields were very 
vulnerable.631 Moreover, the British units that were considered – of First Armoured Division 
– were most compatible with the Fourth Division that was scheduled to go through Turkey.632 
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It was also a shorter sea route and in any case Kuwait was quite a small area from which to 
insert a large number of troops into Iraq.633 
From the first internal British planning in April 2002, three options were on the table.634 
Their content varied somewhat over time, but essentially the first one was to give the United 
States some enablers, but nothing much beyond what London had in theatre anyhow, largely 
Special Forces and some naval forces.635 This force could have been generated in days and it 
went without saying that Britain would have at the very least given its ‘Special Relationship’ 
partner this support.636 The second option, about brigade strength, would also have been in a 
support role, but the political decision to support the Americans would have been 
significant.637 The third option was a division with a full combat role.638 Such a force would 
takes months to generate – six following the Strategic Defence Review, although even the 
Review did not foresee the generation of a full land division at a point at which Britain was 
already engaged elsewhere (Afghanistan).639 
As said in the last section, initially the British expected to contribute the second option.640 
When this was offered, it was received ‘with gratitude’.641 However, there were strong factors 
for bringing a bigger contribution.642 First and foremost on the military mind was the 
influence this would bring to the table. Boyce names this as the rationale for the third option; 
Permanent Secretary Tebbit expands on this.643 To him the lesson of the first Gulf War was 
that boots on the ground were needed to have serious influence on American planning; once 
London committed back in 1990 ‘the planning process opened up completely to us and we 
were able to influence it’.644 Furthermore, the ethical case that pervaded the political 
reasoning behind the policy applied to the military options as well: they were dealing with a 
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vital problem that was the responsibility of the international community as a whole, so 
Britain should play a full part.645 In the end, therefore, London offered the third option when 
it was practically feasible.646 
Another effect of this was ‘that having something on a large-scale size would allow us, as it 
actually happened, to take over a region of the country rather than being integrated with the 
American force in the aftermath process, which is how we finished up with south-eastern 
Iraq’.647 The implicit assumption that this was something worth striving for will be taken up 
in a later section on the Ministry of Defence; the lack of preparation for this region London 
ended up with will also be taken up later. Another, more general effect of contributing a full 
division was thought to be its general, positive influence on American-British 
military/military cooperation, ‘good for future links on future operations, it’s good for 
sharing intelligence, it helps with logistics.’648  
South Plan 
As we know, getting Turkey’s cooperation proved unfeasible and the plan was switched to go 
completely through the south.649 The switch caused fewer problems than one might have 
feared: the operational concept was more or less the same and planning until then had been 
fairly generic.650 There was also a good working relationship between Brims, who was 
commanding the UK 1 Armoured Division, and Franks.651 The American was very responsive 
and accommodating with regard to the extra support that the United Kingdom needed to 
come through the South in time.652 Perhaps somewhat ironically, it was an American part of 
the force – the Fourth – that was stuck in the North on the eve of the invasion.653 Some of the 
British ships had left for Iraq literally not knowing which way they were going to sail when 
they set of, but overall the switch worked quite well.654 
Going through the South certainly had advantages, with notably shorter supply lines, which 
simplified logistical considerations.655 However, the fact that it was more crowded made it 
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more difficult to base all the aircraft (not just for ramp space, but also for the distribution of 
fuel for example).656 The most important differences lay in what would happen once the 
troops had entered Iraq.657 The South route gave the United Kingdom the prospect of a 
defined British ‘box’, as its troops would stay behind while the American troops would push 
on to Bagdad.658 This meant that British troops would immediately arrive where they were 
supposed to end up, and Phase IV would effectively start at the same time as Phase III (war-
fighting).659 The ‘box’ also meant less complexity of manoeuvre and more autonomy from the 
Pentagon.660 This British also hoped this meant that the United Kingdom ‘could set our own 
destiny in terms of setting the tone in that part of Iraq’.661 
Phase IV: Plans for the aftermath 
American Planning for Phase IV 
American planning for Phase IV is a major topic in and of itself. In broad terms: the State 
Department had initially been responsible for Phase IV planning. It had relevant experience 
and put a lot of effort into preparing work streams that covered a wide range of issues, 
although this preparation remained quite conceptual.662 The State Department also shared 
many of the British concerns and priorities, including the need for wide international support 
and a solid plan for after the invasion.663 However, the State Department was fighting a losing 
battle for influence within Washington.664 The entire responsibility for the Iraq project was 
eventually won by the Pentagon, and all preparation – including for the aftermath – went 
there in the first week of January 2003.665 It was put under the responsibility of a retired 
general, and none of State’s preparation moved with the responsibility.666  
                                                             
656 Ibid., 15. 
657 Ibid., 15-16. 
658 Ibid., 15. 
659 Ibid., 16. 
660 Ibid., 15-16, 27. 
661 Ibid., 15. 
662 Ibid., 36-37. 
Miller, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 21 July 2010”, 8. 
663 Tebbit and Boyce, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 December 2009”, 57. 
664 Ibid., 57, 62.  
Chakrabarti, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 16,  
Cross, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry: ‘Post-Invasion Iraq: The Planning and the Reality After 
the Invasion From Mid-2002 to the End of August 2003.’”, 5. 
665 Burridge and Brims, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 37. 
Tebbit and Boyce, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 December 2009”, 108, 110-111. 
Cross, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry: ‘Post-Invasion Iraq: The Planning and the Reality After 
the Invasion From Mid-2002 to the End of August 2003.’”, 14. 
Manning, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 30 November 2009”, 68. 
666 Burridge and Brims, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 37. 
154 
 
For the Pentagon, preparation for the aftermath was very much an afterthought. The 
paradigm that dominated thinking was a neo-conservative one which held that the Iraqis 
wanted a liberal democracy and would grasp the opportunity with both hands as soon they 
would be given a chance.667 All America needed to do, then, was provide that chance by 
deposing Saddam Hussein and dismantling any WMD programs. In this world view, the 
United Nations was also very much a hassle and imposition to be avoided.668 As described in 
an earlier section, this ‘plan’ that no plan is needed also meant that planning started but two 
months before the invasion and was done by very few people (about 100 staff members).669 
As a result, ORHA was a disaster and the good cooperation, resources and plans never 
materialized: ‘they were understaffed, underfunded and … they had profound … difficulties 
with the clarity of their mission’.670 
British Plans for the Aftermath 
Of course, the British military had also considered the aftermath. One bold military claim, 
made by Boyce and echoed by Tebbit, is that ‘[w]e spent as many hours working on our 
Phase 4, on aftermath planning, as we did actually on the actual main battle plan of winning 
the war’.671 It is important to have a sense of what the military expected itself to do, 
though.672 It was quite clear that the military campaign can only be part of the plan if the 
political end-goal is to put Iraq back into the world community.673 Such ‘a big strategic [goal 
is] way beyond … the … planning capability of CENTCOM or London or anywhere else’.674 The 
military expected to go in, topple Saddam to find the weapons of mass destruction, and hold 
the ground while civilians came in and start getting on with their part of the job, which is 
reconstruction and the thousands of non-military things, economic, political, financial, 
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humanitarian, monetary, social, judicial, that need to be solved to bring a state back on 
track.675  
It took the British a while to fully understand the lack of planning across the ocean, especially 
after the move from the State Department to the Pentagon.676 There was a feeling that there 
must be more to the planning than it seemed; surely the United Sates would not believe they 
could invade a country and expect to go to a flourishing democracy overnight?677 This initial 
lack of understanding was probably made worse as American interlocutors frequently agreed 
with the British concerns that were voiced.678 The State Department most certainly agreed, 
but so did many of the military men. In the eyes of the British dealing with him, General 
Franks understood the need for proper aftermath planning exceedingly well. ‘No question 
about that whatsoever. … He certainly understood the sequencing that should happen … and 
he understood the need to have the resources available and the need for security and the 
relationship between reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, disposable funds and security, 
civil action’, but assumed there would be a task force to take care of this.679  
However, as time went on, and in particular from February 2003 on, it was plain to all 
involved that Washington did not have any preparation for Phase IV to speak of.680 Most 
fundamentally, the Defence Secretary seemed to think that, as the liberators would not need 
to do anything in post-war Iraq, there was no need to send substantial amount of troops.681 
The US Armed Forces had asked for more troops but were refused.682 Their British partners 
felt confident that they had enough people to pull off their own area of operation, but were 
‘extremely concerned about the anorexic nature of the American contribution’, which was 
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‘desperately under-resourced’.683 They were also aware that serious Phase IV-planning was 
rebuffed by the inner circles of the Pentagon (or, if you ask Feith, by CENTCOM), and that 
ORHA was a shambles.684 These concerns were communicated up the chain of responsibility, 
and it was clear that efforts were done to address these issues with the United States.685 
However, this did not help and after that the concerns seemingly vanished from the agenda 
and did not change the course of British policy in any substantial way.  
Assumptions 
Assumptions underlie every thought process, every policy, and every plan. Many of these 
assumptions are reasonable assumptions to hold; some are not; some are important; some 
are not. In the case of the British preparation for a possible invasion of Iraq, some of the most 
fundamental assumptions underpinning departmental policies were proved right. The 
relative weakness of the Iraqi forces is an obvious example.686 Some assumptions were 
proved wrong, but not harmful overall: Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and the 
expectation of humanitarian disaster are examples.687 Other assumptions, however, were 
crucially important. They needed to be correct if Iraq policy was to be successful; but they 
turned out badly, for a variety of reasons discussed more fully in chapter five. These 
assumptions will be highlighted in this section. I do not want to suggest that these could have 
been foreseen or even that these assumptions were unique to or stemmed only from the 
military (for the money, for instance, the Treasury played a key role); but they did all 
underlie the military plans. 
“We will not ‘trash the joint’ and we will keep the army and existing infrastructure” 
It was clear to everyone that the goal in Iraq was rather bigger than an easy military victory 
and leaving the country. The goal was a changed country, ideally a democratic one that 
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participated in the international system. To achieve such ambitions, it was crucial for the 
invading force ‘not to trash the joint’.688 They would also need to rely on Iraqis to achieve 
those goals, as it was very clear that the British would not have the people, money or will to 
build up a devastated country from the rubble on their own, or even with the United 
States.689 ‘One of our great concerns’, then, ‘was to ensure that we retained as far as possible 
infrastructure and also such things as the Iraqi army’.690  
“The civilians will come in and take over soon after Phase III” 
British planners understood quite well that the end of Phase III was not was not the end of 
the military engagement in Iraq. In the words of one military commentator, when Bush 
declared ‘Missions accomplished’ in [May] 2003, ‘[t]he President can do what he likes, he 
earns more money than I do, but how could it be? It was not the end of the campaign, it was 
the end of a particular and not overtaxing military task to the United States armed forces’.691 
However, while they understood that they were not only war fighters but also peace keepers 
for at least a short period of time, they nevertheless expected the civilians, notably DFID, to 
start coming in and do their part of the job: reconstruction.692 The military did neither plan 
nor budget for this.693 As we will see in the next section, DFID saw its own role – and budget – 
in a very different light.694 
“Other countries will shoulder large parts of the burden” 
The plans also assumed that someone else – Iraq itself, the United States, and the 
international community – would start picking up the bills for the reconstruction of Iraq.695 
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The core budget, UORs and net additional cost of keeping the armed forces going were all 
expected and sorted out. The costs of getting the country of Iraq going were not. Similarly, 
there was a tension between Strategic Defence Review assumptions on the drawdown of 
British troops and what Chief of Defence Staff Boyce was expecting.696 The Defence Review 
assumed a drawdown to brigade level, about 8,000 troops, after six months.697 Boyce thought 
this was unrealistic and expected forces would be needed in Iraq for at least three or four 
years.698 The general expectation though was that other allies would start contributing 
troops after Phase III, which would allow the United Kingdom to draw down as they would 
come in.699 In fact, one consideration for going all-in with a big contribution in Phase III was 
to avoid being pressurized into a larger (and more expensive) commitment in Phase IV.700 
“The UN will play a central role after the invasion” 
‘We saw the UN as playing a central role’ was an assumption in the governance framework 
after the invasion all throughout the military planning process and underpinning the plans, 
even as it was clear that the United States was always less keen and usually less than keen 
about the prospect.701 From a British point of view, the United Nations involvement was 
necessary for at least four reasons: it would bring the weapon inspectors back; UN 
involvement brings major resources as countries start contributing; to confer additional 
legitimacy on a contested course of action; and to provide a framework for the exit strategy, 
as the United Nations could guide the political processes needed to make Iraq autonomous 
and functioning.702 And of course, even if the United Nations would not come in, at the very 
least a further Security Council Resolution would be needed to give the invaders the right to 
fundamentally change the country: invading forces are restricted from any substantial 
changes to countries’ systems.703 
Summary: The Situation on the Eve of War 
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On the eve of war, the British military had managed to put together a full divisional 
contribution to the American effort, a feat that was outside the normal Strategic Defence 
Review planning assumptions. The plan was for the troops to be inserted through Kuwait 
after a short air campaign. One of the American units – US Fourth Infantry Division – was 
stuck in the north now that Turkey had refused access, which meant that the British 
contribution was now a major part of the initial invading force. After the invasion, the British 
would stay behind in the South while the Americans pushed on to Baghdad; they would also 
become responsible for that area around Basra. 
Plans for the phase after combat were rudimentary. The general idea was that once the 
invasion had succeeded, the international system would start working. Other nations would 
then start contributing troops, allowing the British to draw down substantially. The bill for 
the reconstruction of Iraq would also be borne by Iraq itself, rich in oil, the United States, and 
the international community, with Britain doing its usual share but not being responsible on 
its own for the money. The military was aware it would need to keep order for a while but 
expected humanitarian relief and reconstruction to be managed mainly by the Department 
for International Development and perhaps to a lesser extent by the Foreign Office, which 
had the overall policy lead on Iraq. 
3. DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
Planning process 
Spring 2002 – September 2002: Is something happening? 
As we now know, the first major post-9/11 British policy framework for Iraq was put 
together in March 2002 in advance of the Prime Minister’s visit to Crawford. The Department 
for International Development was not involved in this; its Permanent Secretary Suma 
Chakrabarti was not even aware it was happening.704 DFID staff were neither invited to nor 
informed of the 23 July 2002 meeting at which military options were discussed.705 However, 
in the spring and summer of 2002 the DFID personnel became aware that some form of 
military contingency planning was taking place, although it was not informed of any 
details.706 Internally, the department started doing some humanitarian contingency 
planning.707  
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September 2002 – October 2002: Thinking about humanitarian assistance 
In September 2002, the Cabinet Office set up the so-called Ad Hoc Group of Officials on Iraq, 
of which the Development Department was a part.708 It was the first time the department was 
formally involved in any Iraq discussions.709 This group brought together all relevant 
departments and allowed them to exchange information. DFID mainly contributed on the 
humanitarian side of issues, for which it was preparing extensively internally.710 
Humanitarian relief, of course, was one of the department’s core tasks. It was a task that DFID 
was equipped for. It was also a task that would never be legally contentious: humanitarian 
aid, unlike reconstruction, is always allowed under international law.711 This preparation had 
to be kept internal, as there was a ban from Number 10 on talking to outside institutions, to 
not to be seen preparing for war.712 Short asked for a briefing on military developments but 
was rebuffed.713 When a briefing eventually happened, it was – according to Short – soothing 
rather than a genuine briefing .714  
At this point in time, the department was not yet preparing to address the problems of 
reconstruction in the aftermath of the problem; perhaps because they had no clear idea of 
what was going on nor of the timeline involved (the general assumption was that war was 
quite far away, as the United Nations process would have to be fulfilled first and hopefully 
avoid war altogether).715 The reconstruction side of things seems to have been the 
responsibility of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who were in charge of the overall 
Iraq policy and who certainly, if somewhat accidentally, were thinking about policing and 
other post-invasion issues.716  
The ban on talking to outside institutions was problematic for a department whose working 
method relied on inserting money and coordinating existing other organizations; the 11 
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October 2002 paper of the Ad Hoc group explicitly mentions the ban as a constraint.717 Clare 
Short told her department to disregard that blockage as far as the United Nations was 
concerned.718 They discovered that the United Nations was doing its own preparations, but 
had just as much interest in keeping that silent – and for the same reasons – as Britain.719 
When the ban on talking to outside organizations was lifted to a limited extent on 23 October 
2002, DFID also started liaising with NGOs.720  
November 2002 – December 2002: Signs of trouble 
In November 2002 (the time when Resolution 1441 was passed), DFID representatives were 
part of the cross-Whitehall team that went to the United States.721 At this point, the military 
was just receiving permission to start its overt planning and the first UORs were coming 
through. DFID started discovering what would only start to dawn in earnest on the military 
two months later: there was no serious post-invasion planning being done.722 To be sure, 
DFID and its American equivalent USAID were on the same page, but USAID and the State 
Department had little internal pull.723 Their plans, including the State Department’s 
document ‘Future of Iraq’, were also ‘reasonably top level or too top level for that stage’, that 
is lacking in detail.724 Overall, the British came ‘back with a very clear conclusion that the 
people with the expertise on humanitarian assistance … were still not being heard’.725 
Then, in December 2002, Defence’s Tim Cross came to DFID and asked for a meeting under 
Chatham House rules.726 He expressed worries that the Ministry of Defence’s Permanent Joint 
Headquarters were not paying enough attention to the humanitarian assistance task and that 
the planning between the two departments was not integrated enough.727 His interlocutors 
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shared his concerns, particularly their lack of understanding of the operational planning.728 
Tim Cross asked Clare Short to write to Defence Secretary Hoon; instead Clare Short raised 
the issue with Tony Blair, who suggested she should talk to Boyce.729 Although the Prime 
Minister, she says, agreed that her department should have access to military planning, it 
took until the end up December to get this going.730  
December 2002 is also the month in which the issue of DFID funding is also first raised with 
the Treasury and thereafter in ‘various letters from Clare Short to the Prime Minister’.731 
Initially, the demands are met with a lot of resistance.732 The Treasury expects DFID to fund 
Iraq out of its normal budget for humanitarian aid; and as far as reconstruction is concerned, 
‘[t]here is no money, and that’s why we have got to have a UN Resolution for 
reconstruction’.733 The United Nations itself launched its first appeal for £15.2 million for an 
emergency in Iraq, to which London looked at contributing its usual share of 5.6 percent. 734 
The United Nations appeal goals were not met, as countries around the world were not 
willing to pay for the potential crisis.735 
January 2003 – March 2003: Planning, planning, planning 
In the new year there was much better cooperation between MOD and DFID.736 It was still 
not clear to DFID whether war would in fact happen, though, and in any case the department 
assumed it had a lot more time than it actually did (and then the military would have been 
planning for at this stage).737 When it was decided that the military would go through the 
south rather than the north and thus take civil responsibility for four provinces, this led to an 
internal discussion in Short’s department about the distribution of DFID’s help.738 Given that 
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DFID’s mandate was to fight poverty, there was a strong case to be made for giving assistance 
based on need; the idea that international development assistance should be associated with 
the military was contentious.739 On the other hand, an integrated British policy made sense 
and would allow a better outcome in that region and in the end DFID came ‘to the conclusion 
that [funding the British area] was a reasonably way forward’.740 
Responsibility for the provinces allocated to the British meant a lot more money was needed 
for reconstruction. The Treasury presumed DFID would pay – like the department usually 
does – its activities, including all crises, from its core budget. However, the invasion Iraq did 
not naturally fit in the anti-poverty mandate of the department and in any case the costs 
were orders of magnitude bigger. This in turn also meant that the role of the United Nations 
would be more important. The money issue was raised over and again with the Treasury and 
Number 10.741 Clare Short also wrote to the Prime Minister for guidance on whether ‘you 
want us to go for a modest or a high scenario’ of delivering humanitarian aid to get a better 
idea of what funding the department good expect.742 Tony Blair answered he wanted the 
United Kingdom to play an exemplary role.743  
However, there was still no clarity on the amount of resources that would be made available 
– and Chakrabarti claims that NGOs threatened to ‘go public’ about the lack of funding for 
DFID.744 On 10 February 2003, DFID got allocated additional funding worth £3.5 million for 
Iraq for the first time, followed by another £6.5 million in late February: £3.5 million for the 
United Nations, £3 million for NGOs.745 There was no plan yet for disbursements; the 
assumption was that allocations would be made as needs emerged.746 In early March 2003, 
DFID allocated another £65 to Iraq, this time out of DFID’s annual budget for contingencies 
for 2003/2004, depleting the contingency budget for the entire world in one go at almost the 
beginning of the year.747 
Around the same time, the Ministry of Defence got £30 million from the treasury for post-
conflict humanitarian work (£20 million in advance and £2.5 million each week for the first 
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month).748 Getting the money is one thing; injecting it into the system another. By the middle 
of March, £17 million of the money received by DFID had been allocated to agencies.749 By 
way of comparison, United Nations and British Treasury papers indicated that the total cost 
for post-conflict resolution might be in the region of £1,200-£2,600 million750, and the costs 
for the United Kingdom was estimated at perhaps £60 million per month.751  
If Britain was to be involved in reconstruction, a role for the United Nations was essential. 
Ideally, for DFID, this meant that the UN should have the leadership of the post-war effort, 
but at the very least it meant a resolution legalizing reconstruction.752 However, when 
Carolyn Miller and the Foreign Office’s Edward Chaplin went back to Washington in January 
2003 to talk about the Day After, it was clear that the United States was still not keen on a 
role for the United Nations.753 As always there were clear divisions between the different 
parts of the American government, and State and USAID were keen for the international 
organization to have a role.754  
However, as a whole, the American stance was not to outright deny a role for the United 
Nations, but to focus on having them ‘deliver some things rather than a more overall role’ – a 
pick-and-chose approach that the United Nations would be unlikely to accept.755 It was also 
clear that the American planning had little in it that was good, new, or substantial.756 
Departmental communication to the Cabinet Secretary of 11 March, as well as a letter of 12 
March, outlined the need to ‘be very clear with the Americans on the need for UN leadership 
in the post-conflict effort’.757 In the margins of the Cabinet meeting of 13 March 2003, Clare 
Short got reassured by Tony Blair that this was indeed the case; she reported back to her 
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department that Bush had agreed that the United Nations would be in the lead for post-
conflict efforts.758 
All throughout this, the department was considering what parts of the United Nations to 
fund, what role they should have in supporting the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces, what 
NGOs were likely to be working immediately after the conflict, and whether to send out any 
people of DFID itself.759 In February, the department deployed one person to the States to 
work with ORHA; two advisors also deployed to the UK First Division in Kuwait.760 The 
numbers slowly continued to increase over the week. By the time of the invasion, around 
seven staff members were deployed.761 
Plans 
The department had four different strategies between January 2002 and May 2003.762 The 
first strategy, ‘business as usual’, meant allocating money to Iraq based on humanitarian and 
development needs.763 By that metric, Iraq was not a policy priority for the poverty-fighting 
department.764 After fall 2002, when it became part of the Ad Hoc Group of Officials, DFID 
started preparing for a potential engagement in Iraq.765 The Ad Hoc group ‘broadly set up the 
department’s role as being firstly to provide funds to other organisations …, secondly to 
provide expert advice and assistance … and thirdly to work with international partners’.766 
Its focus was overwhelmingly on humanitarian assistance.767 A more advanced version of the 
second plan was set out in the 12 March 2003. The document ‘Humanitarian Strategy and 
Immediate Assistance: A Plan for Iraq’ identified three possible scenarios regarding the role 
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of the United Nations,.768 The worst outcome, from DFID’s point of view, would be a situation 
without UN mandate, which would effectively install an American viceroy in Iraq.769 The ideal 
would be a resolution that clearly put the United Nations in charge.770 The last option was 
something that would fall in between.  
These plans were generic and little detailed.771 A few mitigating factors apply. Throughout, 
DFID had a very unclear idea of the timeline that was likely to be followed, but assumed that 
a possible invasion was further off than it turned out to be.772 Another problem was that DFID 
had little field experience in Iraq, which made detailed planning harder as they had no good 
idea of what the current situation in Iraq was like.773 This was initially made more 
problematic by the ban on talking to those outside organizations – like NGOs that were on the 
ground – that would have had better knowledge.774 And of course, DFID’s working methods 
implied that these organizations would not only be talked to, but would agree to be 
involved.775 Lastly, the assumption was that DFID would help with crisis management, which 
obviously would depend on the crisis that would take place: ‘wait and see’ was the message 
there. 
Assumptions 
“We will work within a legal framework” 
The Department for International Development worked under the assumption that they 
would work within international law. This sounds obvious, but it influenced their strategies 
and options in important ways.776 International laws on occupation stipulate that the 
occupiers have the right – and the duty – to cater to the humanitarian and security needs of 
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the people they have occupied. However, they are not allowed to fundamentally change the 
institutions and laws that guide the occupied territory. That meant that DFID was about to 
have a major problem in working together with the American ORHA, which in its perception 
intended to do exactly that: so the legality of reconstruction became ‘quite a fundamental 
thing which actually did make for difficulties in operating with ORHA when ORHA wanted to, 
you know, change mechanisms for which there wasn’t legal authority to do’.777 The quote 
comes from Desmond Bowen, who worked for the Ministry of Defence and for Cabinet (which 
shows that this was not just a problem that DFID recognized), but this had major implications 
for what the Development Department would be allowed to do. 
“We need a relatively stable security environment to do our work” 
The department had a humanitarian mission and it worked with and through civilians, not 
military personnel. That meant that its people could only work when there was a basic level 
of security, guaranteed by the military before this next phase can be started up.778 The United 
Nations will pull its people out if their security cannot be guaranteed well enough, as do most 
NGOs. This assumption becomes important when it is read in conjunction with the first one, 
because it takes time to get a legal framework for reconstruction, and by that time, security 
was starting to deteriorate.  
“We will work by inserting money into the international system” 
This is, of course, simply a description of the department’s usual way of functioning. The 
Department for International Development, unlike the Ministry of Defence, did not normally 
send its own people to a conflict zone and putting them to work.779 Instead, the small 
department had a coordination and liaison function, and worked through other organizations 
like the United Nations and NGOs.780 The presumption that DFID would insert money into the 
international system rather than send people, therefore, was intimately related to another 
assumption: 
“We will obtain international support and legitimacy before going into Iraq” 
Any plan that assumed the department’s usual way of functioning necessarily assumed a 
measure of international legitimacy. If the international community, the NGO’s, the Red Cross, 
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the United Nations, refused to be involved in a crisis, then the tasks given to DFID could not 
be executed properly: ‘if we didn’t get some kind of UN authorization, we wouldn’t get the 
World Bank, the IMF, we wouldn’t get other countries’.781 All the plans of the Department for 
International Development, indeed its entire usual working method, thus relied on the 
assumption of a cooperative international system, which ultimately relies on legitimacy.782 
This concern with legitimacy had been brushed off by Number 10 and those in direct charge 
of the policy, and confused with a need for strict legality, which the British government 
successfully claimed it had obtained when the Attorney General declared the invasion was 
fine. When it came to the Development Department, however, this trick simply did not work, 
because the department relied on those partners.783 DFID’s concern with legitimacy, then, 
was not just about the moral high ground, although the Secretary of State made no secrets of 
that aspect either. 
“The United Nations will have a lead role in post-invasion Iraq”784 
This assumption underlay most of Whitehall’s planning and has already been discussed in the 
section on the Ministry of Defence. The Department for International Development counted 
on a lead role for the international organization in post-invasion Iraq for many of the same 
reasons. The legality and legitimacy of any invasion in Iraq have already been discussed, as 
has the separate legality of reconstructing and changing the country under occupation. The 
department also had a mission that was specifically human-centric and needs-based, in 
contrast to military organizations around the world, which are state-centric and results-
based. For that reason, an organization like the United Nations would be a good 
counterweight to the military, helping to safeguard the more overall mission and concerns of 
the department. Of course, the Treasury’s assumption that other countries would pick up 
large parts of the reconstruction bill would also most easily be fulfilled if the United Nations 
came in.785 
Summary: The Situation on the Eve of War 
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By March 2003, the Department for International Development had prepared for a 
humanitarian catastrophe including the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, food 
shortages after the disruption of the Food-for-Oil program, and the displacement of many 
Iraqis. Most of the details, however, were left vague as the department intended to respond 
to crises as and where they developed. The department also understood that there was an 
intention to rebuild Iraq, going beyond the rights covered by a lawful invasion, but was clear 
that it would need a separate Security Council resolution to do so. It expected the United 
Nations to have a substantial role post-invasion, and it planned to distribute its aid and help 
through other (usually civilian) organizations that would be present in Iraq. 
4. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
Context: Working for the best 
This chapter focuses on the preparation of a possible military invasion of Iraq. In other 
words, it concentrates mainly on the preparation of the plan that eventually ended up 
happening. An invasion and regime change, however, were the back-up plan for most of the 
period in the lead-up to the war. This meant that the Foreign Office was working a difficult 
balancing act. Ideally, it was working to achieve disarmament without force. Realistically, it 
was working to achieve disarmament with force and with Security Council backing. However, 
getting the agreement of the Security Council to deal with Saddam Hussein required that 
London not be perceived as belligerent. The Council was willing to pressurise Baghdad into 
disarmament but would only consider force as a last option. It was also (justifiably) weary of 
the Anglo-American zeal, worried that the United Nations route was just a pretext for an 
invasion. This meant that the Foreign Office had to covey that it was looking for a peaceful 
resolution, while also preparing for the alternative: an invasion (with United Nations 
backing).  
Little wonder than that the Foreign Office had a tough time negotiating a satisfactory Security 
Council Resolution. In addition, its first hurdle had not been the Security Council: it had been 
to convince the United States to go down the Security Council route at all. From September 
2002 on, when Washington agreed to go to the Security Council, the Foreign Office was 
working on the future Resolution 1441 with the goal of making it self-containing, so that no 
further resolution would be necessary to justify military action. Of course, once that 
resolution was passed, it was legally dubious (although the government ignored that, and it is 
likely that many civil servants would not have been aware of this or able to have an informed 
opinion about it). The Foreign Office subsequently worked very hard on getting a second 
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resolution, to improve the legal grounds and solve the clear legitimacy problem. All of this 
explains why the Foreign Office – eternally overstretched anyway – had little time and 
resources to prepare for the actual invasion or the aftermath, even though reconstruction 
and the overall foreign policy would have fallen under its remits.  
The pressure of the various timelines was another dimension that the Foreign Office had to 
balance. The diplomatic route clearly demanded more time: more time to make resolutions 
work and allow Saddam Hussein to trip up, more time to convince other countries that 
invasion was necessary, more time to not look like the diplomatic process was but an excuse. 
Not being willing to wait a little longer with Saddam Hussein – especially as there were no 
clear new factors that suddenly made him a more urgent problem – meant that the burden of 
proof shifted from Baghdad to London and Washington. The debate became less about what 
Baghdad is hiding and more about why the hurry.  
The pressure in favour of speedy action came from the military timetable, in particular the 
American one. There are two different arguments about time. The first one is that, once the 
troops have built up in the Gulf, there is an argument for using them quickly, to prevent an 
attack with weapons of mass destruction on the troops in waiting. The other argument was 
that the Foreign Office ‘kept hearing that it would get too hot around March/April and tanks 
wouldn’t work and therefore, we had to have a decision’. Although the civil servants of the 
Foreign Office would have found it hard to judge the merit of that argument; ‘it was clearly a 
view strongly felt and strongly put and did act, without any question at all, as a constraint on 
the negotiating process’. There might well have been additional other reasons on the 
American side. Either way, the American military timetable was pressing hard and the 
Foreign Office was not in a position to negotiate with it. 
Planning Process: Preparing for the worst 
First half of 2002 
After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the initial attention was on Afghanistan, but by 
January 2002 it was becoming clear that the American approach to Iraq was changing, with 
the Axis of Evil speech as perhaps the most public example.786 It was clear to the Foreign 
Office that Baghdad would be a difficult issue in the ‘special relationship’ and that London 
and Washington were unlikely to be on the same page.787 At the same time, Foreign Secretary 
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Jack Straw read the Axis of Evil speech as being as much about domestic American politics as 
about foreign policy, and the prospect of a conflict did not take up much time or attention yet 
in the Foreign Office.788  
July 2002 – September 2002 
The Foreign Office always works under high pressure and on many issues and had many 
other questions to worry about during that period too.789 It is only by the summer of 2002, 
once the crisis – with potential nuclear ramifications – between India and Pakistan has 
passed, that Iraq rose up the Foreign Office agenda as a priority.790 The usual constant 
demands from Number 10 and the Cabinet Office now included briefings and papers on Iraq. 
While ‘[they] always wanted more … my understanding is that [those briefings] were well 
received’.791 Incidentally, these briefings to higher-up without real understanding of or 
influence on what the exact policy line was at this time, shows just how much Iraq policy was 
in the hands of the few people concentrated around the Prime Minister. 
September 2002 – January 2003 
From September 2002 onwards – when the United States agrees to go through the Security 
Council – Iraq was becoming ‘an extremely serious issue’ that had more resources devoted to 
it.792 The Foreign Office started preparing papers on the issue, including one by Peter 
Collecott, the Director of Corporate Services (that is the head of the administration) about 
possible scenarios in Iraq.793 Dominick Chilcott (unrelated to Chilcot from the Inquiry) joined 
the Office’s Middle East Department in September 2002.794 His initial job was to work on how 
best to find allies amongst European Union partners for the developing Iraq policy, but it 
soon morphed into a job thinking about the post-war phase if there were to be a conflict.795 
He was the exception: most of the departmental efforts were focused on the Security Council 
process.796 
                                                             
788 Ibid., 3. 
789 Ibid., 6-7. 
790 Ibid., 3-7. 
791 Ibid., 12. 
792 Ibid., 5. 
793 Ibid., 5. 
794 Chilcott, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 2-3. 
795 Ibid., 3. 
796 Jack Straw, “Letter to the Prime Minister: ‘Iraq: Pursuing the UN Route,’” Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, September 14, 2002. 
Peter Ricketts, “Note: ‘Iraq: Resolutions: The ’Kosovo Option,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
October 3, 2002. 
172 
 
By October 2002, the conceptual work of what will later become the Iraq Planning Unit 
begins.797 A submission to Jack Straw of 14 or 15 October argued for a United Nations 
framework and a credible legal base for the ‘day after’ actions.798 Interestingly enough, 
though, it was the United Nations department of the Foreign Office that began looking at the 
‘morning after’ as well, apparently because the individuals involved felt that ‘it did not seem 
… that anyone was thinking about these things’.799 They started identifying volunteers for 
policing in Iraq in January 2003.800 Foreign Office civil servants were also a part of the first 
round of Anglo-American interagency talks that took part on 6 November 2002 (also 
mentioned earlier in the section on DFID).801 
February 2003 – March 2003: The Iraq Planning/Policy Unit 
In February 2003, the decision was made that a cross-Whitehall unit should be set up to deal 
with the day after issues.802 This unit was located in the Foreign Office.803 The Iraq Planning 
Unit, later renamed the Iraq Policy Unit, was meant to allow for an overall strategy. It was 
conceived as a step up from the Ad Hoc Group of Officials, the group that had been set up in 
September 2002. The Ad Hoc Group had been an exchange platform; the Iraq Unit was 
supposed to draw together and coordinate the entire effort.804 The Unit put up advice and 
provided a lot of background material for ministerial discussions.805 It thus functioned as a 
response to the concerns of Boyce and other senior military people who felt that there 
needed to be a step change in Whitehall’s thinking about post-war planning.806 It also 
addressed the concerns of the staff of the Department for International Development, who 
had (rightly) felt excluded from a lot of the initial preparation.807  
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However, Whitehall officials have described the Iraq Planning Unit as ‘too little too late. It did 
not have the expertise to ask and address the key questions about post conflict 
reconstruction. The Unit seems to have recognised early that US planning was inadequate, 
but did little to tackle this’.808 They described it as ‘a very small team’, ‘quickly overwhelmed’ 
that ‘suffered, like Garner [of the American ORHA], from the chaos, lack of coherent planning 
and a chorus of competing voices’.809 Pattison was the head of the United Nations Department 
of the Foreign Office; this was the department that had taken it on itself to prepare for 
policing. He felt that ‘I did not see a lot of material coming out of that unit on post-conflict 
planning’, and there is no doubt that British planning on the eve of the war was still 
piecemeal and wildly inadequate.810  
The IPU was announced on 5 February 2003, the same day as the transatlantic talks about 
the post-conflict role of the United Nations.811 These talks excelled in clarity: the United 
States was ‘implacably hostile’ towards a substantial role for the United Nations in post-
invasion Iraq, and on 6 February let it be understood that there would be ‘no question of any 
high profile UN role in administrating Iraq’.812 The Foreign Office’s UN Department concluded 
that this needed to be taken up by the Prime Minister to go directly via the President.813 
London kept making the point in its various contacts with Washington, with little immediate 
success.814 Only in the Hillsborough meeting of 7 and 8 April 2003 – after the invasion – 
would the Prime Minister convince the American president enough for the latter to concede a 
‘vital role’ for the United Nations (and it would later become clear that he meant much less by 
that than did London).815  
In February 2003, however, the Foreign Office was still working hard on the issue of the day 
after. It was not just the role for the United Nations: during the rock-drill of ORHA on 21 and 
22 February, mentioned earlier in the section on Defence, it became abundantly clear ‘how 
undercooked ORHA was as an operation’.816 The groundwork done by Iraqi exiles under the 
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‘Future of Iraq Project’ coordinated by the American State department, had been thrown out 
and ORHA was starting from scratch: it was utterly underprepared.817 Like DFID, the Foreign 
Office also had worries about being too closely associated with the office because of the scale 
of its ambitions, which ‘without specific Security Council authorization … would go beyond 
what we were allowed to do as occupying powers on the basis of the Geneva Convention and 
The Hague regulations’.818 Those worries were communicated back home, much as they were 
in the Defence Department, with just as little result.819 
Plans 
Policing & Security Sector Reform 
The Foreign Office had taken on an operational role on international policing in general and 
did this for Iraq as well.820 It identified British police volunteers to participate in 
international policing missions.821 For Iraq they initially planned to follow the usual pattern 
of ‘supplying a relatively small number of British police, whose main role would be training 
and advice on security sector reform’.822 Providing executive police forces for Iraq would 
have far exceeded the United Kingdom’s capacity.823 In fact, Washington approached London 
with exactly that question; but when the British replied that they would not be able to, 
Washington changed its mind and assessed that we would not ‘need an executive police force 
made up of international components after all in Iraq’.824 The plan thereafter remained to 
send only trainers and advisors: even recruiting those proved hard.825 
British Sector 
The concept of a British sector and the decision to have one had major implications, both for 
the resources needed to make it a success and for what it meant for Britain’s responsibility 
for Iraq (the full British division and its independent sector are probably the reason it got 
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named as a full occupying power in Security Council Resolution 1483).826 However, when the 
idea of having a British sector initially came up – when people were still tossing around ideas, 
as opposed to doing serious planning – both the Department for International Development 
and the Treasury expressed hesitations at the level of commitment this would entail.827 
Much depends on how one defined a ‘British sector’. Initially, the idea was that those areas 
that were under British control – whose security was safeguarded by British troops – would 
not be treated differently by the American Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance: the American Department of Defence told Mike O’Brien of the Foreign Office as 
late as 12 March 2003 that there was ‘no question of food distribution or public-sector 
salaries stopping at the border of any British sector’.828  
The problem was that the plans for Phase IV were so underdeveloped for the circumstances 
in which the de facto occupiers now found themselves that little of the supposed activity 
throughout the entire country happened.829 The result was an acute gap that London started 
filling by investing more people and more money into the area to address ‘the need to have 
acceptance amongst the people of southern Iraq’.830 The four provinces around Basra thus 
ended up being a lot more British that was the intention at the outset.831 The bill also ran up a 
lot higher than initially expected, not because the United States was unwilling to pick up the 
bill on principle, but because its planning and system for disbursements were simply not 
functioning.832 As this British sector in that sense was ‘an unintended, unplanned 
consequence’, ‘we couldn’t really have been properly [prepared for it]’.833 After all, ‘ministers 
had not taken a clear decision that that’s what we are going to do’.834 So the reason there was 
no plan for a British sector beyond guarding security, was that there was no intention to have 
a British sector in that sense. 
Day After & Role of the United Nations 
For the aftermath, the Foreign Office did not have much of a plan either. In the words of one 
of its staff: ‘The first thing to say about the plan is that there was only ever going to be one 
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plan. That would be the coalition plan, which would largely be an American plan.’835 What 
mattered, therefore, was influencing the American plan.836 There was no alternative: ‘I am 
afraid we have to face the fact that if the US didn’t want the UN, we, the UK, were a very small 
part of the US effort.’837 Not only was London very clearly the junior partner; there was also ‘a 
pretty incoherent state of mind in the United States administration at that point, [so that] it 
was difficult to know who one would try to influence’.838  
At the same time, that ‘lack of sense of preparation on the American side for a clear post-war 
plan [was never] brought up as a reason for the UK not to be involved … because at the same 
time we had much bigger things to worry about’.839 This is interesting, because it goes agaist 
the earlier British idea of a solid war plan (which must involve all phases including the 
fourth) as a condition for participation. Now, the British plan for the day after was virtually 
non-existent, but London would follow the American plan anyway, and the Foreign Office 
was much too busy trying to get a second resolution that would bring London on safe legal 
and political grounds to devote much time to the issue. 
Role of the United Nations 
The United Nations Department of the Foreign Office had considered two broad options for 
the United Nations post-invasion.840 The first was a ‘UN light’ in which the bulk of the Iraqi 
administration would remain in place.841 The bigger option was a full United Nations 
administration, which would be given full law-making powers.842 The Foreign Office’s 
preference was for the lighter version, based on the view that Iraq was already an efficiently 
run state with a functioning civil service.843 These models were developed in-house, without 
consultation with the United Nations.844 It was nonetheless clear that the organization was 
thinking along the same lines.845 In a by now well-known refrain, Washington was not keen 
on the plans; but up until at least February 2003 the British Foreign Office maintained 
optimism that the Americans could be persuaded.846 Their case was based on the symbolism 
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of bringing in the United Nations as much as anything else (mainly money): ‘You don’t get the 
UN in … to do it more efficiently. You get the UN in to do it differently’.847 The argument did 
not resonate with an American administration ideologically opposed to the United Nations. 
Assumptions 
“The United Nations have a leading role in the post-war phase… hopefully” 
The model of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for the post-war period consisted of 
three phases.848 The first would be the period of occupation governed by the Geneva and The 
Hague regulations, during which London would be responsible for the welfare of the Iraqi 
people.849 The aim was to keep this period as short as possible.850 Iraq would then move to 
some form of interim administration, before culminating in a new Iraqi government, which 
would be supported by coalition security forces for as long as Baghdad wanted them there.851 
During most of the preparation, the Foreign Office hoped that the United Nations would be in 
charge of the interim arrangements.852 Later, the Office moved to the idea that an interim 
administration authorized by the Security Council would be good enough, if it would not be 
able to get a UN-lead interim phase.853 
“We will maintain the Iraqi police forces” & “We will get international police forces in” 
For post-conflict policing, the assumption very clearly was that the United Nations would be 
involved.854 Specifically, the Foreign Office’s plans assumed and expected that a United 
Nations police force would help reform the Iraqi security sector. This would never happen 
unless countries were prepared to contribute troops.855 Like was the case for DFID’s plans, 
this meant that the United Nations needed to have a genuine role because the international 
community needed to commit.856 
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The second assumption with regards to policing was that the Iraqi police forces would be 
maintained: without them, the country would be much too big for an external police force.857 
Of course, if the Iraqi police forces would not be kept and there would be no proper 
international engagement, all bets would be off. If the United Nations would not do it, the 
United States would have to do it (despite having shown no interest in doing so earlier), 
because there was no other alternative worldwide.858 The European Union or the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) would be unlikely to want to be 
involved.859 The assumption was not only that the Iraqi police forces would be maintained: 
there was also an implicit expectation that the breakdown in law and order would be 
limited.860 
“The Iraqi administration will easily switch into a new administration” 
The plan involving a limited UN administration rested on the assumption that ‘Iraq was in 
many ways an efficiently run state with a functioning civil service’ and that ‘technocrats who 
had served Saddam would switch easily into serving a new administration’.861 This 
assumption was apparently shared by the United Nations itself: the head of the United 
Nations Development Program told Clare Short that its role should be light because the 
capacity of the United Nations was limited and the Iraqi administration was strong in its own 
right.862 This got reported back to the Foreign Office via the British diplomatic mission in 
New York.863 
Summary: The Situation on the Eve of War 
During most of the period leading up to war, the Foreign Office had worked on avoiding 
conflict and making a potential conflict legal and politically sound. As a result, the 
department had done little to prepare for the actual invasion and aftermath. Some work had 
been done to prepare for policing duties in Iraq. This work relied on the Iraqi police forces 
maintaining intact and on the international community contributing. Most of the plans for the 
after-war period assumed a role for the United Nations; all assumed a functioning civil 
service. The Foreign Office also hosted the Iraq Planning/Policy Unit, which was meant to 
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draw together all department and provide an overall strategy. However, this unit was largely 
overwhelmed and did not contribute much more than the individual departments. Even 
though the department was aware of the weaknesses in the American planning for the 
aftermath, the overall Foreign Office plan remained to influence the American one.  
5. CABINET OFFICE  
The Cabinet Office functions as the link between the political decisions in Cabinet and its 
Committees on one hand and the coordination and implementation of that policy in 
Whitehall. It is a rather small department (around 2,050 staff in 2014) with few direct 
powers, few people ‘and even less money’.864 ‘[I]t is not equipped to run an operation 
directly’ – that is what the various other departments are for – but it works by bringing 
others together.865 Its task is the coordination and integration of policy.866 The Cabinet Office 
has permanent subgroups like the Defence and Overseas Secretariat but also regularly sets 
up ad hoc groups to handle specific issues. 
In September 2002, the Cabinet Office set up an ad hoc group on Iraq and confusingly called 
it the Ad Hoc Group of Officials on Iraq, or the Ad Hoc Group.867 This is the Ad Hoc group 
referred to earlier in this chapter. It should not be confused with the unnamed ad hoc group 
of ministers and Downing Street advisors that had been meeting regularly on the topic of Iraq 
since a few months before. Nor should it be confused with another ad hoc group that started 
meeting after the invasion, or the Ministerial Ad Hoc Iraq Rehabilitation Group set up after 
the invasion in the first week of April 2003. This Ad Hoc Group of Officials, as opposed to 
other ad hoc groups, was ‘a Cabinet Office group and people were invited to join that on the 
basis [that] they had a right and a need and a purpose in being there’ – this set it apart from 
some of the earlier groups which had been informal ‘sofa government’ arrangements and 
excluded Clare Short.868 This group acted as an exchange platform between the different 
departments, but never as a driver of policy. 
In fact, the unit that comes closest to driving, coordinating, and integrating the overall policy 
was the Iraq Planning/Policy Unit located in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as 
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described in the last section. However, this was a rather illogical place for the coordinating 
unit to be. Of course, the Foreign Office was arguably responsible for the most general policy 
line on Iraq, but coordination of policy is what the Cabinet Office is for.869 It was the Overseas 
and Defence Secretariat that ‘would have been the natural place to act as a focus’ for this kind 
of work; ‘to coordinate the question about the aftermath planning in the Cabinet Office’.870 
Half a dozen witnesses in the Iraq Inquiry have brought up this strange vacuum in pulling all 
the threads of the policy together, a role which, Stephen Pattison argued, ‘I would have 
traditionally expected the Cabinet Office to fill’.871 Normally – as had been the case in 
previous conflicts – there would have been a committee of Permanent Secretaries (the civil 
service heads of each department) set up in the Cabinet Office under the Cabinet Secretary to 
ensure coordination and full implementation of policy.872 Kevin Tebbit, the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, ‘asked … to be more involved … in the discussions that 
were going on, and the decision was that that was not the way things were going to be. I think 
Number 10 felt that it was quite a crowded place already and that to widen it would mean 
widening it too far from their point of view’.873 The result was a Vanishing Cabinet Office that 
was virtually absent in policy-making. 
It would be unfair to say that the Cabinet Office did nothing about Iraq policy.874 The Joint 
Intelligence Committee was obviously reporting, the Overseas Secretariat regularly discussed 
Iraq and the Ad Hoc group set up in Cabinet brought staff from relevant departments 
together to exchange information. However, the Cabinet Office never managed to weigh in on 
policy in an important way. It most certainly did not achieve what it was supposed to do, 
which is the coordination and integration of Iraq policy. Normal procedures for using the 
Cabinet Office machinery, like setting up a committee of the relevant Permanent Secretaries, 
were disregarded. 
6. CONCLUSION  
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This chapter discussed the planning for the invasion of Iraq throughout Whitehall. It looked 
at the preparations made in each department, the planning process, and the assumptions that 
underlay those plans. The Ministry of Defence was the first department to start planning for a 
possible invasion. That is both because military operations need a long lead-in time – if you 
want to keep your options open, you should prepare for war – and because they were kept 
relatively better informed of plans in the United States, and possible British reactions, than 
the Department for International Development. The preparation made by Defence was made 
against the background of severe budgetary constraints, even as the Treasury was willing to 
pay for the extra costs that came with the invasion itself.  
The British military was engaged in Afghanistan at the same time and contributing a full 
division to potential action in Iraq broke the assumptions around which the defence 
machinery was built; yet London contributed this biggest option as soon as it became clear 
that it would be able too. There was a general expectation that putting boots on the ground 
would give the British more influence on American-led planning. The war plan initially was 
to go through the North of Iraq as well as through the South, but when Turkey refused 
passage the entire plan got changed to entry through Kuwait. This change left the US 4th 
Division stuck in the North, but not the UK 1st Division that was initially supposed to be 
integrated with the 4th: it went to the South and participated in initial combat. As a result, the 
British contribution to the invasion became a lot more significant – one third of combat 
power – than ever envisaged, although the British only pulled off the change of plan with 
significant logistical help from the Pentagon. 
Although little preparation had been done for Phase IV, the phase after the fighting, there was 
a general expectation that the military would maintain order until the civilians came in and 
started doing their job of reconstructing the country. The existing Iraqi infrastructure and 
military forces would be preserved as much as possible to allow the country to get up and 
running again as soon as possible. Moreover, the expectation for the post-war phase was that 
other actors – DFID, the United States, Iraq itself, the international community – would start 
picking up the bill for reconstruction. Although the British military leaders thought it unlikely 
that Britain would be able to draw down within six months, the assumption in the Strategic 
Defence Review around which the troops are built, there was an expectation that other 
international troops would start coming in, allowing London to draw down. This required 
legitimacy and United Nations involvement. 
The Department for International Development has been heavily criticized by parts of the 
military for its perceived failure to do its job; a failure that is also attributed to bad will, 
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mostly on behalf of its Secretary of State Clare Short. However, the Department was limited 
severely in what it could do by both law and practicality. The expectation that the civilians 
would come in and start reconstructing right away was understandable – for it was a 
strategic imperative – but clashed with international law. The laws governing the occupation 
of a foreign territory do not allow changing domestic systems, which is what the American 
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was trying to do. Providing 
humanitarian aid was fine, but proved largely unnecessary, it has been argued because DFID 
was prepared and immediately could start providing help. 
There were other constraints for the Development Department. Firstly, it had only been 
involved from September 2002 onwards and had no clear idea of when war would likely 
occur. Thus, not aware of the military pressures on the timeline, they assumed the invasion 
would be rather later than was eventually the case. Secondly, the entire idea of going in as 
part of a military campaign is somewhat anathema to the mission of the department, which is 
pro-poor. The department was used – and tasked – to work according to worldwide needs, 
and setting those needs aside to help a government policy that was based on different 
rationales altogether was problematic, particularly as the Treasury for the longest time 
expected the department to pay its contribution to Iraq out of its own budget, meant for 
worldwide humanitarian crises. 
DFID’s working methods were poorly understood. The department works through other 
agencies, by inserting money and expertise into the international system and coordinating 
and liaising with other institutions. This means that any plan involving the department would 
be contingent on these other institutions being able and willing to go to Iraq. They would 
only be able to if there was a relatively stable security environment, and they would not be 
able to go until there was an appropriate legal framework, different from that for the 
invasion itself. They would also only be willing to be involved if the invasion and 
reconstruction were perceived as legitimate endeavours. For those reasons, a substantial and 
genuine post-conflict role for the United Nations was not just morally desirable from DFID’s 
point of view: it was a practical necessity.  
Certainly up until September, and to a substantial extent thereafter, the Foreign Office was 
busy trying to avoid a road that would lead to military action and, after Britain firmly got on 
that road, negotiating favourable political conditions. This meant that the Office had very 
little room left to prepare for an invasion if it were to happen. It also had to balance various 
competing pressures, including those of the diplomatic timetable and the military timetable, 
and the need to go to the Security Council to get permission for military action, permission 
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that would only be given if the United Kingdom did not seem eager to go to war. The Foreign 
Office had the initial policy lead on reconstruction (something that afterwards seems to have 
been taken over by DFID) but did not prepare a lot except for some preliminary work on 
policing. That policing strategy relied on the Iraqi police forces remaining intact and on an 
international community willing to contribute. 
From February 2002, the Foreign Office had the Iraq Planning Unit, the later Iraq Policy Unit 
and Iraq Directorate. This Unit was supposed to fill a clear gap in overall coordination and 
integration of the policy. This would have normally been done by the Cabinet Office, but the 
Cabinet Office never moved beyond organizing the Ad Hoc Group of Officials, which was an 
exchange platform between departments but did not lead the policy. The Iraq Planning Unit 
essentially failed in its task. American planning for the aftermath was shoddy (as was the 
British planning), but although departments all throughout Whitehall flagged this up, it was 
never taken up. 
This chapter ends on the eve of the invasion. The next chapter discusses the invasion and the 
immediate aftermath: it details how Whitehall’s plans fared when tested on the ground. The 
last chapter looks at the entire sequence of events: the decision to go to war described in 
chapter III, the preparation for the war described in this chapter, and the execution of the 
plans, described in chapter V. It analyses how Britain’s weak negotiation with the United 
States and the Security Council – in particular its failure to develop a preferred alternative 
and corresponding minimal requirements – left it with a policy that was far from its usual 
policy; how this was unclear to Whitehall, which had prepared on the basis of assumptions 
that were no longer justified; and how these assumptions meant the plans were unsuitable 





Chapter V: Fighting the War 
1. INTRODUCTION  
This last empirical chapter shows the situation British troops (and civilians) found 
themselves in once they crossed into Iraqi territory. It discusses the situation on the ground 
immediately after the Coalition gained control – or at least responsibility – over the territory. 
Having described these events, it compares the circumstances under which the invasion 
happened to the circumstances, laid out in the last chapter, on which British planning was 
based. The argumentative burden of this chapter is to show that those circumstances were 
very different and that the plans were unsuitable for the conflict as it happened.  It is divided 
into three sections: the first sketches the situation on the ground after the invasion; the 
second compares the assumptions teased out in the last chapter to the situation on the 
ground; the third section describes the likely link between this contrast and the following 
insurgency, but most importantly highlights that a detailed analysis of this element falls 
outside the scope of the dissertation. 
After the warfighting, British troops took responsibility for the region around the Southern 
city of Basra. They soon found themselves overstretched and without much guidance. The 
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), the American organization 
set up in January 2003 to fill gaps in American post-war planning done by CENTCOM, was 
overwhelmed and badly run.875 After the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) on 16 April 2003, Jay Garner, the head of ORHA, was replaced in May by Paul Bremer, 
who had a wider mandate than Garner.876 ORHA was subsumed into the CPA. The CPA 
worked better but took decisions that the British neither expected nor were consulted on.877 
The British troops also struggled to get the necessary funds to start urgent repair and 
construction works. The British capital, meanwhile, proved unresponsive.878 There was no 
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proper structure to receive information, no senior official or minister in charge, and no 
coherent policy. 
Many of these struggles can be attributed to the fact that the plans were simply not made or 
useful for the circumstances in which these British found themselves. The military had 
presumed that civilian experts and money would be available immediately after the invasion. 
The Department for International Development however, which in the military’s view was 
meant to deliver these, had no plans that suited these circumstances. Its plans assumed that 
it would insert expertise and money via the United Nations; that money would be made 
available through contributions of other UN nations (as could be expected when the Security 
Council decides on the necessity of a military intervention); that war would happen later; and 
that it would not cooperate with any organization wanting to reorganise Iraq until there was 
a specific – necessary – Security Council resolution for this purpose.  
The net result of these many miscalculations was that the occupiers failed to improve daily 
life in the weeks after they took control of the territory; nor did they manage to guarantee 
safety and security for Iraqi civilians. As the military literature has described extensively, this 
cocktail of unpreparedness and the challenges of Iraq quickly resulted in an insurgency and 
debilitating instability for years to come. How London’s unpreparedness (and 
mispreparedness, as this dissertation has shown) impacted developments in Iraq, and to 
what extent the long war in Iraq was inevitable, is a question that draws on more and 
different factors than the ones examined in this dissertation. This chapter ends when it 
becomes clear that the British troops are struggling in Iraq because of unsuitable plans. As 
the next chapter will conclude, this was the overall result of a failure to clearly define policy 
with a policy goal, strategy, preferred alternative, and minimal requirements. 
2.  HERE WE ARE NOW... THE POST-WAR PHASE  
The situation in Iraq 
The British 1 Division had ended up in and around Basra, responsible for the four most 
Southern governorates (provinces) of the country. After the fall of the old regime, the three 
British fighting brigades were rotated out quickly and replaced by UK 3 Division. Between 
July and December 2003, this UK 3 Division was replaced by a Multi-National Division 
(South-East), abbreviated as MND(SE).879 General Officer Graeme Lamb, who arrived in July 
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2003, oversaw this transition between July 2003 and December 2003.880 A refrain 
throughout those first months that the military in the South felt neglected (with some good 
cause) by most other players, notably by Baghdad, by the British government, and by DFID.881 
The main message coming out of Baghdad was simply to ‘keep [the] South quiet’, without 
further instruction.882 The bigger problem was nonetheless not a lack of military instructions, 
but rather a lack of resources.883 The British military understood that rapid improvement in 
the day-to-day life of ordinary Iraqis was crucial to long-term success. Yet to improve the 
situation, they needed both money and (civilian) expertise on post-war reconstruction.884 
Neither London nor Baghdad was providing it. 
In February 2003, Tim Cross had been appointed as British representative to the American 
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).885 Before the invasion, he 
had repeatedly reported back to London that the preparation of that organization was 
profoundly flawed and undercooked, to no apparent avail. On 18 March 2003, Tim Cross 
deployed to Kuwait with Garner, the retired military officer at the head of ORHA.886 They flew 
into Baghdad in a military plane in the dead of the night from 21 to 22 April.887 Day to day life 
in Baghdad initially proved very difficult.888 ORHA also had little resources, including not 
enough people.889 It was only set up in January 2003, after it had become clear that CENTCOM 
planning for the post-war phase was insufficient (and indeed some sources suggest that 
commander Franks did not consider it his task at all).890 Garner was subordinate to Franks 
and struggled to influence the plans of the US military. 891 
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Tim Cross was struggling to play his role too. The American Garner had asked Cross to be his 
Coalition Deputy (Cross ended up being ‘International Deputy’ as he himself felt that would 
more accurately portray the need for multilateral cooperation).892 The problem was that until 
a few weeks before ORHA flew into Baghdad, the United Kingdom had not even officially 
confirmed that it had someone in ORHA; and it took until 14 April 2003 for London to 
confirm that Cross was with the organization.893 It had been debating the political and, 
perhaps more important still, the legal implications of explicitly being involved in ORHA.894 
Reconstruction of Iraq was, after all, illegal without a further Security Council resolution if it 
meant reorganizing the institutions of Iraq. 
There were other things London was unwilling to consider. Garner wanted a British-led 
ORHA presence in Basra as soon as possible, but Whitehall refused to agree to this, 
apparently for fear of the costs that would entail.895 London also failed to give Tim Cross help 
more generally. He was not given either a budget or people, although he managed to get some 
informal help through personal contacts.896 Despite repeated and urgent requests, he also 
was not getting any guidance on what course of action to take beyond the guideline that he 
should not commit London to anything.897 Requests to the capital often went without 
response.898  
On 16 April 2003, Franks established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). In May 2003, 
the ineffectual Jay Garner was called back to the United States, less than a month after he had 
arrived in Baghdad. Under-resourced, ignored by the military and undermined by 
Washington, Garner had failed to achieve much. In the eyes of Tim Cross, Garner was ‘hung 
out to dry’.899 His successor L. Paul Bremer, was given a broader mandate. He did not rapport 
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to Franks, but rather directly to Rumsfeld, and was given substantial more freedom.900 ORHA 
was quickly subsumed into the CPA, which received most of the conditions that Garner would 
have wanted or needed: it was backed by Washington; it (eventually) had resources, both 
monetary and people; Bremer had much wider authority and from the beginning demanded 
civil-military colocation.901 
This was seen as a new start. In London, the Iraq Policy/Planning Unit and the Overseas 
Development Secretariat, who had started working on a new strategy as ORHA was seen to 
be failing, shelved their plans to follow the CPA lead.902 On 8 May, a few days before Bremer, 
John Sawers of the British Foreign Office arrived in Baghdad.903 The Department for 
International Development, which had been reluctant to engage with ORHA (for reasons 
discussed later), deployed more staff.904 Still in May, Lieutenant General Frederick ‘Freddie’ 
Viggers arrived in Baghdad to serve as the senior British Military Representative and 
American Lieutenant General Sanchez’ deputy.905 Viggers did not command the British troops 
(who were in Basra); he worked on the ‘military aspects of the reconstruction plan’ of the 
CPA, functioning as the link between the civilian and military parts of the CPA.906  
The working of the CPA improved over its first few months. Initially ‘some of the civilian 
agencies inside the CPA were suspicious of, and did not see/understand how the military 
could contribute’.907 The Coalition Provisional Authority faced many of the problems ORHA 
had: it was trying ‘to achieve multiple and un-sequenced missions, all at the same time: build 
itself; try to run the country day-to-day; kick start the economy; deliver ‘democracy’; 
maintain security within the country and along its borders; deal with increasing terrorist and 
criminal activity; create confidence in the international effort among Iraqi organisations and 
on the street. Iraqis were impatient and suspicious’.908 
However, with Bremer’s new freedom of mandate came three unexpected and controversial 
decisions. Within days of arriving, Bremer announced that he would slow down the political 
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process; thoroughly debaathify the civil service; and disband the Iraqi army.909 Washington 
did not consult London, and Bremer ignored British protest in the capital.910 There are good 
arguments for all of these decisions (although not per se the reasons that Bremer gave). In 
dealing with an already complicated and fragile security situation, one clear authority can be 
easier than a democratic process involving multiple groups and individuals with little 
experience of the process and wildly diverging interests and concerns. According to Bremer, 
debaathification proved very ‘popular’ with Iraqis, although many British commentators felt 
that to be an inappropriate criterion.911 Given that most of the Iraqi army had vanished 
during the war, its unprofessionalism, and its close ties to the old regime, starting anew 
seemed logical.912 Nonetheless, the problems with these decisions later became abundantly 
clear, as discussed later. In any case, London had nothing to say about the policy at this point. 
The American military had its hands full in Baghdad and expected the British to handle the 
Southern provinces.913 On the British side, there was ‘a feeling that Basra was on the shelf, 
that is, was inadequately equipped with security and financial resources and hardware’914. 
The British expected money from Baghdad, but getting any money down proved difficult.915 
There were several reasons. Requests for money that had to go through military channels 
took a long time; people in Baghdad were stretched to the limit and responding to a request 
from elsewhere unlikely to be a priority; and often there were bureaucratic procedures and 
transparency guarantees that needed to be followed.916  
The Americans on the ground also felt that Basra was in the British Area of Responsibility 
and therefore London’s financial responsibility.917 They did not want to hear bad news.918 
British repeated public boasting about the ‘exemplary South’ also annoyed those in 
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Baghdad.919 Not only was the South easier for security, but the United States were paying for 
that exemplary region that Britain so eagerly took credit for.920 When an American 
congressional delegation visited the South, British officer Lamb said the South needed a 20 
billion (currency unclear) investment.921 American ‘vice-roi’ Bremer was infuriated.922 But 
British frustration with the Americans too grew. The American Coalition Provisional 
Authority set up an office in the South, but by August 2003 the British had written that off as 
completely ineffective.923 One person likened it to ‘dancing with a broken doll’, ‘making you 
look rather stupid’.924 
The situation in the United Kingdom 
Those on the ground in Iraq were reporting back to London on a regular or semi-regular 
basis (communication was difficult and they were very busy) but doing so was, in their eyes, 
somewhat akin to sending a signal into space.925 There was no proper structure to receive 
that information, let alone act on it.926 The Iraq Planning/Policy Unit, which was nominally 
responsible for Iraq policy, still existed and after the invasion became the ‘processing centre 
for sending secondees out to Iraq’ – a process that usually took several months and still failed 
to deliver as many qualified people as were needed.927 However, there was no central 
political authority to take charge and still ‘no coalition civil-military plan for the post invasion 
phase’.928 Clear objectives, a definition of success, a desired end state were all still missing.929 
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So were any machinery or established processes to address those issues.930 Lines of 
responsibility were confused.931 Without a senior official or minister in charge, policy thus 
was slow and incoherent.932 Most people involved expected the Cabinet Office to provide 
coherence, but the Cabinet Committee for External Affairs (DOP), which would have been the 
logical choice, did not meet at all in the months after the invasion.933 
Moreover, now that the strictly military phase was over, the military expected the Foreign 
Office to take the policy lead.934 Instead, they observed a ‘trend of a refusal or unwillingness 
by the UK to engage pro-actively and confidently throughout this time’.935 The Foreign Office 
was following the American plan rather than critiquing it. To the Foreign Office, that was the 
only option as Britain was but a junior partner and would not make its own fate.936 The 
Foreign Office was also busy negotiating the post-war Security Council resolution, which was 
passed as Resolution 1483 on 22 May.937 
By contrast, the ad hoc Group on Iraqi Rehabilitation did start meeting weekly. This 
ministerial group formed around 10 April.938 They debated whether to focus on Basra or 
Baghdad.939 From the perspective of the British in Baghdad, they focused too much on Basra 
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and not on the coordination of broader coalition plans.940 Defence Secretary Hoon agrees that 
he focused mostly on Basra, as that was where the British military was.941 The troops in 
Basra, however, felt they were given promises, but never any follow-up to those promises.942 
As ‘the security situation got worse in Baghdad’, the British discussed reinforcing the capital, 
possibly militarily.943 The British kept its military in the south but sent the Foreign Office’s 
Sawers and Greenstock to Baghdad.944  
3. ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS REALITY: A COMPARISON 
How does this reality compare to the assumptions underpinning British planning? To 
recapitulate, in the last chapter we teased out the following assumptions in Whitehall 
planning for the aftermath: 
• “We will not ‘trash the joint’ and we will keep the army and existing 
infrastructure” (MOD) 
• “The civilians will come in and take over soon after Phase III” (MOD) 
• “Other countries will shoulder large parts of the burden” (MOD) 
• “The UN will play a central role after the invasion” (MOD) 
• “We will work within a legal framework” (DFID) 
• “We need a relatively stable security environment to do our work” (DFID) 
• “We will work by inserting money into the international system” (DFID) 
• “We will obtain international support and legitimacy before going into Iraq” 
(DFID) 
• “The United Nations will have a lead role in post-invasion Iraq” (DFID) 
• “The United Nations have a leading role in the post-war phase… hopefully” (FCO) 
• “We will maintain the Iraqi police forces” & “We will get international police 
forces in” (FCO) 
• “The Iraqi administration will easily switch into a new administration” (FCO) 
Comparing those assumptions to the reality on the ground, two types of unjustified premises 
become clear. Firstly, Whitehall departments hold mutually contradictory views about their 
own and each other's roles, intentions, constraints, and capacity. This is particularly true for 
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the military and the Department for International Development. Secondly, there are overly 
optimistic assumptions about third parties: the United Nations, other states, and the Iraqi 
civil service, military, and society. In total, these misguided assumptions and the plans that 
follow from them amount to a shamble, an incoherent preparation that in May 2003 was not 
even ready for itself, let alone for the difficult situation in post-invasion Iraq.  
Waiting for the civilians: 1 (UK) Division 
Assumption: The civilians will come in and take over soon after Phase III 
Reality: The military was on its own in the weeks after the invasion, compelled to do many 
activities it had not planned for and did not have the expertise for 
The military very much felt let down by other Whitehall departments: ‘my impression was 
that Whitehall was uncertain of where to go from there, and I sensed that the FCO felt it 
better not to be implicated too much in what was happening – rather let the MOD get it 
wrong!’945 The impression of DFID was that they were ‘in their tents’, following their ‘mood of 
the moment’, not doing anything (this will be discussed later).946 In general, the commanders 
felt that their troops were risking their lives while the rest of the government was not on war 
footing and not doing its share.947 The Ministry of Defence very much expected the ‘civilians 
that we had been promised’ to arrive.948 We will have to wait until the relevant documents 
have been released to understand who promised them and under what conditions; certainly 
DFID had a very different interpretations and when and under what conditions they were 
expected.949 
From the military’s perspective, the post-war situation was not their job.950 The military 
headquarters ‘was an operational level military campaign headquarters. This was not 
military stuff. This was broader stuff’.951 The assumption in the military plans was a quick 
transition to peacekeeping and nation-building, for which the Ministry of Defence would not 
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be the lead department.952 In reality, the other departments were slow to send people. The 
British troops in the South initially had only one DFID representative.953 By 9 May – weeks 
after the end of hostilities – 34 volunteers were under training; the first batch of 22 civilians 
were only going out on 13 May.954 
Yet there was an obvious urgent need for action beyond war-fighting and controlling the 
country in a narrow, military sense. The life of the Iraqi people needed to improve quickly to 
maintain their relative consent (or at least non-opposition) to the British presence. At the 
very least, life should not get worse; but of course, there had just been a war, there was little 
clarity about the future; Iraqi civil servants were no longer getting paid now that the old 
regime had disappeared; there was widespread looting; and in this uncertain situation, 
criminality thrived. Many of those who had been in high functions under the old regime had 
disappeared, leaving a power and knowledge vacuum that could not easily be filled by the 
British, unfamiliar as they were with local structures, tensions, and social hierarchies. 
The military thus suddenly found itself ‘severely stretched’, handling many issues ‘which we 
were not structured or resourced for’.955 ‘Too many tasks were laid on the military without 
the resources or authority to deliver’, and they were of a mind-boggling variety.956 In addition 
to looking for weapons of mass destruction, addressing criminality, mopping up resistance, 
handling prisoners, and maintaining general security, the military was asked for help with 
such practical issues as sorting out payment problems (as the Central Bank had stopped 
functioning) and making sure crops could be planted. The troops lacked the appropriate 
specialist knowledge, as well as the manpower.  
The military was given £10 million for ‘quick impact project’ in order to quickly improve 
Iraqi’s lives, but by 15 May 2003 only £50,000 – half a percent – of that money had been 
spent.957 Part of the problem was that ‘the MOD probably lacked a strong kind of DFID 
component to help it identify the sort of things it could spend its money on’.958 DFID’s 
Permanent Secretary at the time Chakrabarti later told the Iraq Inquiry that the Ministry of 
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Defence were right to expect more civil military advisors, but also points out that they 
probably would have got them quicker if DFID had been involved in the planning earlier.959  
Tony Blair has said that if people would have told him at the time that they needed more 
resources, they would have been given those resources.960 This seems to be in line with what 
officials report: there was a lot of official and theoretical support.961 The problem was the 
delivery, which was either non-existent or slow.962 Part of the reason was doubtlessly that no 
senior civil servant or minister was clearly in charge of Iraq policy on a day-to-day basis.963 
As a result, incredibly as it might seem for such an important issue, it seemed to fall between 
the cracks. Much of Whitehall’s attention was also focused on the Security Council, where 
London needed to get a Security Council Resolution to be able to rebuild and reorganize Iraq. 
This repeated praise without backing from London led to a lot of frustration on the ground: 
as one person put it, ‘when are you going to produce the goods?’964 It seemed a question that 
everyone struggled to answer.  
What Do You Expect Me to Do About That? Department for International 
Development 
Assumption: War is weeks or months away 
Reality: The invasion was over by April 2003 
Assumption: We work within a legal framework 
Reality: The military expected the civilians to come on as soon as the fighting was over 
Assumption: The United Nations have a leading role 
Reality: The United States, not the United Nations, provided the civilian authority 
The invasion took the Department for International Development by surprise. The United 
Nations route had rather suddenly been abandoned, against the reassurances that Tony Blair 
had been giving the department’s Secretary of State. Yet based on these reassurances and on 
                                                             
959 Chakrabarti, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 41. 
960 Blair, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 29 January 2010”, 192. 
961 Synnott, Lamb, and Stewart, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 9 December 2009 (First Session)”, 15, 
20, 48-49. 
962 Ibid., 15, 20, 48-49. 
963 Viggers, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry”, 6. 
Synnott, Lamb, and Stewart, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 9 December 2009 (First Session)”, 50, 53-
54. 
Chakrabarti, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 53-55. 
Hoon, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 19 January 2010”, 92. 
964 Synnott, Lamb, and Stewart, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 9 December 2009 (First Session)”, 16. 
196 
 
the (correct) assessment that there had been no recent change in Baghdad’s behaviour that 
made war particularly urgent, DFID had assumed that any invasion, if it would happen it all, 
was weeks or months away. The invasion itself lasted shorter – and was much easier – than 
had been projected. Thus, the Department for International Development had a role to play in 
the conflict much earlier than it had envisaged. It was not ready to do so. By the time of the 
invasion, the department had a handful of representatives in various organisations: only 
from June on did DFID staff come in greater numbers, ‘woefully late’ in the eyes of the 
military.965 
DFID still expected the United Nations to have the lead role in the aftermath of the conflict.966 
‘We did not think ORHA – because we were still heavily believing in UN leadership of this 
post-conflict effort, we didn’t think ORHA would be actually the lead in terms of post-conflict 
work. We thought the UN would take that role on. The UN was geared up to do so, putting 
more staff into Iraq at the time’.967 DFID is used to working with the United Nations. It was 
told – reassured – it would work with the United Nations in post-conflict Iraq, so immediately 
after the conflict it was behaving under that assumption.968  
That does not mean that DFID did not pay any attention to the American-led ORHA at all. It 
was under pressure to work with ORHA, not least from the military and people on the 
ground. From DFID’s perspective, working with ORHA was illogical. For one, it was illegal.969 
Regardless of the legality of the invasion itself, an occupying force is not allowed to 
fundamentally change the laws or structures of the territory it is occupying. In other words, 
DFID ‘cannot do reconstruction if it means reorganising the institutions of Iraq,’ which is 
what the Americans set out to do.970 Tim Cross is thus right when he observes that DFID had 
a ‘strong reluctance to formally support ORHA.’971 However, this was more than a fickle 
‘mood of the moment,’ as MOD people saw it.  
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The Department for International Development sent out Moazzam Malik to ORHA.972 Malik 
reported back that ORHA was a disaster.973 DFID then decided to liaise with the organization 
but work outside it.974 When the Prime Minister wanted to strengthen ORHA by seconding 
about 100 people to it, DFID’s top officials felt that adding more people into a dysfunctional 
structure would only add to the chaos.975 Not willing to take reporting responsibility for a 
plan that it judged hopeless, DFID passed on both the money and the responsibility for those 
reinforcements to the Foreign Office.976 The Department for International Development itself 
maintained only one liaison person in the organization.977 
Meanwhile, the department tried to respond to the needs on the ground as they arose.978 
However, it struggled for lack of resources.979 As detailed in the last chapter, in February 
2003, DFID got allocated extra funding for Iraq for the first time, £10 million.980 The Ministry 
of Defence had received £30 million for post-conflict humanitarian work.981 For comparison, 
the Treasury had estimated the post-conflict costs at perhaps £60 million a month for 
Britain.982 DFID tried to compensate this lack of extra resources by reprioritising its core 
funding – the department’s yearly contingency reserve was virtually depleted by April – and 
allocating another £65 million to Iraq.983 DFID only got allocated substantial extra resources 
– £120 million – on 27 March, a week after the invasion had started.984 With everything 
happening at such short notice, there was the additional problem of spending that much 
money in such a short period of time: by the middle of March 2003, only £17 million of the 
money received by DFID had been allocated to agencies.985  
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In summary, there was not enough money – the total cost for post-conflict reconstruction 
was estimated at be £1,200-2,600 million986, not enough time to allocate that money, and few 
organizations on the ground in Iraq who could have been funded with it. DFID was waiting 
for the United Nations to arrive to lead reconstruction, and to allow it to channel its funds to 
international organizations, the department’s usual way of working.987 It could not start 
reconstructing via ORHA or the CPA for legal reasons and preferred to not be involved with 
ORHA in general for that organization was profoundly dysfunctional.988 Faced with those 
circumstances, DFID focused on what it felt is could do, which essentially was only 
humanitarian work.989 
Only in May 2003 did it become clear to DFID that CPA would, in fact, remain the lead civilian 
organization in Iraq.990 It was clear from the language in Security Council resolution 1483, 
which acknowledged the United States and the United Kingdom as de facto occupiers of Iraq, 
and had very little to say about a role for the United Nations.991 This final confirmation that 
the United Nations would not be central to Iraq’s recovery triggered Clare Short’s resignation 
from government.992 It also signalled to her department that working with the Americans 
would be the only option; and from May 2003 the department indeed started strengthening 
the Coalition Provisional Authority.993 In the same month, it also published a new strategy, 
the Humanitarian & Rehabilitation Strategy.994 
Welcome to Help (Only): United Nations and the International Community 
Assumption: The United Nations will have a leading role 
Reality: The United Nations was largely side-lined 
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Assumption: Other countries will shoulder large parts of the burden 
Reality: Other countries were reluctant to contribute to the American-British presence in Iraq 
Throughout Whitehall, the assumption had been that the United Nations would have a 
central role in the reconstruction of Iraq. This held true even though the Republican 
American administration was ideologically rather opposed to the concept of the United 
Nations for several reasons. First, the intensity of that opposition varied widely from person 
to person and department to department. Many American policy-makers and civil servants 
were rather in favour of the United Nations (notably in the State Department). The United 
Nations in the same period was also leading on Afghanistan, which had already been invaded, 
so in that sense, too, ‘it wasn’t ridiculous to think we might be able to persuade Bush to do 
the same’ for Iraq.995 Most importantly though, Blair had reassured Cabinet and public 
repeatedly that the United Nations route was an absolute condition for British participation 
in American-lead action.996 That, combined with the implicit but real idea that it would be 
hard if not impossible to make the invasion work without the United Nations – and why 
invade if doomed to fail? – sufficed to consolidate the planning assumption of a UN presence. 
A United Nations presence in post-war Iraq would matter in at least three different ways. For 
one, the United Nations would bring in its people and expertise to help with the 
reconstruction of the country. Although ‘it takes the UN time to gear up’997 (but clearly, it also 
took a while before the United States and the United Kingdom were geared up), the 
organization has a good track record of doing reconstruction as well as coordinating it.998 
Secondly, the United Nations could lead the political process in a credible way. By contrast, 
the United States and its junior partner were nations, who would more easily be suspected of 
ulterior (selfish) motives, as well as a party de facto involved in the political processes in 
Iraq: it would be hard for them to be player and referee simultaneously.999 Lastly, the United 
Nations flag would bring with it international legitimacy and therefore help from other 
countries, both monetary help and the sending of troops and civilian experts.1000 
By the time the invasion began, the centre of gravity within Washington had shifted to the 
Pentagon – and the people now chiefly in charge felt little for a substantive United Nations 
role. The United Nations was liaising, and it was also contributing to the provision of 
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humanitarian aid, as were NGOs. It was also willing and waiting to take on its ‘proper 
role’.1001 Of course, such a full role for the United Nations would still not have meant running 
Iraq on a day-to-day basis: the United Nations does not have that capacity.1002 But it would 
have been in the lead, bringing in expertise and resources as well as coordination and 
leadership. However, ‘that proper role… wasn’t on offer’.1003 This became abundantly clear 
when Bremer arrived.  
To be clear, President Bush, in a press conference after the Hillsborough meeting of 7-8 April 
2003, had conceded a ‘vital’ role to the United Nations, much to the relief of London.1004 But 
he meant vital in the most literal and limited sense: keep Iraqi people alive.1005 It was 
‘allowed in’ to contribute, but in a significantly weaker function than it is usually involved. 
This ‘coordinator’ role it was now given was, in Short’s words, ‘pretty insulting and 
hopeless’.1006 It did not allow the United Nations to improve the situation in a meaningful 
way.1007 The organization was still expected to work alongside or under the United States, 
and in any case, would be overruled by Washington.  
The net results were considerable resentment within both the United Nations community 
and other states, as well as an inability to reconstruct. As the United States continued to fail 
to bring the security situation under control, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative in Iraq – he initially did not want to do the job and neither did the Secretary-
General want him to take it – was killed in August 2003 in Baghdad.1008 This was the signal 
for the United Nations to leave the country.1009 Without the United Nations playing its usual 
role, the reconstruction plans that London and Washington – shoddy to begin with – became 
even less substantial.  
The estrangement from the intergovernmental organization had wider repercussions too: the 
reservations of countries around the world about the American-British invasion grew even 
stronger. At the end of March 2003, the United Nations launched a flash appeal for Iraq for 
$2,200 million (earlier appeals had amounted to $123 million).1010 In fact, this was close to 
the British estimates of the cost of reconstruction (between £1,200-2,600 million). However, 
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states around the world were unhappy to pay for (what they perceived as) the bad Anglo-
American decisions: by the end of April 2003 only 18% of the necessary money had been 
raised.1011 Only by including Oil for Food money was 88% of the goal met later that year.1012 
Nations were not only reluctant to pay; they were also waiting for a strong United Nations in 
the aftermath. Japan, India, and Egypt all let London know that they would come into Iraq 
once a strong United Nations presence was established.1013  
The British Treasury had hoped and assumed all along that other nations would pay for the 
reconstruction of Iraq; and in any case many people in Whitehall seemed to fail to grasp how 
many resources would be required to rebuild a country.1014 The Treasury’s assumption by 
and large turned out correct. However, most of the money was raised well after the invasion 
(of course, not all the money was needed immediately either) and spending the money was as 
much of a problem as raising it.1015 A lack of clarity on the ground, unsuitable bureaucratic 
rules, and a worsening security situation – which meant that more money had to be spent on 
security, to the detriment of reconstruction – all meant that reconstruction was slow and 
uneven. Huge sums were diverted to tendered contracts (of American companies, not 
employing the Iraqi population in need of jobs and with local knowledge of needs) that did 
not come to fruition.1016 When commanders on the ground needed resources, they often 
could not get them. 
United Nations’ involvement was also supposed to help the political process, which was a 
crucial part of the wider objectives for Iraq, which was to become a stable, reliable neighbour 
and a democracy too. However, when Bremer took over from Garner as the ‘vice-roi’ of 
Baghdad, one of the first changes he implemented was a drastic slow-down of the political 
process.1017 Garner had communicated to both the Kurds and formerly exiled Iraqis his 
intention ‘to hand sovereignty to you by about July and August time’.1018 Whereas London 
believed that the political process had to be Iraqi-owned to be successful, Bremer wanted 
Iraqis involved ‘always on a consultative basis rather than actually handing over executive 
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power’.1019 This drawn-out political process not only was itself against planning expectations; 
it also was one of the causes of Britain staying much longer than it had planned, which in turn 
also breached assumptions.  
Getting the Country Up and Running: Iraqi Civil Service & Police Forces 
Assumption: We will not trash the joint and keep Iraq intact 
Reality: Although the Coalition forces did not ‘trash the joint’, they also did not prevent looting 
Assumption: We will be able to keep the peace and draw down force levels after the conflict 
Reality: Force levels were too low to keep the peace and drawdown had to be postponed 
Assumption: The Iraqi administration will easily switch to a new regime 
Reality: The Iraqi administration was thoroughly debaathified and had to be rebuild 
Assumption: We will maintain the Iraqi police forces and get international forces in 
Reality: The Iraqi police was not up to the task and there were not enough international forces 
The problems with the Iraqi civil service post-invasion are well documented. Before the war, 
Britain as well as the United Nations had assumed that ‘Iraq was in many ways an efficiently 
run state with a functioning civil service’ and that ‘technocrats who had served Saddam 
would switch easily into serving a new administration’.1020 Yet, ‘[a]s in most other areas in 
Iraq, once the fighting stopped, virtually all levels of Iraqi government in and around [Basra] 
simple ceased to exist.’1021 Baghdad’s ministries stopped functioning. People vanished from 
their places of work: ‘Many civil servants and key ministers fled – worried they might be 
implicated in Saddam’s crimes or become targets for retribution by disgruntled fellow 
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Iraqis’.1022 Files and information disappeared with the people.1023 In addition, the ministries 
and civil services offices were looted and attacked.1024  
Yet while the collapse of the Iraqi civil service might now seem to have been inevitable, 
Coalition forces had in fact had some initial successes. ORHA’s plan had a pillar for immediate 
operations, which was divided in (1) humanitarian issues, (2) immediate reconstruction, and 
(3) civil administration.1025 For the latter, there were 18 ministry teams – each with a handful 
of people, sometimes only two or three personnel, and the heads of the units changing all the 
time – that would fan out in Baghdad to restart the ministries.1026 They found that the third or 
fourth hierarchical level of the civil service was usually still there.1027 Moreover, individuals 
were anxious both to keep their jobs and to get the Iraqi administration working again. 
Two major problems arose: looting and the American decision to debaathify the civil service. 
The looting was worst in Baghdad but arguing that Basra was spared would be wrong: 
‘Mayhem occurred. A bit like a cork coming out of a champagne bottle, they all went berserk 
and started looting and burning, and an area that had been appallingly undercapitalized for 
years under the Ba’ath regime was completely trashed.’1028 The damage was much worse 
than the London Iraq Planning/Policy Unit had expected.1029 DFID asked MoD to protect 
medical stocks of the International Red Cross, but nonetheless, ‘[t]here was mass looting of 
shops, offices, clinics and hospitals, and people carted anything they could carry out of every 
government building they could enter’.1030 The British House of Commons Defence 
Committee later judged that ‘the impact of this looting on the task of post-conflict 
reconstruction had been enormous’, not only in material damage, but in making it difficult for 
the local population to ‘return to work or school [or] get healthcare’, thus sapping their 
patience with the occupation.1031 
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Neither Britain nor the United States deployed enough people to prevent looting and crime 
(let alone, at a later phase, targeted campaigns against the occupation). Military troop 
numbers were low. In Northern Ireland in the 1970s, over 20,000 people were deployed.1032 
Kosovo in the 2000s saw 60,000 security forces for a province the size of a ‘couple of UK 
counties’.1033 By contrast, in Iraq – over thirty times the size of Northern Ireland, with a 
population of almost 26 million in 2003 compared to Northern Ireland’s 1,5 million in 1971 – 
the Coalition invaded with around 150,000 troops.1034 Britain had deployed 45,000 
personnel. These numbers proved sufficient to topple the regime, but they were hopelessly 
inadequate after the war-fighting phase. Moreover, or perhaps as a result, the troops mostly 
stood back when looting took place.1035  
The aggressive posture of many (American) troops yet their refusal to intervene in looting, 
combined with their low overall numbers, is one way of evaluating the problem.1036 Another 
way to evaluate the problems with looting, criminality, and internal security, is by 
considering the lack of police forces in post-war Iraq. As discussed in the last chapter, the 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office had taken on international policing in general and for Iraq. 
Someone in Washington had realised that executive police forces (police forces that do actual 
policing, not training) might be necessary in Iraq and asked the United Kingdom whether it 
could provide them.1037 Britain could not: most of its police forces are unarmed and the 
Northern Irish and military police had other tasks too and, in any case, could not raise 
enough numbers. Washington subsequently dropped the issue, assuming no executive police 
forces would be needed after all, Britain hopefully assumed that the Iraqi forces would be 
maintained, that the breakdown in law and order after the invasion would be limited, and 
that other countries would contribute via the United Nations. Thus, no substantial police 
forces were planned. 
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Using the Iraqi police proved hard. ‘The police that we brought back in in short order which 
everyone said was a wonderful effect … brought with it people who the locals knew only too 
well were guilty of heinous crime.’1038 Professionalism is hard to install in a short period of 
time, particularly in an unstable security situation where corruption is rife and tensions that 
were suppressed for decades have just been released. With so many internal power struggles 
going on – based on ethnicity, religion, local power hierarchies, the tribal system, 
nationalistic feelings for various groups, differences on how to achieve shared goals – 
establishing a neutral, non-racist, non-corrupt police force in a country that had not had one, 
was impossible in the short term and very difficult in the long term. 
In any case, Britain did not have the police officers to train them. First, it needed to find the 
volunteers within its own police ranks. But the harder problem was not finding volunteers; it 
was sending them out. There was a ‘tremendous reluctance from APCO to supply police 
officers’.1039 British constables needed to give permission for their police officers to be 
deployed to Iraq; some were reluctant to give up their best men.1040 In addition, because the 
police are civilians, duty of care responsibilities arose – to the frustration of the military, who 
needed those officers and somewhat resented the different level of risk analysis done on the 
police officers.1041 At the start of July 2003, a British lieutenant asked for 90 police men.1042 
Six months later, two were in Iraq.1043 Little wonder then that the British did not manage to 
train the Iraqi police efficiently and effectively. The assumption of the Iraqi police 
maintaining its policing duties and internal security thus proved wrong. 
The second big hurdle to getting Iraq up and running was the extent to which the civil service 
was debaathified.1044 Immediately after his arrival in Baghdad, Bremer announced that the 
four top levels of the Iraqi administration would be removed because of their strong ties to 
the old regime.1045 This was more than Britain had envisaged, but any objections – 
vehemently expressed by British on the ground – were waived aside.1046 Debaathification is a 
thorny issue: without a clear break with the past, the new regime would just seem a 
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continuation of the hated old regime; many at the top of Hussein’s regime were certainly 
responsible for terrible crimes. Yet many more others had been members of the Baath party 
because it was a precondition to holding a job; removing them would simply put more people 
out of work for no good reason, without enough qualified professionals to replace them.1047 
Bremer dismissed opposition to the extent of the civil service’s debaathification by arguing it 
was popular with Iraqis.1048 Many had suffered greatly at the hands of the old regime.  
However, the dismissal of all those qualified people – civil servants, administrators, teachers, 
politicians – led to a massive knowledge gap.1049 Those who remained at work were 
unfamiliar with the higher levels of the organization.1050 Few were inclined, willing and able 
to show the initiative and expertise necessary to fill the gap; certainly in a law-less, post-war 
situation, no-one would be willing to take the blame vis-à-vis an angry mob if anything went 
wrong.1051 The Coalition forces did not understand the system they had now decapitated – 
plus, as mentioned earlier, much of the infrastructure was looted and destroyed.1052 Thus, 
essential services like electricity and water provision in many places became worse than they 
had been under Saddam Hussein.1053 This was particularly true in the South.1054 To the Iraqis, 
it seemed incredible that their occupiers could put a man on the moon but fail to fix the 
electricity supply1055; many suspected foul play or at the very least a lack of interest in their 
fate on behalf of the Coalition. Their daily life became a struggle, and it was a direct result of 
the invasion. 
4. FROM BAD PREPARATION TO INSURGENCY  
British planning for the post-invasion phase, like American planning, was bad. It started from 
an unclear policy position – with the notable absence of a preferred alternative and 
articulated minimal requirements – and as a result, the plans meant to achieve the policy 
were based on unsuitable premises. Moreover, a complex insurgency started emerging mere 
months after the invasion. It was complex in that it involved many different parties, each with 
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their own positions, all challenging the Coalition’s authority but for distinct reasons, and 
while also fighting each other. The Sunnis rebelled en masse; the Shia community had internal 
struggles, part of which also addressed the Coalition forces.1056 In 2006, Iraq’s population 
groups turned on each other and the conflict took on sectarian characteristics of a civil 
war.1057 In 2009, Britain left.1058 Seven years later, the territory remains unstable and 
insecure. 
One can very reasonably assume that these two elements – bad planning and insurgency – 
are related. Certainly, London’s bad planning and plans meant that the British were badly 
prepared to improve daily life for the Shia community in the weeks and months after the 
conflict. Disenfranchisement was certainly part of the grievances of those Shia Arabs that 
caused the British most trouble. Yet it is difficult to know whether better planning would 
have been enough to prevent a bad security situation. The decision to abolish the Iraqi Armed 
Forces put many young, trained men on the street who helped or became insurgents. Yet 
keeping the Armed Forces would have brought its own problems. The exact causal link 
between London’s bad planning and the mayhem in Iraq in the following years is complicated 
and cannot be properly assessed without considering the role of the Americans and many 
specific circumstances in Iraq in depth. Others have addressed it, both by arguing that the 
failures in the first weeks were the seeds of the later insurgency and by arguing that Iraq 
would always erupt into conflict but doing so falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that bad planning hurts rather than helps. This does 
not mean that badly planned ventures can never be successful, and that well-planned venture 
will always succeed. However, not knowing your preferred alternative and minimal 
requirements will tend to produce suboptimal decisions. Such decisions have a propensity to 
bring about negative consequences, even though how and how far this propensity manifests 
itself will be a matter of contingency. In the case of Iraq, this tendency towards failure 
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manifested itself very clearly. Whether more coherent, suitable plans would have been 
enough to make a successful of the Iraq campaign is not guaranteed, and in any case a 
question outside the scope of this dissertation. However, it is plain to see that the United 
Kingdom failed to give itself the best possible chance of success. 
5. CONCLUSION  
This chapter discussed what happened in the period immediately after the United States and 
the United Kingdom had declared victory in Iraq. It demonstrated that the assumptions on 
which British planning was based, were not true when Britain actually went to war. This can 
be explained – as shown in the last two chapters – by the observation that plans were made 
based on one assumed preferred preference, whereas in the end, another preference was 
chosen politically. Hence there was a mismatch between the circumstances in which Britain 
went to war and the plans that had assumed other conditions of invading Iraq. The plans thus 
were unsuitable for the invasion as it happened. 
Once the war-fighting phase was over, the British troops in the South struggled, as did the 
British representatives to the American-led (civilian) headquarters in Baghdad. The 
American military leaders in Baghdad expected the British to keep their own area quiet. The 
British forces in the South needed money and resources, yet these were not forthcoming. The 
Office for Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), was understaffed, overwhelmed and of little 
help. Moreover, London was non-responsive and seemed intent only on avoiding costs. The 
idea of a British-led ORHA presence in Basra was refused, apparently for monetary reasons. 
London also refused or was incapable – despite multiple requests of people on the ground – 
to give further policy guidance beyond ‘do not commit’ to anything. 
A large part of the problem of the stalemate was that the British had not envisaged being 
present in Iraq under these circumstances. In its planning, the military had assumed that 
civilians would start contributing soon after the war-fighting was over. In reality, DFID’s 
civilians had only very limited means of doing so as long as the United Nations was not 
present on the ground. In any case, the Department for International Development was not 
ready for war. It had assumed war was weeks or months away, as the Security Council route 
had (correctly) looked like it would be successful anytime soon. Nor had DFID expected to be 
working with ORHA or the CPA as the leading civilian authority; DFID had legal constraint on 
working together with an institution intent on changing the institutions of Iraq without 
explicit additional Security Council resolution. Funding was also highly insufficient. 
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The United Nations being largely side-lined also meant that other countries were reluctant to 
contribute to the American-British presence in Iraq. Again, British plans assumed that other 
countries would quickly start shouldering large parts of the burden. Another problem was 
criminality. Looting and crime sprung up around Iraq as virtually all levels of government 
suddenly evaporated. The invaders did not have enough police forces to deal with this. They 
had been aware of this policing problem in advance but ended up ignoring it. The problems 
were exacerbated when Bremer, the head of the new Coalition Provisional Authority, made 
several strategic decisions without consulting the British. These included disbanding the 
army and thoroughly debaathifying the Iraqi civil service. 
To the Iraqis, these problems of the British and the Americans seemed so incredible as to 
raise more suspicion and mistrust: were they incompetent or did they not care? In reality, the 
troops had gone to war with plans that did not match the circumstances. For the war-fighting 
phase that was not a problem; but it proved deeply problematic when the post-invasion 
phase started and the lack of suitable plans became clear. It is hard to assess how and to what 
extent these problems in the beginning contributed to the ensuing insurgency(s); but many 
writers focusing on the post-war phase, whose research starts where this dissertation ends, 





Chapter VI: The Relation Between ‘Why’ and ‘How’ 
London Went to War 
1. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter analyses British 2001-2003 Iraq policy as a whole. Its argumentative burden is 
the thesis of the overall dissertation: that London invaded Iraq badly prepared because of its 
failure to have a clear policy position. This argument consists of three principal parts, which 
also constitute three out of four parts of this chapter. First, I establish that London indeed 
failed to have a clear policy position. The most important problem was the lack of an agreed-
upon preferred alternative to the policy that was being pursued, although there was a 
second, more minor problem around the ill-defined policy goal too. This lack of clarity 
harmed the British government in two related yet distinct ways. The first harm – elaborated 
upon in the second part of this chapter – done by the lack of clarity on British policy was that 
the plans that were prepared were not good. The second harm of this lack of agreed-upon 
preferred alternative, I argue, is that it drove the government to push ahead with the invasion 
despite the many indications that there was a severe lack of suitable plans. 
Those in the British government and civil service responsible for Iraq policy did not have a 
clear policy position between September 2001 and March 2003. There was no clearly defined 
policy goal: the government wavered between ‘disarmament’ and ‘disarmament+’ which 
would include a stable, democratic Iraq. Nonetheless, a fairly clear singular strategy emerged 
as the result of competing forces: disarmament, if necessary by force, through the Security 
Council. Disarmament was pushed by the Prime Minister; his government and civil service 
put this in the (only possible) context of the Security Council. On a preferred alternative to 
such disarmament via the Security Council, however, there was no agreement.  
Two different implicit interpretations existed: (1) Saddam Hussein must be dealt with, if 
necessary without the United Nations, (2) the British cannot abandon the Security Council. In 
practice, of course, the latter might mean postponing, or abandoning, quick disarmament. 
Minimal requirements similarly were never clear: both internally and externally the 
government spoke of ‘iron conditions’ and ‘preconditions’ to various scenarios, but these 
elements of Iraq policy, which might have passed for minimal requirements, were easily and 
frequently abandoned. Genuine, well-thought-out minimal requirements – the kind that 
would have logically followed from having established a preferred alternative to the policy 
pursued – were not articulated, let alone consistently acted upon.  
211 
 
This lack of clear policy position mattered in two ways. The British failure to establish a clear 
policy goal and, more important still, an agreed-upon preferred alternative, led to different 
government entities making their own assumptions – but these assumptions were mostly 
wrong, as well as mutually conflicting. This harmed Britain’s preparation for any plans in Iraq 
in a multitude of ways. Five failures are highlighted in this chapter: the Ministry of Defence’s 
failure to demand or provide clarity about the policy goal it was preparing for; the 
Department for International Development’s failure to make relevant plans, the result of a 
differently envisaged preferred alternative than the one that prevailed politically; the 
interdepartmental mismatch of those departments’ plans; the Foreign Office’s failure to 
prepare any well-development plans at all, which is in no small measure linked to the 
uncertainty that existed about the policy it was pursuing; and Cabinet’s failure to identify and 
manage all of these problems.  
The lack of clarity about the policy that was being pursued, and the limits of that policy, had a 
second type of effect as well. Indeed, there are two curious aspects about Britain’s decision to 
go to war. The first is: how do a Prime Minister and government stake so much political 
capital on the decision to go to war yet end up virtually unprepared for that very invasion – 
an invasion of choice, no less, in which unpreparedness must be less easily forgiven. The 
second curiosity, related but distinct, is the following: given that it should have been fairly 
easy for Cabinet and the Prime Minister to understand the extent of the under- and 
mispreparedness for an invasion in March 2003, with the Americans but without genuine 
Security Council support, how must we explain the decision to nonetheless invade? Wanting 
to pursue disarmament and failing to prepare for the circumstances as they present 
themselves is one thing; going through with the decision at that point, knowing the plans are 
not up to standard, quite another.  
I argue that here too, the dynamic of policy uncertainty crucially shaped events. In other 
words, the lack of preferred alternative was the root cause of both the unpreparedness for 
the invasion and the decision to nonetheless go ahead. The second element happened 
because the lack of preferred alternative made it both argumentatively and emotionally 
harder to assess the necessity of a policy reappraisal and what such a re-evaluation should 
amount to. As has been written before, this lack of alternative tends to make decision-makers 
nervous and overly pessimistic about alternatives. It is emotionally harder to abandon a plan 
when the stakes are high and there is no clear alternative. As a result, the policy that Britain 
followed in the end was the policy of invading Iraq alongside the United States without 
Security Council support: in practical terms the policy closest to what it had been pursuing all 
along, albeit in circumstances that would have previously been considered unacceptable. 
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Without minimal requirements and defined preferred alternative, it was hard to judge 
whether this was the best option on the table. It became the option chosen. 
Moreover, this is not just a matter of temperament and emotional avoidance; the lack of 
clearly defined policy also makes it harder argumentatively to argue for a change of policy. 
Indeed, when the limits of the initial policy goal are badly defined, it is harder to argue that 
the initial policy goal is, in fact, no longer what is being debated (and in the past chapters we 
have seen several examples of shifts in policy that were portrayed and perceived as 
continuity). If the goalposts and boundaries have never been clearly defined, it is easier for 
them to shift and harder to argue that they have shifted. Had the policy goal and preferred 
alternative been clearly established well ahead of that final Cabinet meeting before the 
invasion, it would have doubtlessly been easier for members to see and articulate how far the 
policy had shifted and the extent to which Whitehall policy planning had been premised on 
different conditions. As it is, the lack of policy clarity not only made Britain less well prepared 
for an invasion in March 2003; it probably also has a role in explaining why London forged 
ahead with the invasion despite this. 
Chapters III to V traced various aspects of Britain’s Iraq policy between 2001 and 2003 in 
detail. Unlike the current chapter, those chapters concentrated on a description of events as 
they unfolded. This chapter analyses those events and how they related to each other. It 
highlights how the decision-making described in chapter III impacted the planning process 
and plans that were reconstructed in chapter IV; and how the result was the litany of 
problems described in chapter V. To do so, it uses the lens introduced in chapter II: that of the 
(missing) preferred alternative. This chapter focuses on the absence of the preferred 
alternative and how this impacted Britain’s foreign policy for the worse. Let us therefore 
begin by establishing that London did, indeed, fail to have a clear policy position, including a 
well-defined preferred alternative to its policy. 
2. LONDON DID NOT HAVE A CLEAR POLICY POSITION  
Policy goal and strategy 
The government was more or less clear on its policy goal: weapons of mass 
destruction disarmament (oh, and add democracy) 
Until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on American soil, the United Kingdom had 
been pursuing a policy of containment vis-à-vis Iraq, even as that policy had increasingly 
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come under pressure.1059 After 9/11, large parts of that containment policy initially 
continued as it had been going on: the Security Council Resolution on smarter sanctions 
against Iraq was passed on May 2002.1060 Nonetheless, it quickly became clear that 
Washington was dropping its policy of containment. This put London in a dilemma. On one 
hand, in December 2001, an internal British policy document asked, ‘If the US heads for direct 
action, have we ideas which could divert them to an alternative course?’, focusing on 
alternatives to the American direction.1061 On the other hand, a letter of the 3rd of the same 
month to David Manning from the Foreign Office discussed options for ‘dealing’ with Iraq, 
exploring the American-led road.1062  
Indeed, London soon started to adopt certain elements of American thinking on Iraq, most 
notably the idea that containment as usual, or even smarter sanctions, would no longer do. Of 
course, in the eyes of many containment had become ineffective anyway: there was fertile 
ground for moving away from this policy (albeit less so for moving away from smarter 
sanctions). This, however, is also where things become less clear; for while the old policy goal 
was abandoned, a new one was far from clearly defined. It was sparked by the United States’ 
enthusiasm for regime change (a problematic concept for Great Britain, not least for legal 
reasons), pushed strongly by Blair’s feeling that risk could no longer be tolerated, and 
eventually coalesced into disarmament. This constituted an important change in Iraq policy. 
It is remarkable, therefore, that it was mostly portrayed as a form of continuity. The secret 
Options Paper, for example, stressed that ‘[s]ince 1991, our objective had been to re-
integrate a law-abiding Iraq’.1063  
Maybe so. But this theoretical long-term desire suddenly morphed into a short-term 
ambition. A policy goal of containment is different from a policy goal of disarmament; and 
while it might be that the long-term ‘plan’ (desire might be a better term) for Iraq remained 
the same, this nonetheless constitutes a substantial shift. On 15 February 2001, an FCO paper 
still stated that ‘[w]e cannot achieve complete WMD disarmament’.1064 By December 2001, 
the discussion had moved to considerations about how regime change could be combined 
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with other regional interests, implying disarmament and accompanying regime change were 
not only possible, but envisaged.1065 Any discussion about regime change, however, had to 
deal with the problem that regime change could not in itself be the British policy, for well-
established legal reasons. As a result, disarmament was the only way in which to talk about 
the new Iraq policy – regardless of whether regime change was the actual goal, a positive 
side-effect, a negative side-effect, or an irrelevance. Which of those it was, would have 
depended on your interlocutor. 
This shift in policy goal was portrayed (and perhaps perceived) as a shift in means; and 
indeed, the bulk of the conversation seamlessly shifted to a discussion focused on means, 
again fuelled importantly by American thinking. Is an invasion possible? Desirable? Can an 
uprising be provoked? Can Saddam Hussein be forced to disarm via extra Security Council 
pressure? This focus on the means and the failure to acknowledge that disarmament is more 
than a continuation of Iraq policy as it has been understood since 1991 is problematic. Policy-
makers miss a chance to properly define the new policy goal and the scope of that goal. The 
issue of democratisation of Iraq looms large here. When asked, the British government will 
narrowly define its policy goal as disarmament. (Despite the fact that of course, a democratic 
Iraq has also been Britain’s long-term hope since well before 9/11.) Indeed, the Foreign 
Office and the military were keen to emphasize that disarmament was the only goal.1066 Yet at 
the same time, democracy pops up regularly but casually as an additional goal. 
In any case, disarmament is overwhelmingly likely to occur together with the disposal of 
Saddam Hussein, and then someone else will have to take over.1067 The idea is also partly 
normative: democracy is the obvious good thing to happen to Iraq, and if Britain ‘can 
establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society 
then that is in our national interest too’.1068 Therefore, if Britain has to find a replacement for 
Saddam Hussein anyway, it might as well install a democracy. This will also contribute to a 
law-abiding Iraq at peace with its neighbours, which is another part of Britain’s overall vision 
for a future Iraq.1069 In addition to disarmament, democracy thus becomes, to some 
undefined extent, a part of the end goal without much thought, discussion, or attention. 
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There were other incentives for including democracy in the goals Britain had for Iraq. 
London felt it had an interest in keeping strong the relationship with the United States, who 
clearly favoured regime change. Saddam Hussein’s was an atrocious regime; later Iraqi 
president Talabani described it as ‘a prison camp above ground and a mass grave beneath it,’ 
a description correct at least in sentiment.1070 Another argument was the idea that terrorism 
was a risk that could no longer be tolerated in a post-9/11 world. Although the risk of 
terrorism from Iraq to Britain was considered low even at the time, Iraq having weapons of 
mass destruction might mean terrorists might be able to acquire those. If regime change in 
Iraq would lead to more stability in the Middle East, that would be another bonus.  
What interests us here, however, is not whether democracy in Iraq would have benefits.1071 
The question here is whether a democratic Iraq was part of Britain’s policy goal. Of course, if 
one fails to distinguish between short-term goals and long-term preferences, the answer is 
straightforward: yes, it is a part of the goal. If one does distinguish, however, the case is less 
clear. On the one hand, there were the concerted efforts to demonstrate that the British 
policy goal in Iraq was disarmament, and disarmament only. Democracy in Iraq, under this 
logic, would at most be a positive side effect from the fall of Saddam Hussein, in itself a likely 
side effect of disarmament. On the other hand, this idea that democracy could follow from 
disarmament meant that democracy – a clear preference indeed – was also intended for the 
reasonably near future. Missing from this picture was the acknowledgement that 
disarmament would not automatically lead to democracy (even as it seemed to open up the 
possibility) and a genuine discussion as to whether that route must be actively pursued. The 
implicit answer was ‘yes’; the more explicit answer was ‘no’; a half-hearted attempt at 
preparation was made. 
The government was clear on its strategy: disarmament via the Security Council 
Even though the government had policy goals for Iraq of varying levels of ambition (from 
disarmament to a stable, democratic Iraq), it emerged with a clear strategy: pursuing 
disarmament, if necessary via force, through the Security Council. At least, this would lead to 
disarmament. But more broadly speaking, disarmament was seen as a necessary (though, one 
could argue, not exactly sufficient) step to the wider, more ambitious policy goals. This 
disarmament through the Security Council would probably have to involve force; but in the 
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unlikely event that Security Council pressure would lead to a sudden capitulation by 
Baghdad, that would have been all the better. 
That last point is important, because it is in direct contradiction to any suggestions that Blair, 
or his government, preferred war to any other option. There is no reason to believe this is the 
case; Tony Blair wanted to ‘deal’ with Saddam Hussein, and the government as a whole 
would have gladly taken peaceful disarmament over an invasion. Had London preferred war 
to peaceful disarmament, it would have advocated for a high bar for Saddam Hussein in 
Security Council Resolution 1441. Instead, unlike the United States, it argued for a low bar.1072 
In other words, the British negotiators wanted Saddam Hussein to be able to comply with the 
disarmament conditions. They also were lobbying hard for more time with their American 
counterparts to give the peaceful route more time.1073 They failed; but they tried. Although 
the British were never hopeful that peaceful disarmament through the Security Council 
would work, that was certainly understood as the best possible outcome for London. 
Given Saddam Hussein’s track record of non-cooperation, however, the possibility of an 
invasion (the more likely outcome of the Security Council route) had come on the table soon 
after 9/11, when the policy goal shifted from containment to disarmament. The means that 
were now under consideration were ‘covert support to opposition groups to mount an 
uprising/coup’; ‘air support for opposition groups to mount an uprising/coup’; ‘a full-scale 
ground campaign’; or a combination of these.1074 Supporting opposition groups quickly 
disappeared from the radar as it was unclear whether a coup could be provoked and if it 
would work; as time went on, it also become more and more clear that Washington intended 
to go to war. 
The focus thus shifted to an invasion. The questions were two-fold: ally with the United 
States and if yes, with what contribution?1075 Issues of feasibility and legality severely limited 
the options. The Prime Minister’s stance was clear: if disarmament through Security Council 
pressure failed (as there was every reason to believe it would), London would stand by the 
United States, up to participation in an invasion. The Foreign Office and the Attorney 
General’s assessment of international law forced London to get Security Council support if 
the United Kingdom wanted to militarily attack Baghdad. The strategy of disarmament via 
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the Security Council, backed by the threat of military force, reflected an emerging 
compromise between the Foreign Office’s understanding of the necessity of the Security 
Council and Blair’s desire to stand by the United States for a variety of reasons. 
Preferred alternative and minimal requirements  
The government did not have one preferred alternative. Instead it had two 
implicit, mutually exclusive alternatives. 
From April 2002 on, the British government had been running Iraq policy across two tracks, 
as shown in Chapter III. On the one hand, the Prime Minister had given a commitment to the 
United States to stand by it as it would deal decisively with Baghdad. On the other hand, the 
Foreign Office was very clear that it would be pursuing a solution via the Security Council, 
and that an invasion could only be considered after and if a peaceful resolution via that body 
would not work. While these tracks allowed for the same strategy (for a while), they had a 
different internal logic with a different underlying finality.  
Tony Blair wanted to disarm Saddam Hussein; show support for the United States in the face 
of the new-found form of terrorism demonstrated on 11 September 2001; and maintain the 
unity of the international community. The ideal path to obtain all those would be 
disarmament through a united Security Council. However, if this were to prove impossible, 
the preferred alternative – for Tony Blair – was to still support the United States in its quest 
for disarmament and a comprehensive solution for the Baghdad regime, up to military action 
if needed. After all, Kosovo had shown that military action could be quick and successful. In 
other words, Tony Blair’s preferred alternative to disarmament via the Security Council 
would be disarmament without the Security Council. 
The civil service presumed a different path. The policy goal they had been given, and which 
they subscribed to, was clear: disarmament through the Security Council as a short-term goal, 
instead of containment with the hope of indirectly disarming Baghdad in the long term. This 
focus on the Security Council was in keeping with the usual British approach to foreign policy 
and in keeping with standard British interpretations of international law. For the civil 
service, the ‘Security Council route’ was not merely the best way to achieve disarmament; 
assuming force or at least the credible threat of force would be needed to disarm Baghdad, it 
was the only option. The use of force against another sovereign state, after all, is only legal 
under very specific circumstances; in the case of Iraq under the circumstances of the early 
noughties, it would only be legal with Security Council authorization. Given that disarmament 
could only happen with the Security Council, the preferred alternative to successful 
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disarmament via Security Council agreement (with or without the actual use of force), was to 
continue smart sanctions or, potentially, any other agreement such as could be made via the 
Security Council.  
In other words, for Tony Blair the so-called ‘Security Council route’ is a way, but only one 
way, to achieve the goal of disarmament. His implicit preferred alternative to disarmament 
with the backing of the Security Council (whether through force or through the threat of 
force) was disarmament without the support of the Security Council and the countries in it. 
For the civil service, on the other hand, the term ‘Security Council route’ refers to the idea 
that the issue of Iraq will be dealt with via the Security Council as a matter of principle, not 
convenience. The implicit preferred alternative to disarmament with the backing of the 
Security Council is whatever else the Security Council settles on (most likely smart sanctions, 
passed in May 2002).  
This is not to say that Tony Blair failed to value the Security Council and the role this 
institution could play. Tony Blair personally, as well as his colleagues and civil servants, put 
substantial time and effort into convincing the American president of the value of going to the 
Security Council. So did parts of the American administration. In September 2002, they 
succeeded. Later, too, Tony Blair continued to value unity in the international community. 
Much time was spent trying to bridge the gap between the United States and countries 
sceptical of the belligerent talk coming from its capital. And in the beginning of 2003, the 
British were lobbying hard with the Americans to give the Security Council route more time 
to work.  
Yet it became clear that a break between the United States and much of the rest of the 
Security Council, most notably the permanent members, was inevitable: the United States 
were no longer willing to wait and the Security Council was not (yet) willing to legitimize an 
invasion. For Tony Blair, it was clear that the United Kingdom would stand by the United 
States as he had promised as early as April 2002. This was – in his view – the right course of 
action. The failure of the Security Council to support the United States was regrettable but did 
not put in doubt the moral argument for participating in the invasion: “[w]hen the 
international community agrees certain objectives and then fails to implement them, those 
who can act, must”.1076 
As Whitehall was preparing for possible outcomes of the Iraq policy however, it built its 
plans around the assumption that London would not go to war without the Security Council. 
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Instead, the preferred alternative to the negotiated outcome in the Security Council would be 
to stay with the Security Council and accept (for now at least) the non-invasion of Iraq. The 
plans reflected this assumption about the preferred alternative. Note that the presumption 
here was that the Security Council members would genuinely achieve a consensus. The plans 
were based on other countries taking on parts of the burden from the invasion and on the 
United Nations system contributing, financially and logistically, to the post-invasion phase in 
Iraq. In other words, when the British Attorney General stated the war could be legal 
(pending the political judgement of the Prime Minister), based on his interpretation of the 
Security Council having given the green light, this was politically necessary for Cabinet to go 
ahead with the invasion, but it was not the policy as originally envisaged (disarmament with 
the Security Council properly), nor the preferred alternative foreseen by most civil servants 
(which included not breaking away from the Security Council). 
The government failed to articulate clear minimal requirements; the 
‘conditions’ it articulated often proved to not be genuine conditions; different 
actors had different implicit minimal requirements. 
British policy-makers failed to establish clear, suitable minimal requirements. This is 
unsurprising since they did not have one clear preferred alternative. However, the problem is 
not merely that they failed to derive their requirements from their preferred alternative: the 
‘conditions’ they did set, had other problems too. While British policy-makers and civil 
servants did, at various moments, talk about ‘conditions’ and ‘preconditions’ to participation 
in Iraq, these were badly communicated internally. They were also not followed up. There 
was no clear distinction drawn between non-negotiable conditions and gains that were 
interesting, but that would not be of essence for the eventual policy preference of the United 
Kingdom. Little surprise then, that many of those ‘conditions’ were not taken seriously 
externally, and indeed altogether proved to not be (pre)conditions at all. Other conditions 
were very much meant as sine qua non conditions but abandoned nonetheless; garnering 
public support for the invasion comes to mind as an example, as does the condition of a 
proper plan for the post-war phase. 
One argument in this dissertation, as established, is that policy-makers should have a clear 
idea of minimal requirements for the pursuance of its chosen policy. It should be very clear to 
the negotiators involved (on your own side of the table) which deal is good enough, and 
which policy must be abandoned because the price is too high. Similarly, an otherwise good 
policy must not be scuppered [refused?] because it is not the best outcome one could have 
hoped for, particularly when it is the best option still available. What those minimal 
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requirements should have looked like depends on the ‘preferred alternative to the pursued 
policy’ chosen by policy-makers. The argument here relates not to what minimal 
requirements should have been chosen; the argument is that (a) minimal requirements 
should have been chosen (b) depending on the preferred alternative chosen by the policy-
makers (c) and should not have been confused with elements that are desirable but not in 
fact essential. Let us first discuss the ‘conditions’ set in Iraq policy over the course of 2002, 
which often turned out not to be conditions at all. With that out of the way, let us then 
consider the absence of genuine minimal requirements. 
The so-called ‘conditions’ in Britain’s 2001-2003 Iraq policy 
When British Iraq policy was under review and disarmament on the table as one possibility, 
British civil servants and politicians alike presumed that there would be conditions to any 
such action. Any participation in an American invasion (sanctioned by the United Nations 
Security Council) was particularly subject to a list of ‘conditions’ or ‘preconditions’. Indeed, 
by the time that the Crawford meeting of April 2002 had taken place at the latest, certain 
conditions became a written part of the Foreign Office’s Iraq policy.1077 They included 
pursuing the United Nations route until it was ‘exhausted’ – a term, as shown in earlier 
chapters, that begs a more precise definition of ‘exhaustion’. There also needed to be 
progress in the Middle East Peace Process; there must be a solid ‘winning concept’; and the 
public – both domestically and Middle-Eastern – must be informed and the idea of war must 
be sold to make any use of force politically viable.  
These ideas were certainly meant to be a part of Britain’s Iraq policy.1078 They were a part of 
the Foreign Office’s policy and they were part of David Manning’s thinking about Iraq. 
However, the American lack of concern for these ‘iron’ conditions, the failure to obtain them 
and the decision to nonetheless push ahead with an invasion all beg the question: were these 
meant as genuine conditions for participation in an American-led invasion? In this context, 
does ‘condition’ mean a minimal requirement: a sine qua non without which the policy goal 
that is conditional on it will be abandoned? Or does ‘condition’ mean something rather 
looser, like a circumstance that would be generally desirable but not necessarily a 
prerequisite to the use of force? If they were meant to be minimal requirements, were they 
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abandoned after a serious reconsideration of the policy, or were they gradually abandoned 
without an explicit rationale behind this change of plan? 
This is where policy-makers disagree profoundly. Various Cabinet ministers and political 
advisors had various interpretations on how binding London’s conditions were: whether 
they were, indeed, minimal requirements. The spectrum of divergence ranges from Tony 
Blair on one side to the Foreign Office’s official position on the other hand (shared by most 
and perhaps all of Whitehall). Both Tony Blair and Jack Straw would argue that there were no 
‘conditions’ as such, albeit for diametrically opposed reasons. To Blair, there were no 
conditions – only recommendations – because doing the ‘right thing’ is a good in itself and 
therefore coalition partners should be wholeheartedly supported.1079 His 2002 Foreign 
Secretary, by contrast, argued to the Iraq Inquiry panel that the ‘conditions’ that people 
talked about could not be ‘conditions’ for Britain to support the United States: instead, they 
were, in Straw’s reading, the entire rationale and strategy of London’s policy. The United 
Nations route; for example, was not a ‘condition’ to be fulfilled before Britain could 
participate in military action: the United Nations route, for the FCO, was the policy.1080   
Foreign policy advisor David Manning was unequivocal that these were meant to be genuine 
minimal requirements for Britain’s participation in any invasion; that it would not have been 
possible to loosen these conditions. In his view, Britain would have had to reconsider its 
policy if any of these conditions would not be respected. To a large extent, and despite Tony 
Blair’s testimony to the Iraq Inquiry and his actions at the time, it was also the message the 
Prime Minister sent to the world: the government recognises the gravity of a possible 
invasion; this invasion will only be undertaken with a certain number of ‘guarantees’. This 
line of persuasion can be detected both in the communication within the civil service and in 
the communication to the wider British public. However, British ambassador to Washington 
Meyer was only informally aware of those conditions – they apparently were not sent out in 
writing to the embassy – and he was unsure about the strength of those conditions.1081 The 
Americans tended to not take them seriously.1082 
Many of these ‘conditions’ certainly did not function as minimal requirements for British use 
of force. Making the case for war to the British public certainly was a major concern of the 
government, but it seems never to have been a condition proper for action. That is 
                                                             
1079 Blair, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 29 January 2010”, 44-51. 
1080 Straw, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 21 January 2010”, 37-39. 
1081 Meyer, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 26 November 2009”, 63-64. 
1082 Tebbit and Boyce, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 3 December 2009”, 61. 
222 
 
unsurprising, as the person who had most to gain or lose from public acceptance for the war, 
Tony Blair, was also the person most fervently convinced of the need to invade. The Middle 
East Peace Process seems to have been quickly forgotten about by everyone, at least in 
relation to Iraq policy. The idea of a winning concept was obviously not explicitly abandoned; 
it also does not seem to have happened, though.  
Meanwhile, the most important requirement of them all, the ‘Security Council route,’ really 
refers to two quite different things: getting Security Council approval of military action 
undertaken by de United States and the United Kingdom on one hand and getting the active 
cooperation of UN member states on the other hand. This distinction is a distinction made 
here, with the benefit of hindsight, because it allows us to highlight the extent to which policy 
was undefined. At the time, ‘the Security Council route’ was used for both elements 
interchangeably and simply meant, first, to get the United States to agree to put to matter of 
an invasion of Iraq to the Security Council and, at a later stage, to get the Security Council to 
agree to military force if Saddam Hussein would not disarm without force.  
In the latter Britain mostly failed: the Security Council did not have much appetite for 
disarmament in the spring of 2003 (although many countries, including France, were willing 
to leave open this option for a later date). However, the Council did pass a resolution that 
Britain interpreted as a legal base for war. This resolution and its interpretation by Attorney 
General Lord Goldsmith allowed the British government to argue that the Security Council 
route had, indeed, been followed to the end. Another line of argumentation visible in British 
thinking was that Britain had attempted to make the Security Council agree with its Iraq 
policy, and that this attempt itself must count as ‘following the Security Council route.’ The 
underlying rationale here is that a fair effort, rather than results, can suffice.  
These different interpretations of ‘the Security Council route’ show the shifting meaning of 
that idea. This idea, which initially was one of the firm conditions of a potential invasion, 
remained a condition throughout 2002, at least on the surface. In reality, however, the 
meaning of this idea changed, allowing the ‘condition’ to be fulfilled nominally although not 
in substance. The interpretation that was given to ‘the Security Council route’ in February 
2003 differed in important ways from the interpretation of a year earlier; the condition as it 
had originally been set out, was not fulfilled when British troops crossed the Iraqi border in 
March.  
Britain’s lack of minimal requirements 
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At a glance, one could easily mistake these ‘conditions’ or ‘pre-conditions’ of British Iraq 
policy for the minimal requirements argued for in chapter II. Yet they fell short in several 
ways. They were not consistent; they were not clearly defined. Partly, the problem was that 
whatever conditions existed were not shared across government and the civil service; their 
status as condition (prerequisite or ideal circumstance?) was unclear; their meaning was 
shifting; they were not used effectively in communication or negotiation, most notably with 
the Americans (who failed to attach much importance to them, apparently rightfully so); they 
were abandoned without much explicit thought or acknowledgement of the fact.  
However, these ‘conditions’ also fall short of minimal requirements as understood in chapter 
II in a more fundamental way: they did not shed any clarity on Britain’s preferred alternative. 
Of course, this is unsurprising since Britain, as established earlier, did not even have one 
clearly-defined preferred alternative while pursuing its Iraq policy. However, the problem 
with the minimal requirements is deeper than that: they also do not correspond very well to 
either of the implicit preferred alternatives that were being pursued. These minimal 
requirements were not derived from the preferred alternative, to which they bore little 
logical relation (for either alternative). This meant that British civil servants and diplomats 
spent time and capital on the negotiation of conditions that proved ultimately irrelevant, 
while neglecting those conditions that should have been relevant.  
3. LONDON GOES TO WAR…  
Official British policy through the spring and summer of 2002 was that Britain would join a 
coalition of military force against Iraq only if certain conditions were fulfilled.1083 These 
included new chances for Saddam Hussein to prove his cooperation, Security Council 
support, a military ‘winning concept’, and the case for war being made to the British public. 
In the words of David Manning, ‘it would not have been possible to have softened those 
conditions.’1084 Or, as Foreign Secretary Jack Straw put it: disarmament and the Security 
Council were Britain’s policy, and any talk of invasion would only ever be relevant in this 
context.1085  
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By the next spring, reality looked rather different. The public, far from convinced, protested 
en masse in the capital on 15 February 2003.1086 Between 750,000 and 1,000,000 people 
voiced their anger at the war plans. Civil servants across Whitehall knew the plans to be 
undercooked. There was no winning concept – at least, no winning concept that addressed 
the goals London had by now set itself, which included a stable Iraq as well as ‘weapons of 
mass destruction’ disarmament. They also strongly, and correctly, suspected that the United 
States were not ready for what would happen after the fall of Baghdad. The Security Council 
and international community were deeply fractured. Yet Britain went to war.  
For someone who focuses on Tony Blair as the driver behind British policy, this would not 
seem surprising. In such a reading, Britain did not abandon the United States because Britain 
had never planned or meant to enforce any conditions to participation in the war. Blair either 
really wanted the invasion (for example to ensure regime change) or – the more charitable 
interpretation – he was genuinely willing to go to war if that was unfortunately the only way 
of addressing the risk coming out of Baghdad. Conditions were never really conditions: they 
were some kind of recommendation at best, or a smoke screen to misguide others at worst.  
The problem with that interpretation is that one Prime Minister does not equal a policy. 
Virtually the entire rest of the British government and civil service, both in public and in 
private government documents, assumed there were conditions. Cabinet members assumed 
there were. The policy actually pursued in the Security Council suggests there were genuine 
conditions. Legally, it went without saying that there were: some of these ‘conditions’ were 
necessary for the war to be legal at all. The Foreign Office thought that Iraq policy was to 
pursue the United Nations route. Of course, this was also the version put out in public, even 
though Blair equally often gave the opposite impression. In other words, the eventual British 
policy was, until very late in the process, mostly just a hope that Blair entertained. We still 
must understand how and why the rest of the government gave in on its previously iron 
conditions and eventually coalesced around Blair’s version of a preferred alternative. 
London most certainly tried to influence Washington, desperately so towards the end.1087 
First, the British had to convince the Americans to go via the Security Council at all (this they 
eventually succeeded in, although this was as much the result of internal American politics as 
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of the British). The British ‘at all levels up to and including the Prime Minister talking to 
President Bush’ tried to convince the United States to give the United Nations a substantial 
role in the post-war effort, with less success.1088 They also tried to push for more progress in 
the Arab-Israeli peace process, but their interlocutors across the Atlantic never really took 
this to heart. The British also argued for postponing the invasion. This might have worked, in 
that at some point the Americans considered going in in the end of 2002, but again whether 
this was because of British pressure is rather unclear. Certain is that in spring 2003, London 
wanted to further postpone the invasion to give the Security Council route more time but 
failed to get American agreement on this. 
Indeed, on the whole London had little impact on the American plans. Part of the problem 
was that policy-makers were influencing the wrong people. They were best heard at the State 
Department, although of course the State Department’s views being quite close to the British 
view does not necessarily mean that London influenced the department. Rather, the British 
and the State Department quite naturally found each other in already held convictions.1089 
The British fed arguments to the department in the hope of influencing the American 
administration; but at the same time, the State Department pleaded with the British to take 
up the common cause and try and convince their own political leaders in Washington. This is 
not so much a case of British influence as of the British joining forces with one faction of the 
intra-American struggle over Iraq policy. 
As Iraq policy advanced, the power balance in the American administration had shifted away 
from the State Department to the Pentagon.1090 While the State Department would be on 
board with the British ideas, it was necessary to argue hard with the Vice-President and with 
Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld (and, to somewhat lesser extent, National Security Advisor 
Rice).1091 Yet there would be very few British ministers who could go over to the United 
States and merit access at that level. Foreign Secretary Straw was an exception.1092 An 
additional problem was that the American chain of command and division of responsibilities 
between departments did not mirror the British one. 
In any case, the British had no clear position of their own to stick to: they had a goal, but it 
was not clear to anyone how hard they could or should push. Should they only ask? Should 
they threaten to limit their military contribution? Should they limit their military 
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contribution or withdraw altogether? Perhaps this lack of reference point is why so many in 
the British civil service and government ended up measuring influence on the Americans not 
in terms of how close it brought them to the British position, but rather in terms of how much 
the Americans had moved away from their original plans. Getting the Americans to budge 
meant success, even if the result was nowhere near what London needed to stick to its 
conditions. 1093 
Of course, it is sensible to understand the position and manoeuvring space of your 
interlocutor in negotiations. Understanding their interests and constraints makes it easier to 
work out a solution that addresses the principal concerns of all parties involved. But to 
negotiate well means to defend one’s own interests while considering where the other can be 
accommodated to come to the outcome that is acceptable and best for both. To consider 
primarily the policy stance of the other and try to understand where you can accommodate 
them, is to set the stage for a solution that will not benefit you as much as it could. The British 
government should defend British interests. That does not mean, of course, that the 
government cannot decide at times that it is in its own interest that the United States do not 
hurt itself. However, it should know when and where to stop. For that, it needed a preferred 
alternative and corresponding minimal requirements. 
This thesis does not go as far as to claim that with a better idea of British minimal 
requirements, London certainly would have been able to negotiate Washington out of an 
invasion of Iraq. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that London would at least have given itself a 
better chance at doing so with a firmer stance throughout. Washington, after all, was 
genuinely concerned with getting allies: hence why the United States agreed to go back to the 
Security Council in September 2002. The most relevant question for this thesis, however, is 
not whether Britain could have stopped the United States. This in any case would be a 
question best answered by studying American Iraq policy in more depth. More to the point 
for those interested in understanding the British story is this: why, after all this, did London 
not drop out of the invasion? 
London could have dropped out and on several occasions was very close to wanting or 
having to do so. The British would not have been able to go to war (or London would have 
needed to denounce its support for international law) had the Attorney General not had his 
sudden change of mind. The parliamentary vote could not be taken for granted. Political 
pressure on the Prime Minister was intense. London could also have dropped out. This is not 
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just true in the abstract – in the sense that no-one can force a state to go to war against its 
will – but also in the actual political realm. London had always been careful (although rather 
unsuccessful) in stressing that its commitment was conditional.1094 The American president 
was aware of the pressures on Tony Blair and repeatedly offered the British government a 
way out. In March 2002 Donald Rumsfeld, fed up with the difficulties on the British side, had 
an ‘outburst saying, “If you don’t want to come, we will do it on our own”’.1095 The president 
repeatedly offered the same (in a more positive spirit).1096 A last-minute British withdrawal 
would have been difficult for the Americans, but they would have doubtlessly succeeded in 
an invasion on their own. 
What Rumsfeld’s outburst demonstrated most clearly, however, was American disbelief, for a 
very long time, at the idea that the British might not participate in the invasion. This was 
despite the British stressing the conditionality of their participation throughout. As then 
Chief of Defence staff Lord Boyce told the Iraq Inquiry: 
I want to re-emphasise the efforts we made to try and tell the Americans that we were not 
committed until the UN process had been completed, and then, later on in March, until the 
Parliamentary process had gone, and we must remember that, in context in which we were 
operating, we had behind us, if you like, an alliance in Afghanistan, and the fact that we were 
working with American forces in Kosovo and as far back as the first war in Iraq in the early 
1990s (...) They just did not believe it, because they did not want to and it wasn't really until 
about March that Rumsfeld finally got it, and Myers got it, and [Rumsfeld] had that outburst 
saying, ‘If you don't want to come, we will do it on our own’, if you recall, and indeed, having 
got it, that's when they realised the truth.1097 
The Americans who were convinced that the British would come through turned out to be 
right (although perhaps accidentally so).  
What did the situation look like for the British towards the beginning of 2003? In one sense, 
the situation looked very simple. They had promised conditional support to an American-led 
invasion; those conditions had not materialised; they could choose to not invade. Their 
preferred policy – an invasion with the backing of the Security Council – was clearly no 
longer on the table. The Americans had made the decision to cross the Iraqi border in March 
2003. Pleas to postpone that date were ignored. The conditions that the British had set had 
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been ignored. On the other hand, the reasons for which the United Kingdom considered 
attacking Baghdad had not disappeared. Saddam Hussein still perhaps had weapons of mass 
destruction, or, more to the point: Baghdad still posed a risk.  
It was not obvious how the United Kingdom should weigh up these considerations. Was the 
danger of the Middle-Eastern country so great that Great Britain should stand by the United 
States regardless? Did the failure to obtain conditions mean that the Armed Forces should 
not stand with their American counterparts? A better-defined policy position would have 
addressed exactly these questions: what is Britain’s preferred alternative if the ideal 
negotiated solution cannot be obtained? By now the war had been prepared, in military as 
well as in political terms (although clearly not well enough). The default option thus had 
become an invasion. Standing with the Americans became an obvious choice. The alternative 
of withdrawal existed theoretically as well as in reality, but by this stage it would have been 
unclear to anyone in the British government what that policy option would amount to.  
This is what Ury & Fisher have to say about such circumstances: 
If you have not thought carefully about what you will do if you fail to reach an agreement, you 
are negotiating with your eyes closed. In most circumstances … (the) danger [of this lack of 
BATNA] is that you are too committed to reaching agreement. Not having developed any 
alternative to a negotiated solution, you are unduly pessimistic about what would happen if 
negotiations broke off.1098 
In this context, thinking beyond the original solution – now unachievable – is difficult: if 
Security Council support cannot be found, it is hard to see what the next step should be. After 
all, London had negotiated itself into a corner, with its commitment to the United States on 
one hand and its commitment to the United Nations, and ditto understandings within the civil 
service, on the other. However, one option that was on the table was presented as if it were 
still the original policy: Blair’s preferred alternative. It was phrased as if the Security Council 
route had been ‘exhausted’ and ‘legality’ meant the Security Council ‘supported’ the invasion. 
In other words, one of the options seemed much more like the initial policy and therefore 
seemed closer to success. Through the preferred alternative lens, what happened is therefore 
quite logical: the option least developed became the road not taken. Britain did not call off 
Operation TELIC. The country had effectively negotiated itself into a corner. 
By now, only one thing was less clear to the government than what would happen if it did 
invade: what would happen if it did not. The government was looking for success. It was also 
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hard, at that point, to determine which course of action was better, particularly as the plans 
made by Whitehall were not suited for this new policy. Without a clear preferred alternative, 
without a way to weigh up the problem faced by the United Kingdom with the costs that an 
invasion would bring, and having geared up for an invasion, London ended up going to war. 
This was, in the end, not so much a conscious policy choice by Cabinet, of which the pros and 
cons had been debated and weighed up, as a lack of discussion: “no one wanted to rock the 
boat,” as described in Chapter III.1099 
I argue that the lack of explicit preferred alternative and minimal requirements is a root 
cause of this lack of discussion. Abandoning the plan to join the American invasion of Iraq 
became unthinkable in part because the tools to think about it were lacking. This is precisely 
what the preferred alternative and minimal requirements offer: a tool to deliberate on policy 
changes. They give a structured way to think about these issues, and they give the 
argumentative vocabulary to argue in favour (or against) a certain course of action. In the 
case of Iraq, as minimal requirements and preferred alternative had never been made 
explicit, it would have been hard to explain why the policy now proposed by Blair was 
substantially different from that initially pursued. As minimal requirements had never been 
articulated, it was harder to argue that they had not been fulfilled.  
This lack of minimal requirements and preferred alternative matters in two distinct ways. It 
makes it harder to analyse the problem without the vocabulary offered in this dissertation. It 
is also harder to convincingly argue about such a problem. Thus, the lack of well-established 
preferred alternative and minimal requirements was one root cause of why Britain went 
ahead with the invasion under conditions it would have previously deemed unacceptable. 
These dynamics of the negotiation explain why London went to war in March 2003 despite 
the obvious political costs, despite the lack of clear plan, and despite the moral problems of 
overthrowing a regime with no good plans for the next stage.  
4. … WITHOUT GOOD PLANS  
To explain how the United Kingdom ended up having poor plans is to presume that the plans 
were bad indeed. Two preliminary questions must therefore be answered. By what metric 
were the plans bad? In other words: what is the yardstick by which the quality of the plans 
should be judged and deemed unsuitable? Secondly, in what sense were the plans bad? In 
other words, how did the plans deviate from what they should have looked like? With the 
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problem thus identified, we can examine how it came about. The specific argument of this 
chapter is that for Britain’s Iraq invasion, the plans were bad because the planning process 
was severely hampered by the lack of a clear policy position. This made the plans incoherent 
across government departments as well as unsuitable for the invasion. 
Good plans: a minimal standard 
To argue that Britain prepared badly for its potential invasion of Iraq (by not defining a 
preferred alternative and derive minimal requirements from this alternative) and that its 
plans were bad as a result, begs the question: what exactly do I mean by ‘bad’ plans? As 
indicated earlier, the metric used in this dissertation is not the eventual success or lack 
thereof of the Iraq invasion itself: success or lack thereof in an invasion does not depend 
solely on the preparation one has done. Rather, I look at several conditions of the plans 
themselves. Those conditions, I argue, have a propensity to bring about good results. 
Indeed, good plans tend to have several characteristics that makes them more prone to 
success. On the flipside, bad plans tend to not have these characteristics. Good plans are 
internally coherent. They do not contradict themselves. By contrast, mutually incoherent or 
internally contradictory plans are worse for having those characteristics. Good plans are not 
only internally coherent (based on assumptions that are mutually compatible): they also 
rationally connect ends and means. Good plans have appropriate strategies to achieve set 
policy goals. Strategies or plans that are inappropriate for the problem they are meant to 
solve, are bad plans, even if they are internally coherent.  
Good plans also need to be well developed. Policy-makers and planners need to have thought 
through the events in enough detail to understand what each step requires. They need to 
know what resources they depend on, whether these are available, and how to get them. 
They need to know what action needs to be taken when. They need to be aware of problems 
and have time to think of solutions. Of course, that does not mean that good plans need to 
foresee every single eventuality or step along the way. Determining the exact level of 
preparation needed is a matter of expertise and judgment, more art than science. 
Nonetheless, the principle is clear. Because they cannot readily and confidently be executed, 
plans that are underdeveloped or incomplete amount to bad plans.  
In other words, at the very least plans should be well-developed; internally coherent; and 
appropriately connecting means to the policy goal that is meant to be achieved. Note that this 
metric of ‘good’ planning is a minimal standard. It is not concerned with evaluating policy 
goals as such: it is concerned with whether the plans are good, not whether the policy as a 
231 
 
whole is a good idea. The metric is also a satisficing rather than a maximizing metric. In other 
words, it looks at whether the plans are likely to give a good solution, not whether they are 
likely to give the best solution. For any given policy problem, several plans might fit this 
criterion, even if some are better than others. However, this being such a ‘low’ standard for 
good policy plans is not a weakness. On the contrary: this minimalist metric should be more 
readily accessible under all circumstances. A minimum standard is not meant to push policy 
and plans to the best they can be; it is meant to understand – and therefore prevent – the 
most egregious failures. 
In evaluating British Iraq policy by this metric, the question is not whether it was the best 
possible policy, with the best possible plans. Rather, the question is whether it was good 
enough. It was not. British Iraq plans failed on all three accounts. The plans were mutually 
incoherent and contradictory. They were incomplete and underdeveloped. They failed to 
provide an answer to the policy goal they were meant to address. The implication of this 
argument is that Britain failed not only because it chose to invade Iraq at all. There was an 
additional, separate mistake: the failure to prepare well. Even those who defend the invasion 
would have to account for this separate failure. And even those who argue that the peace in 
Iraq could not be won anyway, for internal Iraqi reasons, need to contend with British 
internal failures in 2001-2003 before giving the country a pass on its Iraq failure. 
The different failures in London’s war plan are linked to each other, which makes it 
somewhat artificial to discuss them as if they were distinct problems – although it certainly 
highlights the internal inconsistency of the plans and planning. In any case, we have 
discussed individual departments’ preparation and rationales in earlier chapters; here we are 
concerned with evaluating British policy as a whole. A few aspects stand out. There was 
inconsistency in the policy goal that the Ministry of Defence was preparing for: it swayed 
from disarmament to disarmament and stabilisation. The latter would have needed to 
happen with the help of others. To the extent that the Ministry of Defence should have 
prepared stabilisation of post-war Iraq and reconstruction, it did not do so.  
The preparation was mutually contradictory between departments. The general feeling was 
that someone would – or at least should – oversee the post-war effort as a whole, but 
departments diverged in their interpretation of who would be responsible. The Department 
for International Development was also underprepared for the post-war phase, although 
here again, the extent to which it was underprepared depends on one’s reading of how much 
any single department ought to have done. For Whitehall as a whole, the result was that 
Britain was underprepared and misprepared. The plans being unsuitable for the invasion 
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that was happening in March 2003 was something that British politicians either failed to 
understand (probably most of them) or chose to ignore (perhaps some of them).  
Failure to prepare relevant plans: Ministry of Defence 
More so than any other department, the Ministry of Defence was in tune with the Iraq policy 
that the UK government pursued in the end, asthe military needed to focus only on the 
possibility of war (not on the possibility of avoiding war), and prepare accordingly. It did so 
from April 2002 onwards. Nonetheless, its preparation was harmed by the lack of clarity on 
Britain’s policy position. The badly defined policy goal led to half-preparation. Britain’s 
overall desire was to eliminate the risk emanating from the Baghdad regime. Such a broad 
desideratum, of course, needs to be translated into more concrete policy goals. The 
minimalist line taken by the British government was ‘disarmament’: making sure Saddam 
Hussein would no longer possess any weapons of mass destruction (which turned out not to 
be present). This specifically meant that Great Britain would not be pursuing regime change, 
and more generally would not break international law. Regime change could of course be a 
side effect of disarmament. When pushed on Britain’s ambition in Iraq, civil servants and 
politicians across the board have referred to this notion of disarmament and disarmament 
only.  
Except that London also really wanted something best described as ‘disarmament+.’ On the 
one hand, there seems to have been awareness of all the risks and costs of a policy that was 
too broadly defined.1100 On the other hand, disarmament of Saddam Hussein was part of a 
wider vision or hope for Iraq that included bringing it back into the international community, 
making it democratic, having it respect human rights, including minority and women’s rights, 
and making it stable (as if all these features necessarily co-occur). Bringing about such a 
vision would entail a much bigger military commitment and a significantly longer campaign. 
The notion of ‘disarmament only’ is what allowed British politicians to believe that the 
invasion could be mounted in the time frame set up. It also goes together with the idea that 
Britain would be able to draw down shortly after the invasion. Politicians hoped that a big 
contribution in the war-fighting phase – the third package – would avoid them being 
pressured into a larger and more expensive commitment in the post-war phase.1101 However, 
the military top suspected from the beginning that London would be in Iraq for longer than it 
was formally envisaging. Chief of Defence Staff Boyce thought that the Defence Review – 
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which assumed a drawdown to brigade level after six months – was unrealistic for the 
campaign in Iraq. He expected foreign military forces to be needed in Iraq for at least three or 
four years.1102 So although the stated ambition was disarmament and disarmament only, the 
military was not fooled by this. Its personnel understood fully well that after Phase III, Phase 
IV would be coming and it would be at least as problematic as winning the war. The military 
spent a significant amount of time preparing for the post-invasion phase and also pressed the 
topic with its counterpart in the United States.1103  
If the military understood what policy intentions towards Baghdad were likely to actually 
entail, then how does the ambiguity of the stated policy goal matter? Is it not irrelevant if the 
military knew what it should be preparing for? It is not. The ambiguity matters because it is 
precisely this ambiguity that allowed the military to signal readiness in the immediate run-up 
to the war. In the days before the invasion, all British commanders on the ground signalled to 
Commander Robin Brims that their units were ready.1104 In fact, they were ready only for the 
invasion: to get into the country and overthrow Saddam Hussein to search for, secure and 
destroy any weapons of mass destruction. They were not ready for much of what was to 
follow beyond that. Yet because the policy goal was disarmament, the fiction could be 
maintained that the troops were in fact prepared and ready. Had they been forced to judge 
whether they were ready to occupy a country and transform it, they would have been very 
hard-pressed to be as optimistic. 
Of course, the blame here cannot rest solely with the military, even as its ‘can-do’ attitude 
might in this case have been harmful. Just as the military has a professional duty to explain to 
its civilian superiors the limits of its capacities and planning, so too politicians have a duty to 
genuinely inquire and try to understand what the military is ready for – and what it is not 
ready for. The point is a different one: with less ambiguity about the policy goal, it would 
have been more difficult for Armed Forces and politicians to agree that the military was 
ready to enact British policy in Iraq. With a more explicit understanding that minimal 
requirements matter and need to be communicated bottom-up as well as top-down, the 
military could have been much more explicit in signalling to Cabinet what is was ready for 
(the invasion to topple Saddam) and was not ready for (any civilian tasks that would need to 
happen in Phase IV and thereafter; bringing about democracy).  
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Many in military circles have been quick to blame the Department of International 
Development for its alleged attitude problems, its failure to understand military needs, or its 
failure to prepare for the post-invasion phase.1105 There is some justification for that 
(although the military was manifestly even worse at understanding the conditions that the 
Department for International Development works under). Nonetheless, the military cannot 
abdicate all blame for the post-war phase while simultaneously arguing that it ‘spent as many 
hours working on our Phase 4, on aftermath planning, as we did actually on the actual main 
battle plan of winning the war’.1106 In that case, clearly the military thought it had some 
responsibilities for that part of the invasion. Its frantic interlocution with the Americans 
about their lack of Phase 4 planning indicates the same. The Ministry of Defence was 
underprepared. 
Failure to prepare relevant plans: Department for International Development 
All plans of DFID were based on the assumption that the United Nations would be present – 
indeed have a leading role – in post-war Iraq. By necessity, the plans also relied on funding 
coming in through the United Nations, if only because the Treasury was reluctant to release 
money to DFID (it eventually did, but not as much as it released to the military for post-war 
work). These assumptions were not justified. Thus, the plans that relied on them were 
unsuited for the invasion as it happened. DFID’s failure to prepare relevant plans was a direct 
consequence of the preferred alternative being undefined. The department assumed that if 
the Security Council would not agree to invade, the next best option was to abandon 
disarmament rather than the United Nations. As it turned out, the opposite happened. 
Whatever plans had been made for the reconstruction now were not only underdeveloped, 
but also unsuitable. 
Failure to prepare coherent plans: Ministry of Defence and Department for 
International Development 
Whitehall as a whole was underprepared for what needed to happen after the fall of 
Baghdad; but there was also a failure to prepare coherent plans. The Ministry of Defence and 
the Department for International Development, specifically, had conflicting ideas about 
aspects of the planning. These conflicts centred on responsibility for, and timing of, 
reconstruction. As highlighted in Chapter IV, the military expected civilians, notably DFID, to 
start coming in for reconstruction soon after the situation was stabilized. It also felt that the 
department was not doing enough work, both in advance and on the ground. The people of 
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DFID were accused of just staying in their tents, and Clare Short was accused of obstructing 
the war effort.1107 In reality, despite Clare Short indeed being very critical of the 
government’s policy (but not about the idea of removing Saddam Hussein), the department 
had many unrelated difficulties that prevented it from preparing well, and several constraints 
that the military did not understand. 
The Department for International Development suffered from late access to information and 
the war happening much sooner than (it) expected. It also is a very small department with 
limited capacity. DFID was not invited to or informed of the 23 July 2002 meeting at which 
military options were discussed.1108 Its first invitation to a cross-Whitehall meeting was only 
in September 2002. When its Secretary of State Clare Short asked for briefings on the 
progress of military planning, she was habitually rebuffed.1109 The department was banned 
from discussing planning with outside parties until October 2002, when the ban was partially 
lifted.1110 This was also when civil servants discovered that there was virtually no post-war 
plan by the British military or its American counterparts. The magnitude of the planning gap 
became fully clear only in December 2002, when Tim Cross (Ministry of Defence) came to 
DFID to discuss the severity of the problems.1111 Secretary of State Short took the issue up 
with the Prime Minister; Permanent Secretary Chakrabarti did the same with foreign policy 
advisor David Manning.1112 By January 2003, communication and cooperation between the 
Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development improved. 
So the department had to wait six months longer than the Ministry of Defence before it was 
let in on the planning that was going on in other departments. Even then, its staff was 
continuously reassured that the United Nations route would be followed. Quite 
understandably, the civil servants of the department, like their Secretary of State, assumed 
that this meant that war, if it were to happen, was a long time away: the Security Council 
clearly seemed nowhere near authorizing an invasion. Despite not having access to the 
overall policy plan and planning, the department did start planning for a humanitarian 
contingency. Humanitarian crises are a departmental core responsibility for DFID. 
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The department started preparing for a humanitarian emergency in Iraq before it was 
brought into the fold of Whitehall planning. It was interacting discreetly with NGOs and the 
United Nations even when it did not yet have permission to do so.1113 In other words, rather 
than shy away from engaging with the issue of Iraq, the department at that time was trying to 
contribute to policy even before it was asked or allowed to do so. Yet clearly, without a clear 
view on the exact policy that was to be followed, and without permission to use its normal 
channels to prepare for the policy, the department had very limited options. The 
department’s struggle to prepare for the potential humanitarian crisis after an invasion of 
Iraq was thus actively hampered by the fact that there was no clear policy line. Because there 
was no clear position, politicians had to juggle two alternative readings of the policy, and it 
meant that the department had to wait for that to be resolved before it could start preparing 
(although of course the issue never got fully resolved). 
Next, let us consider the issue of the department not preparing (well) for reconstruction. 
Here the impact of the lack of a clear policy position is bigger still. Reconstruction as part of a 
military campaign falls outside its usual responsibilities, much like it falls outside the 
responsibility of the military. Indeed, the Foreign Office was the department that seems to 
have been meant to be responsible for reconstruction. Nonetheless, there was a military 
expectation that DFID’s expertise in this area meant that it would be contributing. However, 
the department itself only discovered in the latter half of 2002 that there was no post-war 
planning. This is when the department became aware of the scope of the Iraq problem and 
began addressing it in earnest, albeit under huge time pressure and while also still working 
on the humanitarian aspects, the core task.  
Clare Short asked for the money necessary for any plans, but the Treasury was consistently 
unwilling to give it.1114 DFID was meant to take money out of its own budget (and indeed 
ended up spending most of its emergency budget on Iraq), but of course this did not work for 
reconstruction.1115 For one, using the money meant for poverty relief on rebuilding Iraq into 
a democracy meant flouting the departmental mission and metric by which money is 
allocated; secondly, the sums needed for reconstruction were orders of magnitude bigger 
than the department’s budget. A further problem was that the department not only made 
limited plans; the plans it made were also based on wrong assumptions, and thus unsuitable 
for the invasion as it happened. 
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To be clear, not all the friction between the military and Clare Short was caused by a lack of 
preferred alternative and minimal requirements. Personalities played a role, as did the lack 
of understanding of the constraints of the other department (mostly the military’s failure or 
refusal to understand DFID’s mission and departmental structure).1116 However, the 
undefined policy position exacerbated these problems. For the military, the preferred 
alternative was not very relevant: it prepared only for the war that would overthrow Saddam 
Hussein (and, with limited output, it spent time on the post-war phase). If the war would not 
happen, the military would not have to fight it, but that did not change much in terms of their 
preparation.  
Those doing the planning – military men, not the civilian heads of the Ministry of Defence – 
were unconcerned with politics. For DFID, clarity about the preferred alternative was crucial. 
The political fight mattered a lot more, not only to Clare Short, but also to the department’s 
capacity for preparation. The military had little understanding. A clearer policy position 
would have prevented the lack of clarity and mispreparation of the department. It would 
have also brought political tensions and the policy discussion to head a lot earlier, which 
regardless of the outcome would have been better for clear and appropriate planning. It is 
possible that this would not have been enough to avoid problems between the two 
departments, but it certainly would have provided fewer triggers for annoyance, 
misunderstanding and conflicts. 
Failure to prepare well-developed plans: Ministry of Defence, Department for 
International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Why did the Foreign Office – which ought to have overseen the overall post-war effort1117 – 
not have well-developed plans for the aftermath? The Foreign Office was working on a 
difficult balancing act: it was meant to get Baghdad to disarm peacefully, a goal that always 
seemed highly unlikely. At the same time, because that seemed so unlikely, the Foreign Office 
was busy creating circumstances under which Saddam Hussein could be disarmed: a united 
                                                             
1116 Chakrabarti, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 8 December 2009”, 39. 
1117 Macpherson, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry: HM Treasury Involvement in Iraq”, 7. 
Buck, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry”, 3. 
Kernaghan, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry”, 5. 
Sawers, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 10 December 2009”, 19 
Jackson, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 28 July 2010”, 25. 
Brown, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 5 March 2010”, 99. 
Torpy, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 18 January 2011”, 45. 
Pattison, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 31 January 2011 (Morning Session)”, 106. 
Straw, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 2 February 2011”, 49. 
White, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 21 July 2010”, 34. 
Kernaghan, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 23 July 2010”, 17. 
238 
 
Security Council willing to invade. Yet the Security Council would only be convinced if the 
United States and Britain did not look intent on going to war. Only by February 2003 did the 
Foreign Office set up the cross-Whitehall Iraq Planning/Policy Unit. The unit – ‘too little too 
late’ - was ‘quickly overwhelmed’ and hit by ‘chaos, lack of coherent planning and a chorus of 
competing voices.’1118 In other words, the Foreign Office failed to prepare well because it did 
not have enough time and manpower.  
It did not have enough time and capacity for two reasons. First, it spent (too) much time 
navigating an unclear policy and dealing with the fact that it was unclear. The lack of single 
policy position meant that the Foreign Office found it hard to speak with one united and 
authoritative voice. The British Prime Minister would have been sending radically different 
messages to Washington. The lack of clearly articulated minimal requirements in the 
negotiating position of London with its trans-Atlantic partner equally meant that Foreign 
Office officials wasted a lot of time re-negotiating conditions and pleading for elements they 
should have been able to take for granted. Negotiation capital, time and effort was wasted 
because of the badly developed preferred alternative and lacking corresponding minimal 
requirements.  
Second, the timing was simply too short. This was exacerbated by the fact that the Iraq 
Planning Unit was set up only in February 2003, but of course the real drama was that the 
invasion happened so soon afterward. If Britain had been clearer on its minimal 
requirements, it would not have invaded without a plan. It might have had a good chance of 
either postponing the invasion or of simply not participating in March 2003. Yet because of 
the lack of a clear policy position, the worst of two worlds happened: the Foreign Office was 
not prepared because of all the time wasted as a result of not having a clear position. At the 
same time, also because it did not have a clear position, London did not pull out of the war. 
So, with its lack of preferred alternative and minimal requirements, London both pressurised 
itself into attacking Baghdad and made sure it was not ready to do so.  
Failure to appreciate the limitations of the preparation: Political understandings of the 
plans 
Lastly, let us consider the bottom-up process. As explained in the last section, limitations to 
foreign policy are not only the result of choices made by the political top. They are also the 
result of planning, both in the long and in the short term. In the long term, budget allocations, 
                                                             
1118 Pattison, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry”, 14. 
Cross, “Witness Statement to the Iraq Inquiry: ‘Post-Invasion Iraq: The Planning and the Reality After 
the Invasion From Mid-2002 to the End of August 2003.’”, 14. 
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built up expertise, the structure of Whitehall itself… all impact policy choices. A military 
specialised in reconstruction would do very differently than a pure fighting force. The choice 
to bundle development expertise into one department that has the specific duty to use that 
expertise to combat poverty matters too for the culture and further use of the people and 
expertise in that department. In the short term, too, plans and planning matter. If a 
department is tasked with the preparation for a humanitarian crisis, its preparation will 
impact what can happen on the ground. Is the focus on epidemics or on the provision of clean 
water? Is there an action plan to combat forced prostitution in refugee camps or is the focus 
on education? Where time and money are limited, those priorities amount to real choices and 
policy differences. 
It is therefore important that politicians be aware of the policy choices and limitations that 
follow from the plans prepared by the Civil Service. It is also important that they understand 
the assumptions on which planning is based, so that they can evaluate whether the plans can 
withstand a change of policy. In the case of the Iraq invasion, this was clearly not the case. 
The plans, as prepared by all departments, could not withstand a change to invasion without 
the Security Council (they would likely have been able to withstand a change to the Security 
Council without the invasion). They were not good enough for an invasion as early as March 
2003. Yet these limitations did not influence politicians’ considerations much, it seems. They 
certainly did not change policy.  
What would it have looked like for the departments to communicate the minimal 
requirements in the policy plans? How could this have helped foreign policy-making? 
Perhaps some people would argue that it is impossible to communicate all the conditions 
that underlie policy plans. However, a preferred alternative and minimal requirements are 
helpful in this precisely because they communicate which conditions ought to be 
communicated. For example, if the Department for International Development had known 
that Britain would be willing to go to war without the genuine support of the Security Council 
and the wider United Nations, it would have been much easier for the department to 
understand that it ought to warn politicians that the plans can only work with the United 
Nations.  
Having a preferred alternative also streamlines the preparation and execution of policies by 
putting everyone on the same page; by better using departments’ expertise; by improving the 
recognition and thereby possibilities for communication of the most relevant information 
from government to civil service and vice versa. Civil servants need to understand the limits 
of decisions, because they have knowledge that the people at the top do not have. Only when 
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they know what is and is not perceived as a minimal requirement at the top, can they (a) plan 
accordingly and (b) point out if any intrinsic minimal requirements follow from the planning 
and warn their political heads of this.  
5. CONCLUSION  
Consider the following brief questionnaire. What would you answer? What would have been 
the answers of the Prime Minister, his confidantes, the Secretaries of State, and the 
Permanent Secretaries of the departments working on Iraq throughout 2002 and 2003? 
1. By invading Iraq, does the British government want to achieve 
…? 
(a) disarmament 
(b) regime change 
(c) stability in the Middle East 
(d) a reduction of the risk of terrorism to the United 
Kingdom  
(e) a better human rights situation for the Iraqi people 
(f) democracy in Iraq 
(g) all of the above 
2. Tick all that apply. Britain would not go to war if 
o it is illegal 
o the Security Council disagrees/there is no legitimacy 
o the United Nations do not get a lead role in the post-
invasion phase 
o there is no ‘winning concept’/clear plan 
o there is no clear plan that matches the end goal 
3. If the disarmament of Baghdad, with the support of the 
Security Council, is not achievable, what is London’s preferred 
choice?  
(a) disarmament without the Security Council  
(b) the Security Council without disarmament 
 
The questions above cannot be answered with certainty. That is problematic. It shows that 
Britain’s 2001-2003 Iraq policy was marred by uncertainty about key aspects: the policy 
goal, the preferred alternative to a negotiated agreement with the Security Council and the 
United States, and minimal requirements. As argued in this chapter and throughout the 
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dissertation, that failure to have a clear policy position resulted in London invading Iraq 
without well-developed, suitable plans for the phase after the removal of the old regime.  
Not having a clear policy position meant trouble in two distinct ways which exacerbates each 
other. First, it harmed London’s negotiations on the international scene. This dissertation has 
focused on how that damaged its negotiations with the United States, but the argument can 
be extended to Britain’s botched negotiations with other members of the Security Council. 
Without a clear and well-developed alternative, London policy-makers could not know when 
to push and when to fold during negotiations. The negotiations went badly: British conditions 
were not fulfilled but the country’s analysis of the Baghdad problem remained the same. 
Without fully defined policy position, policy makers had no metric to know whether they 
should change their policy or not. No defined alternative has been prepared for, practically or 
mentally. Unsurprisingly, London ended up going with the option that looked closest to what 
it had prepared, even though an invasion was now happening under conditions that would 
have previously been deemed unacceptable. 
Second, the uncertainty and misunderstandings reverberated through the Civil Service 
departments responsible for preparing the plans. As a result, their plans were mutually 
contradictory, underdeveloped, and unsuitable for the circumstances under which the 
invasion happened. Plans ought to be internally coherent, well-developed, and logically 
related to – appropriate for – the issue they are addressing. The Ministry of Defence’s plan 
was not completely appropriate for the wider policy goal of stabilizing Iraq because it related 
only to the policy goal as defined more narrowly, which was disarmament. The plans of the 
Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence contradicted each 
other on the timing of civilian contributions to the military campaign. This was because the 
departments had different interpretations of London’s preferred alternative and minimal 
requirements. The plans were underdeveloped, not least because Britain went to war earlier 
than it wanted to. The Foreign Office also lost much time and capacity on fruitless negotiation 
with the Americans, trying to compensate for a lack of clear conditions. The Department for 
International Development’s plans were to a significant extent irrelevant, again because they 
were based on the false premises of an undefined policy position. Politicians failed to 
appreciate the limits in Whitehall’s plans. 
In one sentence, then, the failure to have a clear policy position led to the following 
problematic combination of problems: it made Britain less ready to fight this war, and it 
made it more likely to fight it. In other words, it was the root cause of two types of problems 
that together were the worst of both worlds. This analysis of London’s Iraq policy failure 
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addresses the central research question set out in the introduction (why was London 
seemingly unprepared for the conflict in Iraq, which it chose to pursue?). It also makes a 
wider argument. In arguing that London failed in 2002-2003 because of the lack of policy 
position, it draws attention to the concept and importance of policy positions. This 
dissertation has argued that politicians should not merely consider their goals and strategies 
when making foreign policy. In addition, a preferred alternative and minimal requirements 
should be constructed equally carefully. This is an important safeguard once policy goes 
completely off track; but it is also an important safeguard to prevent policy going off track.  
The idea that a best alternative to a negotiated agreement is helpful both as a back-up plan 
and to help initial negotiations was launched by the Harvard Negotiation Project in the late 
1970s. This chapter has argued that the insight of the Negotiation Project applies to 
governments too; but crucially, preferred alternatives and their corresponding minimal 
requirements have additional benefits in government. Governments and the civil services 
implementing their policies are a collage of minds. In such circumstances, preferred 
alternatives and minimal requirements are an easy heuristic to keep everyone on the same 
page and reduce both purposeful and accidental divergence from the shared policy line. It 
should – and quite easily can – be widely implemented. 
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Conclusion: Failure to Prepare Well 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This conclusion consists of four sections. The first is a brief summary of the findings. The 
focus here is naturally on the three empirical chapters (III-V) and the chapter analysing this 
narrative of the war (IV), that draws together the argument that runs through the 
dissertation as a whole. These empirical chapters cover how decisions-makers decided on 
war; how civil service departments subsequently prepared for war; and how the execution of 
those plans unfolded once the British had crossed the Iraqi border alongside their American 
counterparts. Overall, it answers the research question laid out in the introduction: how did 
it come about that the British government seemingly failed to prepare for a war of choice, 
when the Prime Minister seemed to attach so much importance to this invasion? It does so by 
showing how the lack of clarity about policy preferences – most notably about the minimal 
requirements and preferred alternative – led departments to misprepare for the conditions 
under which it might have to go war. Interdepartmental misunderstandings and unjustified 
assumptions did not help. The overall picture is one of a multifaceted failure to pursue and 
implement the policy that the government tried to set.  
Next, three (types of) implications of this argument are discussed. The first is that we must 
distinguish more clearly between determining a foreign policy, implementing it, and selling it. 
By analysing the gap between determination and realisation of policy, this dissertation also 
ends up highlighting the difference between how the policy was set and how it was sold in, 
and told by, the press (and much of the early Iraq literature, which exhibited the same bias). 
The second is that what happened in the lead-up to the war must be understood as 
mispreparation as well as underpreparation. Thirdly, the role of various key actors is re-
evaluated. Tony Blair, I argue, is both less and more of an explanation of what happened. 
Less, because the problem was not so much what he proposed as the friction between those 
ideas and what Whitehall assumed would happen. More, because this had deeper 
repercussions than is usually analysed. Furthermore, the military’s can-do attitude is 
highlighted as a source of problems; so is the absence of the Cabinet Office. 
The third part summarizes how the concepts of the preferred alternative and minimal 
requirements can lead to new understandings about the foreign policy-making process. What 
is stressed here is that the preferred alternative has not only the benefits of the ‘best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement’ from which it is derived; is has further, additional 
benefits for the large organisations trying to coordinate and realise policy. This argument is 
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constructed as a common-sense prudential guideline. The case of Britain’s 2001-2003 Iraq 
policy is examined following this guideline and, as a near ideal-type example of the failures 
that can occur without a clear preferred alternative and minimal requirements, highlights the 
ways in which the absence of a clear preferred alternative can harm policy. Of course, the 
specific ways in which this plays out are a matter of contingency; not every other policy case 
will play out in the exact same way as Iraq policy between 2001 and 2003. 
The link between the new conceptual lens presented in chapter II and the case study 
analysed in chapter VI is also discussed in the next section, ‘limitations,’ where I stress this is 
not an inductive case study that aims to generalise on the basis of this dissertation’s 
examination of the Iraq war. I discuss the possibility of interviews and the consequences of 
not having grown up in the United Kingdom, which made the Iraq war a truly foreign case 
study; I also discuss to what extent a topic that is 15 years old remains relevant today for 
research. In the conclusion, I briefly summarize the main argumentative steps on which this 
dissertation was build, and how each contributed to the general argument. 
2. FINDINGS  
Let us start this conclusion of the dissertation with a brief summary of its reading of the 
2001-2003 period and how this understanding of that period answers the research question 
of Britain’s failure to prepare well. In the early noughties, the United Kingdom was reviewing 
its Iraq policy. The policy of containment on the basis of sanctions, no-fly zones, and 
incentives to get weapon inspectors into Iraq, was seen to be ‘failing and the rate of failure 
[is] accelerating.’1119 The British were therefore floating the idea of more targeted, so-called 
‘smarter sanctions,’ which would command larger international support (as their precision 
would better spare the population) and prove more effective. 
However, after 9/11 the United States’ administration started concentrating more on foreign 
affairs and it reviewed its Iraq policy. The internal balance of the Bush administration shifted 
away from the more moderate State Department to the rather more belligerent policy hawks 
concentrated mainly in the Pentagon and (around) the Vice-Presidency. Thus, while 
international consensus on Afghanistan had been relatively easy to find, for Iraq the British 
government soon saw itself confronted with a dilemma: to what extent should it offer 
support to a United States administration potentially interested in war with Iraq, and if it 
should offer support, under what conditions? 
                                                             
1119 Webb et al., “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 24 November 2009”, 65-66. 
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The answer that emerged in documents from the Foreign Office, which was reviewing Iraq 
policy under strong impulse from the Prime Minister, was that Britain might support the 
United States in a quest to disarm Iraq, potentially up to the use of force, if a number of 
conditions could be fulfilled: the UN route needed to be ‘exhausted’; there needed to be 
progress in the Middle East Peace Process (what that entailed was rather unclear); and the 
public (both domestically and in the Middle East) needed to be informed and ideally 
convinced of the merits of the case.1120 Yet as time went on, it became clear that many of 
those conditions would be unobtainable. Moreover, it became clear that Britain’s primary 
aim – disarming Saddam Hussein with the cooperation of the Security Council, through the 
threat or use of force – would not be achieved. 
This brought to a head the question of Britain’s best alternative to disarmament via the 
Security Council. The Foreign Office and much of Cabinet had presumed that London would 
not (be able to) participate in an invasion that was not backed explicitly by the Security 
Council and its members. For the Prime Minister, by contrast, the preferred alternative was 
disarmament without Security Council support, if this would prove at all feasible (and it 
proved feasible only because of the remarkable change of heart on the part of the Attorney 
General). As we know now, the Prime Minister’s view prevailed and Britain went to war 
under circumstances that would have previously been deemed unacceptable. 
That is not to say that the Prime Minister’s view was completely implemented and the 
alternative view – in which London would have not gone to war without the genuine support 
of the Security Council, amongst other conditions – was completely swept aside. On the 
contrary: as shown in chapter IV, by the time that political decision was taken, much 
preparation had already happened in the various government departments – and this 
preparation had oftentimes been done on the presumption that the ‘preconditions’ that were 
originally set by London would actually be fulfilled before a British invasion would happen. 
Indeed, the plans of various government departments relied on those conditions. 
The British Armed Forces had two major expectations that did not come true. The first was 
the expectation that in the post-war phase, other actors, including DFID and the international 
community, would start picking up the bill for the reconstruction of Iraq. The other was the 
expectation that other international troops would start coming in after the conflict, allowing 
London to draw down relatively quickly (although perhaps not within the six months 
                                                             
1120 Meyer, “Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry, 26 November 2009”, 63-64. 
Chaplin, “Note: ‘Iraq: Military Action.’” 
Straw, “Letter to the Prime Minister: ‘Iraq: Contingency Planning.’” 
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assumed in the Strategic Defence Review). The Department for International Development, 
meanwhile, had started planning relatively late. It was hampered by lack of clarity on the 
timeline involved and by an initial interdiction of planning with outside partners. However, 
the department’s usual working method was through other agencies, by inserting money and 
expertise into the international system and coordinating and liaising with other institutions. 
Cooperation with others and the involvement of the United Nations were not just desiderata 
of DFID’s Clare Short: they were necessities if the DFID plans were to work. 
The Foreign Office suffered from the lack of clarity about the preferred alternative in a 
slightly different way. It expended much time and energy trying to avoid a road that would 
lead to military action, particularly prior to September 2002; after that, its focus shifted to 
negotiating favourable conditions. This meant that it lacked bandwidth to prepare for the 
actual eventuality of the invasion itself. Similarly, the Foreign Office had become the policy 
lead on reconstruction but failed to prepare much. Its Iraq Policy Unit and the Iraq 
Directorate similarly failed to achieve much. The fact that these coordination mechanisms 
were in the FCO, meanwhile, is indicative of the role the Cabinet Office played: just like 
Cabinet itself, it was virtually missing from the preparation of Iraq policy. The British 
government was not unaware of the problems in the preparation for the war – although it 
might have not understood the particularities and the details. They were repeatedly flagged 
up. Yet, despite that, Cabinet acquiesced in the decision to invade.  
Once Baghdad was successfully toppled, the reality of the badly prepared and unsuitable 
plans set in. The military was without civilian support in the weeks after the invasion, 
compelled to do many activities it had not planned for and did not have the expertise for. The 
timing of the war and its speed somewhat surprised DFID. The department struggled to 
cooperate with the American civilians in Iraq. The department also struggled with the lack of 
resources and without the partner it had expected: the United Nations. Other countries were 
slow to come in and contribute to the American-British presence in Iraq. 
Precisely how the weak circumstances in which the (post-)invasion happened might have 
contributed to the insurgencies that soon emerged, falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
The metric by which I judge the success of the plans, is whether they were appropriate, 
coherent, well-developed – not whether the conflict was won. The point here is that the 
British had gone to war with plans that did not match the circumstances in which they were 
deployed; this mismatch can be traced back to the Britain had about its preferred alternative 
if the first pursued policy of disarmament via the Security Council were to fail. This unclarity 
led to some departments, in the meantime, making plans based on wrong assumptions; to 
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departments having mismatched expectations of each other (MOD and DFID); to the FCO not 
having the space to prepare for the invasion and the post-war phase itself. This lack of clarity 
also hampered British policy-makers when they decided to go to war under conditions they 
would have previously deemed unacceptable: as Britain had effectively negotiated itself into 
a corner, it had no clear of view of what alternatives it had beyond that which looked most 
like the original policy. 
How does all this answer the research puzzle laid out in Chapter I? This dissertation aimed to 
illuminate the curious failure of the British government to prepare well for an invasion of its 
choice. This failure is curious precisely because the government chose to go to war with Iraq 
and could have easily (at least in the earlier stages of the run-up to March 2003) decided not 
to join the United States in its attack on Baghdad. Indeed, the British government joining the 
invasion was in itself a subject that has given rise to much examination because in many 
ways, it was a breach with foreign policy as traditionally pursued by the British state, by 
Labour, and even, in some senses, by the New Labour government of Tony Blair, with its 
penchant for a strong, united international community.  
That is not to say that the decision to invade did not show elements of continuity: as many 
have commented, it did. In many senses, the challenge posed by Iraq fitted the Prime Minister 
and his frame of thought, as established at length in chapter I. But portraying the invasion of 
Iraq as an obvious default choice for the British government in 2002 would clearly be a 
stretch. This is precisely why it is curious that London also seemed badly prepared for the 
invasion. Why would a Prime Minister be willing to put his government on the line, but not 
ensure that the policy can actually be a success?  
If readings of the Iraq war can generally be divided into stories of cover-ups and stories of 
mess-ups, this dissertation clearly falls on the side that interprets British Iraq policy as the 
second type of story. However, the story it sketches is not one of personal deficits of the 
Prime Minister to explain the failure to prepare well. Instead, there was a structural failure to 
prepare well. This failure to prepare appropriately has been traced back to the lack of a 
clearly defined, unified policy position. Britain in effect prepared (badly) for one scenario and 
then executed the other. It is unlikely to the civil service or government at the time fully 
understood the extent to which this gap between the two ‘alternatives’ caused Britain to be 
misprepared – indeed, even in their testimony to the Iraq Inquiry witnesses suggest the 
country was underprepared, simply not ready, rather than also wrongly prepared. However, 
a systematic analysis of the various departments preparing Britain’s 2001-2003 Iraq policy 
shows the importance of this factor. 
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3. IMPLICATIONS  
This dissertation contributes some answers to long-standing issues in the academic debate 
on the British involvement in the Iraq war; it also addresses issues that had not received 
enough attention, most importantly the pan-Whitehall view of policy realization. How does 
the work done in this PhD change, enhance, or nuance our understanding of the lead-up to 
the war? I will touch on three main implications of this dissertation here. The first is the 
difference between determining, implementing, and selling policy. Too often, the story of how 
the Iraq invasion was sold to the British public has been conflated with the narrative of how 
actual policy was made. As for the determination and implementation of policy, not enough 
attention has been given to the gap between a stated policy and the execution of that policy. 
The second implication of this thesis is that London not only underprepared; it also 
misprepared for the invasion. Mispreparation is a different type of problem that is unlikely to 
be solved by simply more time. The third discussion centres on various actors in this foreign 
policy episode and how their role must be evaluated. 
Difference between determining, implementing, and selling policy 
This picture painted here of the lead-up to the war focused not only on the political decision-
making process and on the main political actors involved; nor did it focus (almost) 
exclusively on the preparation done by the military. Its focus on the interaction between 
politics and civil service, between ambitions and the practical enactment of those ambitions, 
highlighted the gap that can exist between those. It calls for a more systematic examination of 
such a gap, both in other instances of foreign policy and in further research about the British 
participation in the war in Iraq. Too often so far, British failure in Iraq has been attributed 
squarely to the decision of war itself. This obfuscates the fact that many of the problems 
Britain experienced in the lead-up to the invasion, which in turn led it to be badly prepared 
when that invasion took place, were not in fact problems that resulted from the idea of war 
itself, but rather from the way in which that decision was reached, and more precisely, the 
way in which the political decision-making process impacted the practical preparation for 
any policy. 
But this dissertation, by tracing in great detail de intra- and interdepartmental preparation 
for war, indirectly has another implication as well: that the story of how the war was made, 
differs from the way in which the war was sold. The selling of the Iraq war is a subject of its 
own right; one that perhaps has received more attention that the actual policy-making 
process itself (especially in the sense that early works on the events based themselves in no 
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small extent on reports in the press and were strongly influenced by the dynamic of how the 
war was sold). A more systematic process on what policy-makers were doing, helps to 
distinguish between those dynamics. One can observe, for example, the dearth of references 
to Alastair Campbell in this work. This is not because he was not a key figure in the Blair 
government and indeed in the wider Iraq story; however, his role in determining the policy, 
as opposed to selling it, was rather more limited. 
Mispreparation, not merely underpreparation 
This focus on the plans made by Whitehall also allows us to better understand the nature of 
Britain’s planning failure. It is well understood that the British (like the Americans) were 
underprepared for the task that awaited them in spring 2003, This comes as no surprise, 
given the enormity of the task before them and the time pressure they were under (although 
it must be stressed that the time pressure seemed to come at least partly from the American 
military). Less well understood, perhaps, is the extent to which Britain misprepared. It is not 
just that the preparations that were made were not sufficient; part of the problem was the 
much preparation was either irrelevant, because it was conceived for execution under 
circumstances which ended up not happening, or internally contradictory, notably because of 
interdepartmental misassumptions about each other’s role, duties, and capabilities.  
This matters because there is a narrative that suggests that Britain was set up for failure right 
from the beginning of the attack on Baghdad because lack of time did not allow for proper 
preparation. If, by contrast, part of the problem was not simply the underpreparation for the 
war, but also the mispreparation, then it is not obvious that more time would have been 
sufficient to mitigate those harms. Rather, what was needed was more clarity at an earlier 
stage about the preferred alternative; about the conditions under which departments could 
expect the invasion to be waged; and the role and responsibilities of each part of government 
and civil service within this context. More time might of course have helped for certain 
aspects of the policy (and certainly there was underpreparation as well as mispreparation); 
but mispreparation is a fundamentally different problem from mere lack of preparation. 
The role of various actors 
A new examination of the Iraq episode will inevitably entail a new interpretation of the role 
various actors played. This dissertation is no exception. I will highlight only a few aspects 
here. The first person under examination must perhaps be the Prime Minister. Does this 
dissertation change our understanding of his role in the conflict? In many senses, this 
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dissertation confirms the picture sketched by journalists, biographers, and academics – 
unsurprisingly, as the focus was not on Tony Blair. He emerges here like elsewhere as the 
driver of British Iraq policy who pushed it in new directions that were nonetheless consistent 
with earlier features of his government and his personality.  
However, this dissertation does stress that one Prime Minister doth not a policy make and 
while other authors have stressed this before, they mostly examined the structural features 
the shaped the Prime Minister’s views and the environment in which he could make policy. 
This dissertation, by contrast, does not aim to explain why Blair did what he did. Rather, it 
stresses that the Iraq preparation failure can only be properly understood by looking at the 
difference between Tony Blair’s view on Iraq policy and the assumptions of others. It is this 
friction rather than the Prime Minister’s pursued policy in and of itself that explains much of 
the dynamic in Whitehall. Crucially, this friction mattered not only in the process of 
determining UK policy; it had important ramifications for the process and outcomes of 
realizing and implementing that policy. 
This means Tony Blair’s role was both more limited and more far-reaching than could be 
assumed without looking at the implementation phase. It was more limited in the sense that 
the policy preparation that was done, was not a realistic reflexion of what Tony Blair was 
arguing for. It was a hybrid and many of the problems stemmed precisely from this hybridity. 
On the other hand, however, examining the civil service working in the period between 
September 2001 and March 2003 brings to light the depth and severity of the consequences 
of Tony Blair’s Iraq policy. Not only did his drive, in many senses so incompatible with British 
habits and the value more usually attached to international law, impact the policy-making 
process, and send British troops into Iraq. The way in which he pushed this view also made it 
substantially more difficult to prepare well for this challenge. In other words, one might quip 
that he was worsening problems that without him would not have existed in the first place. 
The role of the military, too, deserves a critical look. The women and men that were sent to 
Iraq were widely perceived as having been treated unfairly by politicians who made 
unreasonable decisions and demands. At the same time, the military itself signalled its 
readiness to take on the war in Iraq, conflating a short-term goal of toppling the regime with 
a long-term goal of stability. It was not prepared for the latter, despite the latter ostensibly 
being a part of its goals. Professional armed forces must accept civilian authority; however, 
they also have a professional responsibility to at least signal the limits of their capacity 
expressly, as well as a professional responsibility to signal the impossibility of plans as they 
are on the table. The military’s can-do attitude, much admired, cannot absolve it of its 
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professional obligation to serve its civilian superiors not only by obedience, but by clear 
communication about its realistic capacity to do what is asked of it. 
This dissertation also highlights that the participation of political actors matters not only for 
those actors to be present, but also so that the organisations that support those actors are 
present. The replacement of Cabinet by a sofa government not only mattered because it 
bypassed Cabinet as a decision-making institution of British politics. It also impacted Iraq 
policy by taking the Cabinet Office out of the picture. This vanishing Cabinet Office failed to 
coordinate policy; the task subsequently fell to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but 
the FCO was already overstretched in its pursuit of an Iraq policy on the basis of unclear 
minimal requirements and with no clear plan-B. Likewise, the involvement of the United 
Nations was crucial not only for the political legitimacy it would bring, but for the structures 
and expertise it would bring. Without the United Nations to partner with, DFID struggled to 
find a suitable partner and to be able to do its normal work. 
4. NEW UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 
This dissertation introduced a new lens to analyse and make foreign policy: a lens which 
considers not only the policy goal and strategy of any given policy but demands a preferred 
alternative to that chosen course and the corresponding minimal requirements for 
maintaining the policy that was originally set out. Policy-makers benefit from determining 
their preferred alternative and their minimal requirements because they need a clear idea of 
the circumstances under which they ought to abandon their charted policy course and 
considering the preferred alternative is the best way of determining what those minimal 
requirements should be. This argument is a variation and elaboration on the concept of the 
‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’, or BATNA, initially put forward by Ury and 
Fisher in the Harvard Negotiation Project. 
There are two types of benefits that policy-makers derive from this lens. The first type are all 
the benefits that Fisher and Ury already associated with the good use of a BATNA: it gives you 
a clear standard against which to compare the policy you are currently pursuing to assess its 
merit. A BATNA prevents people from being overly optimistic or pessimistic about the 
outcomes of a (implicit) negotiation – and virtually all interactions in the foreign policy realm 
are some form of negotiation – and thus gives them a more level-headed view of their 
options. BATNAs can also improve one’s negotiation position by providing a clear, 
implementable alternative as they nudge parties to consider and develop those.  
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The second type of benefit accrues to large organizations using a preferred alternative. Such 
a defined preferred alternative to the policy that is being pursued is an efficient short-cut 
way to understand and convey to all involved the limits of the policy and the priorities that 
underlie it. It can mitigate the risk of accidental policy drift and plans that are incompatible 
between departments as they are based on varying interpretation of the policy that is being 
pursued and the conditions under which it might be enacted. Having the vocabulary of 
preferred alternatives and minimal requirements also makes it easier to highlight and 
discuss these types of problems when they occur: fissures in policy thus become easier to 
spot. 
The original concept of the BATNA as set out by Ury and Fisher is widely used by negotiators 
over the world. The adaptations I made in this dissertation to articulate how and why the 
concept also can be made to work for organizations making foreign policy, with additional 
benefits, is similarly straightforward. Most importantly, it allows analysists and policy-
makers alike to articulate how the absence of certain elements can cause problems. A cursory 
look at the most pressing problem of the current British government – the negotiation of 
Brexit, again a divisive topic both domestically and internationally – suggest that here, too, 
the concept of (the need for) one ‘preferred alternative’ could be useful; indeed, one major 
difference with the Iraq war is that the debate is already being framed in those terms.  
5. LIMITATIONS  
Interviews 
The first and perhaps most straightforward question is that of interviewing people. Indeed, 
except for two relatively informal conversations referred to in this dissertation under 
Chatham House rules, I relied on the testimonies given to the Iraq Inquiry, the documents 
made available through that inquiry, documents and interviews leaked or published in the 
press, and the literature on Iraq (including some autobiographies). I also filed a dozen FOI 
requests, with various levels of success. Certainly, interviews would have enabled me to 
finetune some elements of the dissertation, fill in further gaps in my understanding, and 
allowed me to better read between the lines of the Inquiry and witness testimonies. 
Interviews would have had their own problems. There are the obvious practical 
considerations in trying to set up interviews, in particular with the more important actors. 
This would likely not have been possible. In addition, interviews, especially over a decade 
later and on a subject as sensitive as the invasion of Iraq, might be unlikely to reveal much 
new information; more importantly, they are likely to mislead as well as enlighten. 
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Something is thus to be said for an approach that steps away from the personal, from insight 
into character and motives, to a point where instead the working of the system of the civil 
service and its interaction with political decision-making is studied. 
Relationship between the prudential guideline and the case study 
Chapter II introduces a new argument about the usefulness of preferred alternatives and 
minimal requirements. I claim this argument is generally applicable to (virtually) all foreign-
policy making; yet I discuss only one case in this dissertation. Moreover, the Iraq war was, in 
many ways, an extreme and unusual episode in British foreign policy-making. It must 
therefore be stressed that this dissertation’s prescription about the good sense of having a 
preferred alternative is not derived from its study of the Iraq invasion. Rather, the guideline is 
derived from abstract empirical reasoning. Experience shows that policy-makers cannot 
always predict whether they will be able to achieve their objectives: plan A might fail. The 
wisdom of knowing your preferred alternative in advance has been amply demonstrated by 
Ury and Fisher as well as by those putting their advice in practice; I modify this by 
highlighting further benefits that come from a preferred alternative when this alternative is 
being used by organisations while Ury and Fisher focused on individuals. In other words, my 
prudential guideline is based on Ury and Fisher’s guideline as well as on standard empirical 
assumptions about the world and foreign policy.  
This means that I do not rely on the Iraq case study to demonstrate the validity of my 
proposition. Rather, this case illustrates the actual workings of my argument in one concrete 
case. The guideline does not rely on the specifics of the Iraq case. Nor will the failure to follow 
this prudential rule always manifest itself like it did in 2001-2003. Indeed, the guideline only 
specifies that a lack of well-defined preferred alternative and minimal requirements has a 
propensity to bring about negative consequences. How and how far this propensity will 
impact a particular instance will be a matter of contingency. In the case of the Iraq war, the 
impact was severe. This makes the ‘preferred alternative’ framework a good lens through 
which to understand the Iraq war; the Iraq war, in turn, illuminates the characteristics and 
working of the prudential guideline set out in chapter II. 
Not growing up in the United Kingdom 
I was twelve years old in the period examined in this dissertation. Moreover, I lived in a 
country that is not a part of the English-speaking world, where the possible invasion of Iraq 
was perceived by the wider public – from what I recall – as something to be expected from 
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(the Bush Junior administration of) the United States. The role of the United Kingdom did not 
get much attention; the general latent opinion seemed to be that the British were a ‘light’ 
version of American foreign policy-making. Thus, growing up and in particular after I came to 
the United Kingdom in 2012, I was surprised to discover that the British involvement in the 
war had had a dynamic all of its own; that there were major differences between British and 
American political systems and policy that made the British invasion more puzzling and 
surprising than that of Washington; nor had I understood at the time of the invasion how 
deeply divisive the issue was on this side of the North Sea.  
I thus had both the advantages and the disadvantages of someone who, to a very large extent, 
had not lived the contemporary history she was now studying. The advantage was two-fold. 
The first is a relative lack of preconceived notions about both the British policy-making 
process and British Iraq policy. Examining a political system that is not your own, based on 
procedures and traditions that you do not take for granted, makes it easier to observe events, 
if not with a neutral eye, then at least with a relatively dispassionate eye. The corresponding 
disadvantage, of course, is that one might occasionally lack subtext and unspoken 
assumptions (although the academic literature goes a long way to dispelling this problem). 
Certainly, I have needed a good few biographies and accounts of New Labour politics, British 
politics, and the Anglo-American relationship before grasping many elements of events. In 
my description and understanding of certain side-events not central to this dissertation, 
Nonetheless, I think on balance the benefits compensate the drawbacks. 
The second, more specific advantage was the capacity to distinguish between the process of 
making policy and the process of selling the policy. Conversations with British citizens about 
my subject matter were routinely rerouted to questions that were based on a particular 
understanding from the policy-making process that was based on what had appeared in the 
press in 2002-2003. Certain documents were attributed a disproportionate importance; 
certain moments were widely perceived as ‘gotcha moments’ (in which the Prime Minister 
had ‘revealed’ his ‘true intention’) even when they were not, in their content, moments that 
marked actual policy change. The academic literature, too, exhibits this bias of the first draft 
of history in its choice of topics and focus. This is not to say that the debate on the selling of 
the war, and the potential misleading of the British (and international) public, is 
unimportant. Clearly it is not. But this debate has obfuscated the fact that there is a 
reasonably clear distinction between the story of how policy was made and how policy was 
perceived to have been made. My lack of familiarity with the latter at the beginning of the 




In the political climate of 2017, it seems almost quaint to submit a PhD thesis about the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Nonetheless, the subject remains important in at least two ways. First, the 
story is an important part of recent British foreign policy and remains relevant not only in 
that sense, but in its current consequences to not only the United Kingdom, but to Iraq and 
the wider Middle-Eastern region. As Porter notes: ‘As a transforming event, the Iraq war is 
not over. (…) The overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime helped trigger a longer-term 
process of violent sectarian breakdown in the Middle East, the shattering of the state system 
(…). It left behind many thousands of maimed and wounded survivors.’1121 
Secondly, the episode not only teaches us important lessons about tragedy and human 
fallibility (as others have noted); it also has important implications about governmental 
structural weaknesses in making and implementing decisions. Here, again, what Porter 
considers the essence of the Iraq Inquiry is equally applicable to this dissertation: ‘Beyond 
rumours of the conspiratorial, and the covert, it is about the quality of decisions.’1122 The 
specific angle of this dissertation, rather narrower than the Iraq Inquiry, is that is examines 
the gap between policy ambitions and reality. That gap is made worse by a lack of clear 
thinking about the preferred alternative a government has to any foreign policy is it pursuing 
and the implications of this preferred alternative. This lesson might yet prove valuable to the 
current British government and for current and future policy issues it faces. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation described and analysed Britain’s 2001-2003 Iraq policy, in particular how it 
came about that the British troops and civilians in Iraq seemed unprepared for their tasks. 
The argument is this: the government failed to articulate a clear policy position consisting of 
a policy goal, strategy, preferred alternative, and minimal requirements. This lack of common 
understanding, particularly about the preferred alternative, was the root cause of the 
subsequent problems in Britain’s preparation for the Iraq war. It meant that departments 
and people prepared on the basis of mutually incompatible, unsuitable assumptions. This in 
turn led to plans that were internally contradictory and unsuited for the invasion as it was 
eventually pursued by the British government. The dissertation offers insights both about 
Britain’s 2001-2003 Iraq policy in particular and about wider foreign policy. This conclusion 
                                                             
1121 Porter, “Lest We Forget: Britain’s Iraq Inquiry, and Why It Matters”, 683-684. 
1122 Ibid., 685. 
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is therefore divided into two major questions. What did this dissertation tell us about 
Britain’s 2001-2003 Iraq policy? What does that policy tell us about future policy-making?  
The analysis regarding 2001-2003 Iraq policy has three essential argumentative steps. One, 
Britain found itself in highly undesirable circumstances in Iraq when it had few useful plans 
for the post-war phase, as it discovered almost immediately after major warfighting ceased. 
Two, this was not simply a matter of being underprepared or being caught in difficult 
circumstances. London was also misprepared: the plans Whitehall had made were both 
interdepartmentally contradictory and suitable for different circumstances than those in 
which London eventually invaded. This is a new and more detailed understanding of events. 
It is based on primary research; most of the sources were made available through the Iraq 
Inquiry. Three, it was Britain’s failure to articulate and pursue a clear preferred alternative 
and corresponding minimal requirements that accounted for its predicament. This is a new 
argument about Britain’s Iraq policy. 
The second part of this conclusion recalls how this analysis of British Iraq policy contributes 
to our general understanding of foreign policy-making and thereby to future policy. There are 
four main points here. One, Ury and Fisher introduced the importance of BATNAs in 
negotiations. My examination of the Iraq case reaffirms the importance of this idea in foreign 
policy and demonstrates specific (extra) benefits preferred alternatives have when used by 
organizations like the government. The concept of a preferred alternative and corresponding 
minimal requirements can strengthen several literatures related to foreign policy-making. 
Two, the failure to have a preferred alternative is avoidable. On Iraq policy, it would not have 
been unreasonable to expect Britain to consider a preferred alternative; it is reasonable to 
expect governments can develop preferred alternatives in future foreign policy instances.  
Three, while having a preferred alternative will not guarantee success in future policies (and 
we cannot prove that a preferred alternative would have been enough to ‘save’ British Iraq 
policy), it should be taken seriously in future decision-making because it improves the 
chances of success. The thesis, therefore, has a potentially wider importance for future 
policy-making. Four, there are limitations to this research. The dissertation has put forward a 
prudential guideline and examined it for one particular case. However, the prudential 
guideline only asserts that a failure to have a preferred alternative will lead to a situation 
with a propensity towards failure; the specific details of how this happens will be contingent 
on each case. To get a better sense of the variety of ways in which this prudential rule works, 
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